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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on the difference between narrators and characters in fiction who tell
stories. It also argues that traditional orality persists in American culture and is a significant
influence in the fiction of Mark Twain, William Faulkner and Lee Smith. In their work, they try
to overcome what some perceive as a structural discrimination inherent in the novel and imbue
their characters’ speaking voices with authority that is determined by something other than their
position in the structural hierarchy. All three authors attempt to give their characters speaking
voices which are not necessarily inferior to the narrative or authorial voices in their works. This
dissertation also suggests that the “narrator” has changed over time from a written representation
of an oral storyteller to a literary function which facilitates storytelling. It is therefore
methodologically useful to distinguish between narrators and storytelling characters. Susan
Lanser’s and Stephen Ross’s concepts of voice help differentiate narrators from storytelling
characters and from other voices in literature. By looking at types of storytellers, both narrators
and characters, and the types of voice used by authors to represent them, we see how each type of
voice acquires discursive authority. This work adapts these concepts in order to begin a
discussion of voice in the works of Twain, Faulkner and Smith, and show that each of these
authors attempt to give mimetic voices unusual degrees of authority–both in and outside the
fictive world. This work looks specifically at storytelling events in several of Twain’s short
stories, including “A True Story Repeated Word for Word as I Heard It,” and how experiments
with these characters in his short stories led to the narrative voice in Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn. This is followed by a detailed look at narrators and storytellers in Faulkner’s Absalom,
Absalom! and Smith’s The Devil’s Dream.
iii

INTRODUCTION
WHO’S TELLING THIS STORY?
I’m not much of a storyteller, but I know a good story when I see it. When I write this I’m
not trying to display the kind of modesty Mark Twain showed in “How to Tell a Story” when he
wrote: “I do not claim that I can tell a story as it ought to be told. I only claim to know how a
story ought to be told, for I have been daily in the company of the most expert story-tellers for
many years” (263). The best research available indicates that Twain was at least an above
average storyteller. Unlike Twain, I have had few storytelling models; I was not daily in the
company of even above average storytellers. I’m from a different time and place. The stories I
hold dear and that have helped create and reinforce my value system were not transmitted to me
through face-to-face interaction and could never have been affected by my active participation. I
get the vast majority of my stories from books, television, and movies, and I always have.
For example, one book that was very important to me, one of the first I read on my own,
was a biography of Green Bay Packers’ quarterback Bart Starr. One season, Starr injured a
stomach muscle so severely he couldn’t even stand up straight without pain. He never
complained, and he never quit. He tried his best to help the team despite his injury and despite
the pain. At least that’s how I remember the story. Bart Starr was my hero, and I tried to model
my behavior on his. Like many young American’s of my time I loved football and its heroes. I
felt like I was a part of something larger than me, an ideal past that reached into the present,
something I could be a part of.
In his book, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life,
Robert Bellah argues that the feeling I had was one typical of modern Americans. Many
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Americans form a sense of belonging through communities that are not necessarily organized
around geography or family. Bellah writes:
Communities, in the sense that we are using the term, have a history--in an important
sense they are constituted by their past--and for this reason we can speak of a real
community as a ‘community of memory,’ one that does not forget its past. In order not to
forget that past, a community is involved in re-telling its story, its constitutive narrative,
and in so doing, it offers examples of the men and women who have embodied and
exemplified the meaning of the community. These stories of collective history and
exemplary individuals are an important part of the tradition that is so central to a
community of memory. (153)
That is what makes a community, not geography, family, or economic interdependence,
but memory. Memory is produced and reinforced through retelling of communal stories. Roger
Schank argues that “We are the stories we tell. We not only express our vision of the world, we
also shape our memory by the stories we tell” (170). Barbara Johnstone notes that “shared stories
are the sources of shared notions of truth and appropriateness which bind people together” (126).
As a child I got my stories from the print and electronic media and not from face-to-face
interaction. I saw film of Bart Starr on television, with narration by John Facenda, but in order to
really find out about him I went to the book. There was something special about books. I
remember looking at my father’s bookshelves, which lined the walls of a room in our basement
we actually called the library, and thinking how much they held. Movies and TV were fun and
interesting, but for me, both wisdom and knowledge resided in books.
This faith I had in the power of books as repositories of truth is indicative of the society I
grew up in, one that privileged literacy. M.T. Clanchy writes that “modern literates, including the
author and his readers, are conditioned by their own schooling to believe that literacy is the
measure of progress and that those who use documents less are less civilized” (20). Clanchy
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argues that this privileging of literacy is misguided; “it is language itself which forms mentalities,
not literacy. Writing is one of the means by which encoded language is communicated; it can
never be more than that” (9).
Though he doesn’t privilege literacy, Walter Ong argues that writing does help form
mentalities. In his book, Orality and Literacy, he argues there is an “oral mindset” that is
fundamentally different than the mindset of individuals and cultures that have “interiorized
literacy,” that is, have made the technology of writing intrinsic to their way of life. Even in
literate cultures, however, oral modes of thought can survive, and in some subcultures they
remain the fundamental way people engage reality, regardless of their use of writing. Ong
alternatively calls these groups–that are aware of writing, or use the technologies of writing, and
yet retain characteristics of orality–“verbomotor cultures” or ones with “oral residue” (68).
Tex Sample uses the term “traditional orality” instead and argues that a large number of
Americans still engage the world in a manner that is in many significant ways “oral”: “about half
of the people in the United States are people who work primarily out of a traditional orality, by
which I mean a people who can read and write–though some cannot–but whose appropriation and
engagement with life is oral” (6). Whatever the percentage, oral modes of thought persist even
though literate modes have gained a dominant position. The word ‘literature’ is itself a testament
to how writing is a culturally privileged medium for the artistic use of language. I will explore
the idea of traditional orality in more depth in the first chapter. Now I want only to underline the
importance of storytelling as a way of forming and maintaining communities, and how the
authority of oral storytellers is the local communal tradition while a novelist’s authority comes
from a different one.
3

In The Nature of Narrative, Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg write: “by narrative we
mean all those literary works which are distinguished by two characteristics: the presence of a
story and a story-teller” (4). Many scholars have defined the novel by beginning with oral
storytelling, but this model may well be outmoded. Though the precursors of the novel spring
from oral traditions, the novel is very much a creation of the technology of print. Mikhail Bakhtin
writes that all written genres except the novel “or in any case their defining features, are
considerably older than written language and the book, and to the present day they retain their
ancient oral and auditory characteristics. Of all the major genres only the novel is younger than
writing and the book” (The Dialogic Imagination 3). Originally, written stories were an unironic
attempt at the transcription, replication, and representation of oral storytelling. The authority for
tellers of traditional tales comes from the tradition itself and from the individual teller’s
familiarity with, and mastery of, the tradition. Over time the figure of the storyteller was replaced
by those of the narrator and the author, and the figure of the author has become one of an
individual who is the source of authority, through knowledge and mastery of the written tradition.
This idea of the author is a creation of the literate tradition, as is the novel. Ong writes that “the
novel is clearly a print genre, deeply interior, de-heroicized, and tending strongly to irony” (159).
Walter Benjamin writes that the novel is different from “all other forms of prose literature” in
that:
it neither comes from oral tradition nor goes into it. This distinguishes it from storytelling
in particular. The storyteller takes what he tells from experience of his own or that
reported by others. And he in turn makes it the experience of those who are listening to
his tale. The novelist has isolated himself. The birthplace of the novel is the solitary
individual. (87)
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Benjamin suggests here that the novelist is estranged from the community and cannot
pass on the wisdom of the storyteller, in part because he himself is uncounseled. The only
community the novelist is a part of is one of tenuously connected, solitary individuals.The novel
is the most written of literatures. It is the type of storytelling furthest removed from storytelling.
It is the type of literature that developed because of the technologies of writing and print and
through separation from the oral tradition, and it is not the shared living experience that
storytelling is. This sense of shared communal experience that storytelling engenders is very
important in the formation of group identity, on all levels of society. What if a novelist wants to
show the wisdom of the storyteller? How can someone use the most literate of genres to
represent orality? Mark Twain, William Faulkner and Lee Smith all try to present storytellers in
their work. Their works contain oral and auditory characteristics. They try to express the
importance of storytelling, of the spoken word, in their novels.
Stephen Ross argues that when the spoken word is represented in the novel it is
necessarily secondary to the written discourse which produces it. In his work, Fiction’s
Inexhaustible Voice: Speech and Writing in Faulkner, Ross writes that “transcribed speech, the
product of mimicry, always occupies an inferior position in relation to the diegetic discourse of
its production. The mimetic voices we hear are always secondary, indulged and condescended to
by the reader who shares (as an audience shares the mimic’s knowledge) the author’s power over
all the voices” (108). My arguments do not require that this assertion be either true or untrue. It
may well be true. Certainly any author who wishes his or her mimetic voices to be authoritative
has an obstacle to overcome. In their work, Twain, Faulkner and Smith try to overcome the
structural discrimination inherent in the novel and imbue their storytelling character’s with
5

authority that is determined without regard to their position in a structural hierarchy. Twain and
Smith have both made attempts to present an authentic vernacular voice that is not “secondary,
indulged and condescended to.” Faulkner may differ from them on this. If so, it is because he
elevates his speaking characters to the same rhetorical plane as his narrators thereby not
accurately representing individual dialects. I hope to show that all three authors attempt to give
their characters speaking voices which are not necessarily inferior to the narrative or authorial
voices in their works. Whether or not they succeed is another story.
I have a story about how this work came about. In a discussion about William Faulkner’s
Absalom, Absalom!, I mentioned my interest in how oral traditions played a part in the novel, and
how they effected the way Faulkner approached his work. We talked about how critics couldn’t
agree on the number of narrators in the novel, and I mentioned how Estella Schoenberg, in her
book Old Tales and Talking: Quentin Compson in William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! and
Related Works, claimed that there were “nearly a dozen of them in the novel” (73). Then the
person I was talking to said: “Absalom, Absalom! only has one narrator.” Cleanth Brooks agrees
with this assessment, writing that “in spite of the many conversations between characters and the
long reveries and monologues of a single character, Absalom, Absalom! is finally a novel written
in the third person by an omniscient narrator” (308).
If there is only one narrator, what do we call all these other voices that certainly are
narrating? The point is that in a very important sense both Schoenberg and Brooks are right. If
we follow Gerard Genette’s Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, we can label the narrators
Schoenberg identifies. Rosa Coldfield, Quentin Compson, Mr Compson and Shreve McCaslin
are all intradiegetic narrators; Ellen Coldfield Sutpen, Judith Sutpen, Wash Jones and “possibly
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Charles Bon” are all metadiegetic narrators; Thomas Sutpen is a meta-meta-meta-metadiegetic
narrator. That may be one “meta” too many, but the point remains that Genette has an exact
designation; if we can agree how many narrative levels exist, we can agree on the exact term.
Schoenberg argues that there is another narrative voice that is easy to overlook: “the objective or
impersonal author–Faulkner himself” (73). This narrative voice is the novel’s only extradiegetic
narrator and the omniscient narrator Brooks identifies.
All of these characters narrate, and in Genette’s system can be correctly identified in
terms of their diegetic level. But Brooks is certainly correct–this one extradiegetic narrator is
fundamentally different; he performs the functions attributed to narrators. He is not a
representation of a storyteller, unlike the other characters. He is not in a concrete setting telling a
listening audience a story. His is a written voice. Absalom, Absalom! has one narrator and a great
many storytelling characters.
Storytelling characters are characters in novels who tell stories. These characters are
presented to the reader by narrators. In order to understand storytelling characters we must be
able to differentiate then from narrators and other types of characters. First and foremost a
storytelling character takes part in a fictive storytelling event. This event may not be fully
dramatized, it may only be implied. Robert Georges argues that a storytelling event is a specific
social interaction where at least two people agree to “assume social identities for the purpose of
the event” (“Towards” 318), specifically those of storyteller and listener. These are, of course,
not necessarily the only social roles that are relevant during the event, but they are important and
are adopted specifically for the event; “wile narrators and audience members are first and
foremost narrators and audience members, they are other things to themselves and each other as
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well; and the ways in which they behave during storytellings are determined by the multiple
social identities” (Communicative Role” 52). A storytelling character is a representation of a
social role that is as old as human culture while a narrator is a literary role that is younger than
the technology of writing. A narrator is a device that facilitates storytelling in a novel. It seemed
to me that it could be methodologically useful to distinguish between these two types of voices in
novels, and that is one of the main goals of this text.
A storytelling character is not represented as writing, even if his or her voice is not being
presented. A storytelling character may not be aware a book is being written. When the character
is, the narrator of the work is a character involved in the presentation of the teller’s spoken word.
Sut Lovingood and Jane Pittman are aware that someone at least intends to write a book. In both
of these works the narrator of the works claims to be an amanuensis, a transcriber of the
character’s spoken word, which is also what Twain said he wished to be for Huckleberry Finn.
Even if the character is aware a book is being written, he or she is not consciously complicit in
the work of fiction. This is not to suggest that these characters do not relate fictions, merely that
they themselves are entirely fictive and are constrained to remain on a fictive plane. A restriction
narrators do not necessarily have.
Storytelling characters are also speaking to fictive story listeners. These story listeners are
sometimes the narrator of the work, as in Twain’s “A True Story” and Joseph Conrad’s Heart of
Darkness. Sometimes the listener is a character as in Joel CHandler Harris’ Uncle Remus stories
and as Quentin Compson is in much of Absalom, Absalom! One particularly interesting way to
dramatize a storytelling event is to have the story listener be undramatized, but have the teller
seem to be speaking directly to the listener. This technique, used by Eudora Welty in the short
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story “Livvie” and by Lee Smith in several of her works, puts the reader in the position of story
listener while the fiction of the event can be maintained. The difference between a fictive story
listener and the implied reader is the difference between private and public voices; Lanser defines
them: “private voice (narration directed toward a narratee who is a fictional character) and public
voice (narration directed toward a narratee ‘outside’ the fiction who is analogous to the historical
reader)” (15). I have to point out that all fictional narratees are not necessarily story listeners, but
this study is concerned with the distinction between public and private voice and their
relationship in the depiction of storytelling events.
I had initially assumed I would be looking almost exclusively at storytelling characters
and how they establish their authority through the act of telling. I found that even though fictional
storytellers do establish their authority in a manner similar to real storytellers, narrators still play
a significant role. In order for a storytelling character to gain authority two things have to happen.
First an author figure must endorse the character or deny his own authority either overtly or
tacitly. Second, the character must positively establish authority. Storytelling characters gain
authority in much the same manner as actual storytellers, either through demonstrating verbal
acuity, wisdom and/or knowledge–through demonstrating mastery of the discourse and the
subject of the discourse–or through actions inside the fiction which will elevate them in the
reader’s estimation.
In this dissertation I suggest that we look at narrators less like representations of
storytellers. Instead a narrator is a literary function that facilitates fiction’s storytelling. Of course
the role of narrator was initially a represented storyteller, and often still is. However, in order to
clarify what happens in fiction, we should understand that narrators do not necessarily tell stories
9

and that characters who tell stories are not necessarily narrators.
Some characters who tell stories in fiction certainly relate narratives, but they do not
perform all the functions of narrators, and they have a different set of powers and prohibitions.
These storytelling characters are more closely analogous to oral storytellers than narrators in the
literary sense and therefore follow conventions of storytelling which different from those of
written fiction. Conversely, some narrators do not actually tell the story, instead they perform
what Genette calls the directing function.
Genette argues that the actual telling of the story, which is mostly closely analogous to
the function of oral storytellers, is the “narrative function.” He argues that “no narrator can turn
away from [this function] without at the same time losing his status as narrator” (255). In the
same paragraph he defines the other function of a narrator, “the directing function.” this function
includes the ordering of events, chapter division and manipulations of point of view and time.
Genette class these acts the “‘stage directions’ of the discourse” (255). The analogy with film
direction is apt. Significantly, there are times in novels where the voice performing the narrative
function does not perform this function. In those cases Genette apparently attributes this function
to the author1, Wayne Booth to the implied author, and David Hayman to the arranger. I hold that
this function is always performed by a narrator, and would provisionally name a presence that
performs the directing function but does not narrate a covert narrator.
I don’t intend to invalidate the terminology or work of these other critics by doing this.
All of them acknowledge that the directing function is performed and that in some works it is not
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I say ‘apparently’ because he doesn’t explicitly name this figure. He use ‘author’ more
than once in this context; in other instances he uses, “the context” (174-75), and “the text” (185).
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performed by what is conventionally considered to be the narrator. I suggest the term covert
narrator because it helps bring an important fact to the forefront: narrators are not necessarily
storytellers. Equating the two may foster a misapprehension of the genre. The directing function
is one of two functions performed by the narrator; therefore, a presence that performs this
function should be categorized as a narrator, whether or not it literally narrates.
The narrator has changed over time from a written representation of an oral storyteller to
a literary function which facilitates storytelling. At the same time, the authority for the narrator
initially was derived from mastery of a communal oral tradition and discourse and now springs
from mastery of a more widespread written tradition and its discourse. One result of this is that
speaking voices represented in modern works at least tend to have a secondary position to the
authorial voice.
In the first chapter I will be looking closely at the idea of voice as it is outlined by Susan
Lanser and Stephen Ross, respectively, both of whom follow Gerard Genette to some extent. By
looking at types of storytellers, both narrators and characters, and the types of voice used by
authors to represent them, we will see how each type of voice acquires authority. I will adapt
Lanser and Ross’s concepts of voice in order to begin a discussion of voice in the works of
Twain, Faulkner and Smith, and show that each of these authors attempt to give mimetic voices
authority–both in and outside the fictive world.
The first chapter will also discuss the shift in authority in literature that in part defines the
novel as a genre. This shift occurs so early that I will use Beowulf as an example of written
narrative that is the transcription of traditional materials. This will help establish the difference
between narrators and storytelling characters. Narrators were initially modeled on storytellers and
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as such were authorized in similar ways. As early as Chaucer, however, we see narrators
identified with elite, written culture and character’s speaking voices, specifically represented
storytellers’, considered secondary. We see this again at the time Twain begins to write. Many
southwestern humorists, Twain’s literary predecessors, face the same challenges as Chaucer
when they try to present their character’s speaking voices. Like Chaucer, many of them used
frame tales both as guides for their audiences and as what Kenneth Lynn calls a “cordon
sanitaire”–a genteel shield protecting both the author and the reader from the “vulgar” vernacular
speaker. This acceptable form for presenting speaking voices marks the starting place for
Twain’s literary career. Like other writers of his time Twain was interested in the realistic
portrayal of nonstandard speaking voices. I will define and discuss some of the techniques of
literary dialect. I also will define the genteel narrator as a type of personal voice available to
white male authors in order to prepare us to see Twain’s use of this narrator to present
storytelling characters.
In the second chapter I will show how Mark Twain’s technique was developed in part
because of the influence of oral modes of thought. Twain demonstrates a commitment to as
accurate a representation of dialects as possible in the written medium. We will see his attempts
to realize storytellings events in print. I will discuss his use of the folktale the Golden Arm in his
live work and in “How to Tell a Story.” In that short story Twain demonstrates how the act of
performance, at least in this case, cannot be realized in print, while also giving the reader
sufficient information to imagine the effect of a proper performance. In his several versions of
“The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County” and other of his short stories Twain uses a
type of genteel narrator characteristic of southwestern humor which I will argue is a type of
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authorial narrator, a writerly presence. Twain uses a variety of frames in the jumping frog stories
which are based in part on a story he heard performed while working at a mining camp. We will
see his use and at least partial abandonment of the genteel narrator in some of his more important
works as he attempted to authorize speaking voices by removing this writerly presence. In “A
True Story, Repeated Word for Word as I Heard It,” for example, Twain opens the story in a
very conventional manner, with the narrator dominating the storytelling character. By the end of
the story, the narrator has withdrawn and left the mimetic voice of the storyteller as the only and
hence the dominant voice in the story. A more striking move in this direction is in The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, where the authorial presence withdraws almost immediately,
allowing Huck’s speaking voice to take the privileged position in the novel and tell his own
story. When Huck tells his own story, however, he demonstrates that he is still dominated by
“sivilized” culture; the novel’s authorial presence subtly helps show, as Henry Nash Smith
writes, that “the dominant culture is decadent and perverted” (117).
In chapter 3 we will see the importance of oral traditions to Faulkner, and his
representation of the power of one in Absalom, Absalom! He tries to vividly represent a living
tradition in the novel, but Faulkner is less interested in accurately portraying dialect than Twain.
Instead, most of his storytelling characters use the same voice and orthographic system as the
omniscient narrator. Since the primary storytelling characters in the novel and the narrator speak
in the same voice, their voices could be considered to be on the same dialogical plane as the
narrator, and perhaps Faulkner has evaded the structurally secondary status of mimetic voice and
written what Mikhail Bakhtin calls a dialogical novel as many critics have contended. One reason
this theory has explanatory power is because this novel so persistently focuses on narrative
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authority in novels and in oral traditions, and on how Quentin Compson uses the oral tradition of
his community to try to arrive at a truth he can live with.
Besides being in this way a dialogical novel, Absalom, Absalom! also has a public
extradiegetic narrator–an authorial voice–who seems to refuse some of the authority he possesses
by literary convention. By refusing to take authority, he encourages his voice to be on an equal
dialogic plane with the voices of the individual storytelling characters in the novel. The
relationship between the narrator, the storytelling characters, and the story they tell also seems to
change as the novel progresses. Later in the novel the storytelling seems to have greater evocative
power, and the narrator seems to give up authority he has exerted earlier. It does seem this way,
but I will argue that the narrator’s authority and the evocative power of the story remain almost
analogous throughout the novel, and that the seemingly greater explanatory power of the latter
sections is leavened by the narrator’s ostensible arrogation of authority, leaving all of the sections
nearly equal in authority. During a period where authority still generally rests with the narrator,
faulkner’s narrator can only give his characters authority by denying his own.
Lee Smith’s novel, The Devil’s Dream, has an authorial presence that narrates a
significant portion of the novel, while also performing the directing function throughout. In the
final chapter we will see that Smith was also strongly influenced by storytelling events she
witnessed even though she was influenced by electronic and written media as well. In The
Devil’s Dream Smith tries to show a sense of community, and how one community constructs
meaning by retelling stories, and how the identity of the protagonist Katie Cocker depends on her
community and its stories. She sometimes uses storytelling events where there is a storytelling
character telling part of the family’s story and the reader becomes the implied story listener. In
14

the novel, characters tell stories about their past and often in so doing come to a clearer definition
of themselves. Smith uses other types of narration as well, including a third-person omniscient
narration that I will argue is a type of authorial voice that uses nonstandard dialect. One result of
this third person narration is that the voices of the individual storytellers presented are, in
Bakhtin’s terms, objectified, making The Devil’s Dream a monological novel, where all the
individual character’s voices are subsumed by one semantically authoritative voice. I will also
suggest that the categories of monological and dialogical, though useful, are too constrictive.
Mixing character’s direct and indirect discourse with an authorial voice, Smith presents
the history of the Bailey family leading up to Katie Cocker’s telling which brings the novel to its
present. In a way Katie is the novel’s semantically authoritative voice, but her voice is authorized
by a source outside of her. Preceding chapters prepare us for Katie’s telling which the authorial
presence assures us is the direct discourse of an honest, wise and balanced character who we
should like, trust and respect. This voice, however, does not use the voice of authority. Instead
this third-person narrative voice is similar to the storytelling characters’ mimetic voices.
The roles of narrator and author have been made different from the role of the storyteller.
A narrator is no longer necessarily or generally the fictive representation of an oral storyteller.
Though the beginnings of the novel lie in the unselfconscious attempt to transcribe oral
traditional materials, the novel as a genre is defined by authors consciously writing to a reading
audience in a voice whose authority derives from their ability to use the written word and their
individual creative imaginations. Writing in the accepted standard voice is to write in the voice of
authority. Each of these authors are presented with conventional literary ideas of authority that
conflict with their own. Each uses formal methods to deal with this conflict. Their effort to
15

authorize speaking voices is a result of their conviction that the speaking voice is vitally
important. This work will look at the different voices in play in these three writers’ works.

16

Storytelling Voices and Narrative Authority
When Mark Twain begins his career as a writer, the figure of the author is closely, but
even then not always, connected with the narrator. Whether or not there is an ironic gap between
author and narrator, the conventional narrator is a writerly persona connected with elite culture,
and it is inappropriate not to write in an educated voice. Though some authors use a lower style,
one marked as substandard in relation to the dominant discourse, they are either “vulgar”–lesser
artists not worthy of serious consideration–or they are masters of literary discourse who are
mimicking the “lower” style from the position of someone above it, and they mark the “vulgar”
by conventional means that signal the difference. Stephen Ross argues that the spoken voice is
always necessarily represented at a level of authority lower than that of the conventional writerly
narrator (108). All three of the novelists in this study attempt to negotiate what Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. calls the speakerly paradox–the paradox of representing the spoken word in writing;
specifically, they attempt to authorize not only the speaking voice but the colloquial voice, that
is, the spoken voice that is usually considered not only nonstandard but substandard. Lee Smith,
Mark Twain, and William Faulkner came from areas of America that were more “oral” than the
dominant discourse that controlled the medium of print, at least on the national scale, and the
mindset of orality they retained is reflected in their fiction.
I will not be making a historical argument about the development of voice in American
literature. I want to study instead how these authors approached similar difficulties in realizing
their individual artistic visions. There has clearly been a historical progression. It is not
scandalous or even particularly odd that Lee Smith uses vernacular narrators. This is in part
because Twain’s work helped make the use of vernacular voices acceptable. But a conflict
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remains. There is always a difficulty in authorizing a voice that is different from the “standard.”
This was a difficulty faced by Geoffrey Chaucer, Giovanni Boccaccio, Augustus Baldwin
Longstreet, Johnson Jones Hooper, Charles Chesnutt, Zora Neale Hurston, Twain and Faulkner,
and it is one that Lee Smith still faces. This difficulty appears to be inherent in the novel as a
genre and, as such, does not necessarily benefit from arguing an elaborate theory of the
development of the novel.
I plan to differentiate storytelling events embedded in literary works from the larger
narrative, while still looking closely at both. It will be methodologically useful to narrow the
definition of narrator by distinguishing narrators from storytelling characters. I will be looking
closely at the idea of voice as it is outlined by Susan Lanser and Stephen Ross, respectively,
specifically the concept of authorial, personal and mimetic voice which name the crucial
distinction between the narrative voices of characters and the different types of narrators used by
these authors. By looking at types of storytellers, both narrators and characters, and the types of
voice used by authors to represent them, we will see how each type of voice establishes and
maintains authority. I will adapt Lanser and Ross’s concepts of voice in order to begin a
discussion of voice in the works of Twain, Faulkner and Smith, and show that each of these
authors attempts to give mimetic voices a discursive authority that they would usually not
receive.
In this chapter I will sketch out the difference between the terms orality and literacy and
the persistence of orality in American culture, and the importance of it to these authors.
Beowulf, the first narrative work written in English, will serve as an example of early narrative as
a transcription of traditional storytelling and will show how traditional storytellers established
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their authority by mastery of a communal tradition. I will discuss how oral narrative is
constructed in writing, and the creation of the roles of author and narrator, which did not exist in
the first written narratives but which help define the novel as a genre. These changes also
affected the sources of authority individual artists appealed to. The author becomes an individual
creative artist who is a master of the literate tradition. In a discussion of frame tale narratives by
Chaucer and Longstreet we will see authors present aspects of oral culture in print while also
taking steps to retain their status as members of the written discourse community by overtly
separating themselves from the folk characters. All of this will help show that the figure of the
author gains and maintains what Susan Lanser calls discursive authority, authority and influence
outside the fictive world, through demonstrating mastery of the appropriate discourse, a discourse
incompatible with the vernacular.
This will lead to a discussion of the term voice in relation to the idea of narrative
authority. The concept of voice is pivotal to my overall argument–specifically three kinds of
voice: Lanser’s idea of personal and authorial voice, and Ross’ of mimetic voice. The distinction
and interplay between these three types of voice will help us understand how these authors
present storytelling characters and other spoken voices.
The Persistence of Traditional Orality
First, I want to discuss the difference between oral and literate modes of thought and how
oral thought processes persist in literate culture. Tex Sample, at the beginning of his book,
Ministry in an Oral Culture, tells about his experience as a college freshman. His advisor had
suggested that he take a course in philosophy: “I was thrilled with the very idea that the college
taught such a course,” he writes, “and that there was a book where someone had written down all
19

the great lines of Will Rogers and Uncle Remus and Minnie Pearl. That all this would be
available in one book that we would study throughout the fall semester filled me with
excitement” (3). Sample was disappointed to find no mention of the philosophers he was familiar
with; instead, he read about a “Socrates” who discussed ‘chairness’ and ‘thingness’ and other
things that seemed uncomfortably abstract.
Sample describes the difficulty he had adapting to college discourse. “My world was not
one of discourse, systematic coherence, and consistent use of clear definitions, and the writing of
discursive prose that could withstand the whipsaws of academic critique. Rather, it was a world
made sense of through proverbs, stories and relationships” (3). Though a high school-educated
member of a literate society beginning his college education, his basic engagement with the
world was one far more similar to the thought processes described as “oral” by Walter Ong in
Orality and Literacy. Ong describes the oral mindsets that persist in literate cultures as “residue.”
Sample describes his culture as one of “traditional orality” in order to avoid the negative
connotations of Ong’s term.
Much of Sample’s understanding of orality comes from reading Ong’s book (which is
itself a very literate activity). In it Ong argues that there are “certain basic differences . . .
Between the ways of managing knowledge and verbalization in primary oral cultures (cultures
with no knowledge at all of writing) and in cultures deeply affected by the use of writing” (1). In
primary oral cultures the only way to store information is in memory. Because of this, the only
information that can be preserved is that which can be remembered. The “whipsaws of academic
critique” are structured in a fundamentally different way because academics can not only refer
back to texts, they can also jot notes to themselves--writing their thoughts out in a form that is
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available for them to refer to while articulating their thoughts. Long argumentative sentences
with subordinate clauses are too complex to be stored in memory. The relative fixity of the
written and the printed word not only enables people to more easily remember and reorganize
their thoughts, it makes different kinds of thought possible.
These modes of thought are unavailable in oral cultures. Instead of relying on written
records, all knowledge in oral cultures must be stored mnemonically. “Heavy patterning and
communal fixed formulas in oral cultures serve some of the purposes of writing in chirographic
cultures, but in doing so they of course determine the kind of thinking that can be done, the way
experience is intellectually organized. In an oral culture, experience is intellectualized
mnemonically” (Ong 36). Experience is intellectualized mnemonically because any other type of
thought can not persist in memory. One popular kind of mnemonic organization is the story.
Once writing is introduced, and the pressure to think only memorable thoughts is
removed, man soon finds new ways of thinking. “Without writing, the literate mind would not
and could not think as it does, not only when engaged in writing but normally even when it is
composing its thoughts in oral form. More than any other single invention, writing has
transformed human consciousness” (Ong 78). This transformation has created new kinds of
storytellers and given them a new set of tools.
Writing, commitment of the word to space, enlarges the potentiality of language almost
beyond measure, restructures thought, and in the process converts a certain few dialects
into ‘grapholects’ (Haugen 1966; Hirsh 1977, pp. 43-8). A grapholect is a transdialectal
language formed by deep commitment to writing. Writing gives a grapholect a power far
exceeding that of any purely oral dialect. The grapholect known as standard English has
accessible for use a recorded vocabulary of at least a million and a half words, of which
not only the present meanings but also hundreds of thousands of past meanings are
known. A simply oral dialect will commonly have resources of only a few thousand
words, and its users will have virtually no knowledge of the real semantic history of any
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of these words. (Ong 7-8)
One of the things this work will focus on is the use of the grapholect known as “standard
English,” or the variants of standard English that novelists have at their disposal, to represent
various American dialects, and how authors use the culturally powerful grapholect to empower
alternate forms of communication. It is my contention that the authors in this study were all
strongly influenced in their writing by what Sample calls “traditional orality” and Ong calls
“verbomotor culture,” which is similar to primary oral culture. “Today primary oral culture in
the strict sense hardly exists, since every culture knows of writing and has some experience of its
effects. Still, to varying degrees many cultures and subcultures, even in a high-technology
ambiance, preserve much of the mind-set of primary orality” (Ong 11). Sample feels a significant
number of Americans are influenced by this mindset:
It is my contention that about half of the people in the United States are people who work
primarily out of a traditional orality, by which I mean a people who can read and
write–though some cannot–but whose appropriation and engagement with life is oral.
More than this, I am convinced that most churches have a clear majority of their
membership who work from a traditional orality. (6)
I wouldn’t hazard a guess at even vague figures like “about half,” but I would certainly
contend that traditional orality plays a significant part in the lives of many Americans. A great
many Americans still make sense of their worlds through “proverbs, stories, and relationships”
(Sample 6). The authors examined here come from backgrounds where traditional orality does
play a significant part.
Though Sample feels he is from an oral culture, all the “oral” sources in his book’s title
are from what Ong calls print culture or “secondary orality.” Secondary orality consists of oral/
aural forms that rely on a technology unavailable to primary oral cultures. Sample, I assume, had
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never been in the same room with Minnie Pearl; he heard the Grand Ole’ Opry on the radio. His
exposure to Will Rogers could have been from several sources, including his father, but the
originary source route was either print, radio or film–literate technologies. Of course, Uncle
Remus is a fictional character created by the writer Joel Chandler Harris, yet Sample doesn’t
seem to differentiate him from Rogers or Pearl. He writes at one point that he “knew about the
great wisdom of Uncle Remus” (3), not that he had read Harris’ work.
Lee Smith describes formative experiences similar to Sample’s. In her introduction to the
Oxford Edition of Mark Twain’s Sketches, New and Old, Smith describes her father telling her
personal experiences stories, local legends, tall tales, and also reading from the works of several
writers, including Twain. Smith was influenced by all of these stories. Whether they were
products of written or oral traditions, her initial exposure to all of them was aural.
My whole sense of story is, as a consequence, oral, and it comes from them. Of course it
does–as writers, we cannot really choose our truest material, any more than we can
choose to have, say, curly hair. Our material is given to us. It all has to do with where we
were born, and the circumstances we are born into, and how we first hear language. What
I hear is a voice, always one particular human voice, telling the story. (xxxii)
Smith was born into a cultural heritage that led her to privilege the oral remark. Even when
reading, she hears a voice, and this is reflected in her work.
The interplay between oral and written imaginative traditions is discussed in Carl
Lindahl’s book, Earnest Games: Folkloric Patterns in the Canterbury Tales. “In any society
where oral art and art literature coexist, there is some degree of interdependence between the
two. . . . This interdependent process is still at work in contemporary peasant communities,
where narrators sometimes tell tales from memory and sometimes read them aloud from books.”
(6). Smith’s father and other members of her community told stories both from memory and
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print. Smith was born into her material and the experience of hearing Twain’s stories read aloud
is part of it, and it resonates for her as do the other stories. Writing about Twain’s short story
“The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County,” Smith says: “This story–like all these
stories I heard as a child–was doubly oral. The oral remark was privileged, and the story was
always told aloud” (xxxvii).
I am not suggesting that stories are important only in oral or verbomotor cultures. All
societies use stories to teach their children. All cultures have myths that contribute to the
construction of their identity. Karl Kroeber writes that “all human societies have employed
narrative, usually making it the preferred form of expression for systems of moral judgement–
systems, of course often violently antithetical to one another” (9). We all tell stories; we order
and delimit the flow of experience into an intelligible form and transmit these orderings to others.
Environmental historian William Cronon writes: “like all historians we configure the events of
the past into causal sequences--stories--that order and simplify those events to give them new
meanings” (1349). We tell ourselves stories to help us understand our surroundings and
ourselves. “Not merely information storage devices, narratives structure perceptual experience . .
. individuals become the autobiographical narratives by which they tell about their lives. These
private constructions typically mesh with a community of life stories, ‘deep structures’ about the
nature of life itself” (Riessman 2).
Though all societies relate stories, in oral cultures they are necessarily more important
and they are necessarily told aloud. There are no records that report historical facts. There are
only the stories people tell–built out of the memories they have. “In a writing or print culture, the
text physically bonds whatever it contains and makes it possible to retrieve any kind of
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organization of thought as a whole. In primary oral cultures, where there is no text, the narrative
serves to bond thought more massively and permanently than other genres” (Ong 141). Eric
Havelock writes that the “only possible verbal technology available to guarantee the preservation
and fixity of transmission was that of the rhythmic word organised cunningly in verbal and
metrical patterns which were unique enough to retain their shape” (42-3). The most common and
familiar verbal and metrical patterns are those of proverbs. A stitch in time saves “nine” instead
of ten or eight because of the rhyme with time, not because it is more likely that nine stitches will
be necessary.
Sample writes about his upbringing, where we see, among other things, a recurring
theme–that experience, “doing,” is privileged. The important point now, however, is that an
orality persisted in the culture Sample was raised in:
A great deal of what we knew was tacitly understood: we often knew a lot that we could
not put into words (because we didn’t have the right words) but that we nevertheless
knew how to do. We knew things we couldn’t say, we felt things we couldn’t name, and
we did things we couldn’t explain. So proverbs and stories helped us. They pointed to
what we meant. No, actually, they were what we meant. (3)
Despite the introduction and use of the technologies of writing and print, Sample lived in a
culture where traditional stories, and other mnemonic structures, retained their cultural
importance. Though interiorizing literacy gives people access to entirely new ways of thinking,
not all cultures necessarily become literate in the sense of embracing writing and the thought
processes Ong associates with it.
Robert Pattison claims that “literacy” is the recognition of the difficulties inherent in
language, and mastery of the modes of thought that one’s specific culture uses, regardless of
whether they are oral or chirographic. “Consciousness of the uses and problems of language is
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the foundation of literacy” (6). The technology of writing is not a necessary component of
literacy.
New technologies do not drive out old forms of literacy. Rather, the new technology, be it
print or television, lives side by side with the existing state of literacy and gradually
blends with it in complex ways that change but do not necessarily diminish or abolish it.
Print and written record did not destroy but supplemented the oral literacy in which they
emerged. (Pattison 115)
Terms like literacy and orality may be problematic, but I will use the term orality to describe the
mindset, the type of literacy, the cultural perspective, the method of engaging reality that Ong
and Sample describe. This mindset does not preclude the individual from being literate in the
contemporarily accepted sense. All of these authors are very literate–very well read–very much
aware of the literary traditions in place when they are writing and conscious of the uses and
problems of language. They are also very oral; stories and proverbs point towards what they
mean. The cultures they took part in retained a state of literacy that privileged (for lack of a better
word) oral modes of thought. This is also why a continuum-based model of orality and literacy is
inadequate for my purposes. These authors are both very “oral” and very “literate.”
The influence of oral modes of thought on these authors is a significant part of why all the
texts I will be discussing are in a very broad sense “speakerly.” Henry Louis Gates defines the
speakerly text as:
a text whose rhetorical strategy is designed to represent an oral literary tradition, designed
“to emulate the phonetic, grammatical, and lexical patterns of actual speech and produce
the ‘illusion of oral narration.’” The speakerly text is that text in which all other structural
elements seem to be devalued, as important as they remain to the telling of the tale,
because the narrative strategy signals attention to its own importance, an importance
which would seem to be the privileging of oral speech and its inherent linguistic features.
(181)
The only hesitation I have about this definition is the idea of the other elements being
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“devalued.” Perhaps this is only a fear of overemphasis. What I will address is these texts’
“paradoxically written manifestation of the aspiration to the oral” (Gates 208), and how these
authors approach or attempt to overcome this paradox. The paradox that these authors are dealing
with involves not just the spoken word but all aspects of the oral–the paralinguistic and the
cultural factors that combine with the spoken word to produce meaning.
In The Nature of Narrative, Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg argue that “genuine” oral
traditions can be “challenged by a spurious, pseudo-‘oral tradition’ arising out of the newly
established textual tradition” (30). Oral traditions that meet their definition of genuine are
different than the ones Sample and Smith describe, but I would hold that all traditions that are
passed down orally are something other than spurious. As Lindahl argues, even in contemporary
peasant communities “narrators sometimes tell tales from memory and sometimes read them
aloud from books.” (6). Even stories told by Mother Goose or Uncle Remus, ones that have
become part of or at least passed through the literate tradition are not any sort of threat or
challenge to any ‘genuine’ tradition. Robert Georges argues that “there is nothing especially
authentic or traditional about the messages of storytelling events generated by the interactions of
the nonliterate or the preliterate” (“Towards” 323). He does not argue, of course, that they are
inauthentic or untraditional, only that “storytelling events constitute one kind of communicative
event within a continua of human communication . . . irrespective of their relative social,
educational, or economic statuses” (“Towards” 323). Storytelling, written and oral, is pervasive
in all cultures. More importantly for my purposes, the interplay between oral and written
traditions is a significant factor in the development of American literature. Devaluing either is of
little practical use. Carl Lindahl writes that folklore “is more than an item or means of
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transmission: it is a community-based process, embodying the values and beliefs of that small
closely-knit group, and generating works of art that reflect them” (9). Any artwork that reflects
this community-based process can be considered “folk.” Though they are influenced by literate
modes of thought, many Americans are also parts of rich oral traditions that are constantly
making use of parts of “print culture.” Sample writes:
In the oral culture of my youth we knew how to read and write, but these skills were used
basically to fill out forms at work, write checks or recipes, make lists of things to do, sign
our names, read sports pages or romantic novels, take tests for driver’s licenses, and, very
occasionally, write letters or notes to friends and family. But the way we approached life–
the way we celebrated things, the way we understood, the way we handled, mishandled,
or avoided our feelings, hopes, or dreams–was oral. (5-6)
Because a culture that does not make lists, fill out forms, or exchange recipes–more specifically
one which doesn’t know what forms or lists are–is so drastically different than one that does,
Ong has rightly focused on “primary oral cultures.” When Sample read Ong’s book, which is
proof of Sample’s literacy, he found statements which resonated so strongly in his experience he
chose to write a book stating that he was part of an oral culture. Though members of Sample’s
culture participate in literate culture, by filling out forms, making lists and recipes, and writing
books about their orality, their approach to life is still one tremendously similar to primary
orality.
Traditional orality played a very significant part in the lives of Mark Twain and William
Faulkner, and continues to do so in Lee Smith’s, though all three are certainly literate in every
sense of the word. The works of all three reflect an interest in and the influence of traditional
orality, both formally and thematically. What I wish to study specifically is who actually does the
telling in these works, how these tellings are represented and how these authors address the

28

difficulty of representing the spoken in writing. Much of the time I will be focusing on
storytelling that is represented inside of fictions. Of course the vast majority of novels have
stories, but oral storytelling is a very different mode of communication than the narrative
generally found in the novel.
A fundamental fact of storytelling events is face-to-face communication; “it cannot and
does not occur unless two or more individuals are willing to interact by behaving in a particular
way while communicating at first hand” (Georges “Communicative Role”52). The key to
storytelling events, for Georges, is that the teller responds to listener feedback and shapes the
evolving story accordingly. “Once the storyteller begins to receive and decode the responses of
the story listener and to interpret and respond to them as feedback, the storyteller and the story
listener begin to shape the message jointly (“Towards” 322). As Neville Dyson-Hudson writes,
“Narrative, then, through the act of narration, becomes a form of behavior, rather than a form of
literature . . . it becomes an interactive form of behavior” (338).
Because novels are written, they cannot accurately replicate oral storytelling. Reading a
novel is not a truly interactive form of behavior. For Georges there is no message without listener
feedback that helps determine the content. This is clearly impossible with a novel; we cannot see
individual tellers shrug their shoulders or hear the variations of their voice, no matter how
strident the authors’ italics are. More importantly, we cannot materially change the outcome of
the telling, even when we are fictionalized as the story-listener. We can have different
experiences with a text, and we do, but we cannot change the telling, only the reading. Jay Bolter
writes: “Writing changes the intimate relationship between the creator and the audience: it is no
use shouting at a novel whose plot is heading in a direction we do not like: the book cannot
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adjust itself to our wishes” (109). We can, of course, terminate the event, but the words remain
unchanged. Reading fixed texts of a story and storytelling are two very different acts, even
though the teller/listener relationship is replicated in both to some extent. Authors are forced to
present storytelling in a way that suggests the event, even though some techniques of both are the
same. As Joseph Sobol argues:
Conversational discourse is characterized by linguistic, paralinguistic and kinesic
‘involvement strategies,’ designed to create interaction and integration between speaker
and listener. Linguistic involvement strategies, such as repetition, constructed dialogue,
and representational imagery, are common to oral and literary storytelling, though
originating in speech. (70)
Many of the linguistic aspects of storytelling can be transferred to print; however, part of the way
meaning is constructed during face-to-face communication is by the physical interaction between
the participants, and by the participants with the physical surroundings. There are also other
factors which make up the context of the event, which may be difficult or impossible to replicate
in print. Whether we choose to label these aspects of the communicative event “involvement
strategies” or not, they are a part of the process.
Paralinguistic and kinesic involvement strategies can include variation in pitch and
tempo, gesture, physical and emotional mirroring, as well as the vast register of implicit
information that constitutes the relationship of conversational partners. None of these are
available to the writer, except in a refracted and distanced form. He has to rely instead on
a range of ‘contextualizing’ conventions to fill in what is sacrificed to print. (Sobol 70)
These contextualizing conventions, the methods for transcribing storytelling, have developed
over time. They were not used or even conceived of by the first authors of narrative, however.
Initially, authors wrote with an eye toward recitation, and didn’t see representing these events or
speech as problematic. Indeed, they saw no other way to commit stories to paper. As Ong writes,
Written narrative at first was merely a transcription of oral narrative, or what was
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imagined as oral narrative, and it assumed some kind of oral singer’s audience. . . . How
these texts and other oral performances were in fact originally set down in writing
remains puzzling, but the transcribers certainly were not composing in writing, but rather
recording with minimal alteration what a singer was singing or was imagined to be
singing. (“The Writer’s Audience” 12)
In the first written narratives the distinction between author and narrator was not recognized
because the individual who actualized a specific version, who was the author in our
understanding of the term, did not consider himself as such. He was instead one who transmitted
the work which held the authority of the cultural tradition. As Jean-Francis Lyotard writes, “the
narratives themselves have this authority. In a sense, the people are only that which actualizes the
narratives . . . they do this not only by recounting them, but also by listening to them and
recounting themselves through them” (23). The written narrative works were, in effect,
represented storytelling events, and they were authorized in the same manner as actual
storytelling events.
Authors, Narrators and Storytellers
Novels are authorized in a different manner. A novel’s authority comes from the status of
the author as a member of an elite literate community. The idea of an author comes from the
word “auctor,” which, as Donald Pease points out, “denoted a writer whose words commanded
respect and belief” (107). This respect, however, was not based on the artist’s imaginative power
to create new stories. Instead his power came from his knowledge of and “adherence to the
authority of cultural antecedent” (Pease 105). The meaning behind the word author is one of an
“authority”-that which guarantees the validity and truthfulness of the work. The author knows
what he is talking about- he is transmitting wisdom. The novel’s origins lie in different sources
of authority. Whoever produced the manuscript that contains the story we call Beowulf, for
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example, was not the originary source or authority of the work. The authority that produced
Beowulf is its own tradition. The text of Beowulf is a particular written performance or
manifestation of oral traditional materials. The literate editor, the author, the amanuensis of the
work is not the source of the work–he is not the auctor; he is a carrier of tradition. This is not to
suggest that he did no creative or interpretive work. It is to suggest that his creative work was
significantly influenced by his interaction with a communal storytelling tradition, and that he
considered himself a part of this tradition.
Beowulf begins with a clear exposition of the audience and the writer’s authority: “Hwaet,
we have heard how in olden times” (1). Robert Weimann writes that the “we” in Beowulf’s first
line “is designed to link the audience and the narrator in a common act of remembrance . . .
meant to underline and draw authority from a sense of community” (86). The narrator of Beowulf
is a member of a story listening and telling tradition that goes back in time. He is both a creator
and carrier of his tradition. He is part of the listening audience that has heard this story time and
again, and part of the culture that uses the epic story as what Havelock calls the “encyclopedia”
of the culture. However much this narrator has transformed the tale from the pagan past to reflect
the Christian present, he has also remained faithful to a tradition that presents him with the way
one should live his life in society.
What is more important about the Beowulf narrator for our purposes is that the narrator
speaks in the work; he is present in the work in that he is the medium through which the story is
being related, but he does not exist as an embodied “character” in the performance. The narrator
of Beowulf is unselfconsciously the teller of the tale. It is an attempt at a direct transcription of an
oral performance–the narrator’s discourse is the direct discourse of a storyteller, and the reader is
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quite effortlessly imagined to be the listening audience. However the tale was committed to
paper, the role of the narrator is as a teller who is in fact physically present to the listeners at the
time of performance. He is literally the “I” of the work because he is the person standing there
saying “I”. This kind of self-identification is certainly problematic now, but the writer of the
manuscript appears to have had no problem with it, and senses no absence in the work. There is
no absence because all of the intended participants are part of an oral/aural tradition that has
maintained and retold versions of this story countless times, and because the work was written to
be read aloud.
As written narrative flourished and became more than the transcription of oral traditional
materials, authors were presented with the challenge of how to give their readers the contextual
clues that live performance and community membership provided. “Literature” Lindahl writes,
“must incorporate a context to be understood, because the author’s work must survive on paper,
outside the situation in which it was created” (128). The writer/reader relationship of the novel is,
in part, based on how these authors met this challenge. As Ong points out “If the writer succeeds
in writing, it is generally because he can fictionalize in his imagination an audience he has
learned to know not from daily life but from earlier writers who were fictionalizing in their
imagination audiences they had learned to know in still earlier writers, and so on back to the
dawn of written narrative” (“The Writer’s Audience” 11). The writer must also fictionalize a
storyteller–a narrator. He must create a fictive voice to address this fictive audience. As Scholes
and Kellogg write, the “traditional, oral narrative consists rhetorically of a teller, his story, and an
implied audience. The non-traditional, written narrative consists rhetorically of the imitation, or
representation, of a teller, his story, and an implied audience” (52-53). In effect, every voice in a
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novel is mimetic; every voice is at least one step removed from the author.
Rhetorically, the use of writing permits the individual, creating narrative artist to add an
important level of complexity and of potential irony to his story. The new level has
always appeared to result from the introduction of a self-conscious narrator and an
opening of ironic distance between him on one side and the author and audience on the
other. In the light, however, of our discussion of oral narrative we can see that what in
fact made possible the revolutionary complexity of point of view in written narrative was
the introduction, not of narrators, but of authors. (Scholes and Kellogg 53)
Another important development is when the distinction between authors and narrator became
self-conscious. The development of both roles is significant. The representation of a teller that
has come to be known as the narrator has been transformed from an imitation of a specific social
role into a literary function, a set of conventions of representation with powers and prohibitions
different from those of traditional storytellers. Novelists do not unselfconsciously attempt to
replicate the storytelling dynamic. They now choose the types of narrators they will use. A
narrator is not a social role; it is a literary construct. The complexity of the novel that Scholes and
Kellogg discuss arises from the creation of fictive voices–voices that do not necessarily represent
the author, and the audience’s awareness of this possibility. One of the defining features of the
novel is the potential for significant difference between the author and the narrator. This does not
mean there is necessarily anything more than the potential for irony–it is possible for there to be
no significant difference between the author and the narrator. Scholes and Kellogg point to a
specific example: “In Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises, for example, the artist, the narrator, and
the protagonist are almost united and certainly share the same viewpoint on the action and the
same attitude toward it” (269). The roles of narrator and author have, however, evolved in such a
way that a narrator is no longer necessarily or generally the fictive representation of an oral
storyteller.
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This separation of author and narrator, and of narrator from storyteller, has also changed
the sources of authority. As this process evolved, authors achieved their status by absorbing and
relating written sources instead of by absorbing and relating the communal tradition. They had to
demonstrate their mastery of the literate tradition, the tradition they shared with their new
audience. Robert Weimann argues that as “the author assimilates the role of fictional narrator, the
presence in the text of the performer is either displaced or transmuted into artifice. It is in this
new space for projecting a fiction, that the author claims his own authority as the maker of a
‘well-joined’ composition” (90). In this new paradigm of authority the author is thought of as not
merely a transmitter of tradition but as a creative force. It is the figure of the author that has this
authority. The author can choose to create a narrator who wields this authority, but the novelist is
the master of the discourse who wields authority outside of the text.
In a very important sense, the method of demonstrating and establishing authority has not
changed; authors must prove that they have absorbed the tradition–that they are masters of the
discourse. What has changed is the nature of the tradition at the source. Throughout this process,
authority is achieved through mastery of a respected tradition, primarily through the use of the
appropriate voice. The authority shifts from mastery of a local, communal and spoken tradition to
a written one of a more widespread elite community.
Even in the Twentieth Century, T.S. Eliot’s essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent”
still looks for the author to have a sense of the literary tradition which “cannot be inherited, and if
you want it you must obtain it by great labor” (467). For Eliot an understanding of the tradition
consisted in part of “the historical sense [which] involves a perception, not only of the pastness
of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his
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own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of literature of Europe from Homer
and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and
composes a simultaneous order” (467). Of course, for Eliot and for the novel as a genre,
individual talent is also important. The novel’s author is one with a creative talent as well as an
historical sense, but his status still derives from mastery of the tradition.
Despite the differences between early written narratives and the novel, the author’s need
to retain status has remained. In the Canterbury Tales Chaucer chooses to frame his represented
storytelling events to preserve his status and to give his reader’s guidelines to comprehension. In
fact, collections of framed tales are an important bridge between the modern novel and the orallyderived text. Mary Louise Pratt writes that frame-tale collections, like the Canterbury Tales and
the Decameron, comprise “many of our earliest novel-like literary texts” (105). In both the
Decameron and the Canterbury Tales a series of storytelling events is created and all of the
listeners and tellers are named, with a few exceptions; this provides a context for the reader. The
“reader,” the author’s audience, is no longer necessarily a present auditor, as he is treated in
Beowulf, and he may not have the expectations of one. The reader may be, in fact, a solitary
individual reading to his or her self separated by both time and distance from the author. Both
Chaucer and Boccaccio present their readers with sufficient clues, with a recognizable, welldefined context that they can use to understand the work. The frame creates a context familiar to
someone unfamiliar with the author/narrator/reader dynamic.
This is one advantage to the frame tales common in Southwestern humor, one of several
literary traditions Mark Twain used to formulate his style, a style which helped define the
American novel. Such frame tales allow readers to fictionalize themselves relatively
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easily–giving them indicators to help them properly interpret the event as it is represented. In the
Canterbury Tales Chaucer is not only representing storytelling events in order to represent the
actual dynamics or realities of storytelling, he is also giving his readers indicators of how they
should react to the story. In “The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction,” Ong argues that
Chaucer’s frame allows readers to fictionalize themselves:
There was no established tradition in English for many of the stories, and certainly none
at all for a collection of stories. What does Chaucer do? He sets the stories in what, from
a literary-structural point of view, is styled a frame. . . . In terms of signals to his readers,
we could put it another way: Chaucer simply tells his readers how they are to fictionalize
themselves. He starts by telling them that there is a group of pilgrims doing what real
people do, going to a real place, Canterbury. The reader is to imagine himself in their
company and join the fun. Of course this means fictionalizing himself as a member of a
nonexistent group. But the fictionalizing is facilitated by Chaucer’s clear frame-story
directives. And to minimize the fiction by maximizing real life, Chaucer installs himself,
the narrator, as one of the pilgrims. His reader-role problem is effectively solved. (16)
The narrator Chaucer creates has the social status of an author, but also has status as part of a
storytelling community. This character is authorized to tell this story because he was a witness to
all the events- not because he is a carrier of a tradition. Though he is a master of the appropriate
discourse; he also has the authority of an eye witness and as such merely reports what he has
seen. He is attempting to replicate “everich word” that was spoken, arguing that a man retelling a
tale must attempt this although he may have to speak “rudeliche and large,/ Or ellis he moot telle
his tale untrewe” (731-735). The writer is not inelegant; instead, he records the broad and vulgar
speech of others correctly in order to avoid being “untrewe.” The narrator plays the roles of story
listener and storyteller and invites the reader to play similar roles.
Katharine Slater Gittes writes that “Chaucer’s role as pilgrim and eyewitness . . . acts as a
unifying force to some extent, authenticating the framing story and making the pilgrimage appear
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actual” (248). Bonnie Irwin writes, however, that “as author he distances himself from his own
text by insisting that he merely presents the tales of others. This ironic distancing allows him to
fend off criticism from those who believe his tales to be too risqué” (50). Though verisimilitude
is important; it is also important that Chaucer the poet retain his social status. His General
Prologue includes a direct appeal to his readers. In order to protect his status, he asks his
audience not to attribute to his “vileynye,” that he: pleynly speke in this mateere, / To telle yow
hir wordes and hir cheere,/ Ne thogh I speke hir wordes proprely” (726-30). “Vileynye” is
generally glossed as “bad manners,” or even “coarseness”; Chaucer remains aware that he has an
audience that will find his use of the vernacular inappropriate, but he is protected because he is
writing “their” vulgar words in an attempt to write authentically. 2
Chaucer has in effect drawn what Kenneth Lynn calls a “cordon sanitaire” around his
narrator to protect him from the criticism of being vulgar (64). In fact, Southwestern humorists
and Chaucer use the same framing device to solve similar problems. The audience for
Southwestern humor was familiar with the narrator/author dynamic; however, it was unfamiliar
with the specific context in which these stories took place. In effect literate authors created
narrators who guided the reader through the oral world–a world outside of the dominant
discourse and foreign to the majority of readers. They also kept them separate from it. Bridgman
writes that “the presence of a literate narrator to introduce the vernacular speaker permitted the
reader to enjoy colorful informality, yet be assured that the hierarchy of social values still stood,
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For insight on similar appeals to realism in the Decameron, see N.S. Thompson’s
“Local Histories: Characteristic Worlds in the Decameron and the Canterbury Tales.” The
Decameron and the Canterbury Tales: New Essays on and Old Question. Leonard Michael Koff
and Brenda Dean Schidgen, eds. Cranberry, NJ: Associated UP, 2000.
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that the vulgar were still under control” (23). This statement is as true for the frame tales Chaucer
wrote as it is for those written by Southwestern humorists. One of the most important collections
of frame tales in American literature is Augustus Baldwin Longstreet’s Georgia Scenes (1835).
In a letter written before the collection’s publication, Longstreet also claimed to wish to present
his subject truly. “The leading object of the Georgia Scenes, is to enable those who come after
us, to see us precisely as we are” (qtd in Kibler ix). During one of the Scenes a character is
represented as cursing: “‘Well d–n* the man’” (44). Even though half of the four letters of the
word are omitted, Longstreet chooses to add a footnote where he directly appeals to his readers:
I should omit such expressions as this, could I do so with historic fidelity; but the
peculiarities of the times of which I am writing cannot be faithfully represented without
them. In recording things as they are, truth requires me sometimes to put profane words
into the mouths of my characters. (44)
Note the repetition of the idea of historical accuracy, and how truth requires inelegancies. He is
also certainly trying to insulate himself from criticism. In the Preface to Georgia Scenes,
Longstreet echoes Chaucer’s General Prologue by apologizing for the coarseness of his
character’s speech. Interestingly, he also apologizes for the crudeness of his narrators’ speech.3
I cannot conclude these introductory remarks without reminding those who have taken
exception to the coarse, inelegant, and sometimes ungrammatical language which the
writer represents himself as occasionally using, that it is a language accommodated to the
capacity of the person to whom he represents himself as speaking.” (xxiv)
In other words, if the writer, the narrator, is represented as speaking in a voice that is ungenteel,
not the voice of authority, it is because he is speaking down to the characters in order to make it
clear to them. He does not apologize for the coarseness of the other characters; they are coarse
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Georgia Scenes has two named narrators, Lyman Hall and Abram Baldwin, who narrate
individual scenes, respectively. The preface is signed “The Author”.
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and inelegant and may be represented as such. Longstreet may not be asking for forgiveness from
his readers, but he is defending himself from attack and maintaining his status as a master of the
dominant discourse.
While presenting mimetic voices–specifically vernacular speakers–Chaucer and
Longstreet increase the sense of realism and authenticity. At the same time these substandard
dialects threaten their authority as masters of the appropriate literary discourse. Both address this
threat in their introductory sections in attempts to maintain both authority and authenticity. It
must also be said that they do so ironically. Gittes adds, following E. Talbot Donaldson, that
there is ironic space between author and narrator. “Standing behind Chaucer the reporter is
Chaucer the poet, a figure who . . . is a manipulator of irony, of details, of structure” (248). I
would argue that both Chaucer and Longstreet felt that the use of the vernacular was vitally
important and objections based on a sense of propriety were overly fastidious. What is important
for our purposes is that both authors felt that those objections would be forthcoming, and that it
was necessary to comment on them. I don’t want to overstate the similarity, but both Chaucer and
Longstreet find themselves addressing this issue in their prefaces–both have to address an
objection, or perhaps an expectation, at least some of their readers will have in order to help
maintain their authority.
It continued to be important that the writer remain the “morally irreproachable
gentleman,” particularly if he was dealing with regional or folk material. Even in the twentieth
century it was important for Allen Tate to point out that both Longstreet and his material were
above the folk. “Georgia Scenes is a collection of tall tales written by an accomplished
gentleman for other accomplished gentlemen; this famous book is in no way folk literature”
40

(591).
Even in the latter part of the twentieth century, Lee Smith wrote of the difficulty she faced
when trying to write about “the character of the people” of her hometown of Grundy, Virginia
and “document that rich language I had–thank God!–grown up on, all those wonderful
expressions so much more exact and robust than the TV talk now going into every mountain
home” (“Introduction” xli). Though she didn’t have to worry that substandard language would be
banned, as Twain’s was, by the Concord Library for being “rough, coarse and inelegant” (????
308), she did feel a gap between the written and spoken. The use of vernacular may not have
been considered inappropriate by her audience, but a gap remained:
The problem was that I was writing this novel in the third person, in good standard
American English, so that every time one of my characters piped up and said something
like, ‘He’s daddied more children . . . ,’ he sounded like he was on Hee-Haw. And I
sounded like I was condescending to my characters–the last thing in the world I intended
to do. The gap between the third-person narrative voice of the novel and the characters’
own voices was simply too great. (xli)
In Chapter four we will discuss Smith’s specific attempts to solve this problem. What I want to
stress here is the persistence of written/spoken and elite/folk distinctions. Note that Smith uses
the term “condescending,” which Ross also uses when speaking of all mimetic voice. She also
writes of a “standard” narrative voice. In all of these works, separated by 400 years, we still see
that the narrator is expected to be genteel–elegant–to conform to the precepts of the dominant
discourse– the dominant discourse represented by what Lanser describes as authorial voice.
Authorial, Personal and Mimetic Voice
There are three types of voice that will be discussed in reference to the works of all three authors
in this study. All three authors use types of authorial, personal and mimetic voices. Examining
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similarities and the differences between the kinds of voices these authors use, and how they
employ them will help us understand how they attempt to negotiate the speakerly paradox. We
will see how these authors attempt to give their character’s colloquial voices what Lanser
describes as “discursive authority.”
Before we discuss voice, I want to define authority. There are two types of authority that
can generally be attributed to narrators. The first is the type of authority associated with
omniscience: the narrator can read minds, and travel effortlessly through time and space,
knowing and understanding all of the relevant causal relationships. Authors choose whether or
not to give their narrators this authority. An author is the source of this authority because the
author has created and is in control of the world of the novel.
The second type is discursive authority. In Fictions of Authority, Lanser defines
discursive authority as “the intellectual credibility, ideological validity, and aesthetic value
claimed by or conferred upon a work, author, narrator, character, or textual practice” (6).
Discursive authority reaches past the narrative authority generally associated with the term
‘omniscience’ and refers instead to wisdom that stretches beyond the world of the fiction and into
the culture at large. Lanser calls the act of authorship “a quest to be heard, respected, and
believed, a hope of influence” (7). When I speak of authority, I will be primarily concerned with
discursive authority.
Different voices hold different kinds of authority and establish or maintain it in a number
of ways. Lanser identifies three narrative modes “authorial, personal, and communal voice. Each
mode represents not simply a set of technical distinctions but a particular kind of narrative
consciousness” (15). Though I will discuss communal voice in reference to Absalom, Absalom!
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and The Devil’s Dream, I will primarily be concerned with her theories of personal and authorial
voice. Lanser calls authorial voice the unmarked case for the novel.
Authorial voice is “‘extradiegetic’ and public, directed to a narratee who is analogous to a
reading audience” (16). Extradiegetic narrators are outside of the narrated events, and are, in
effect, the creators and masters of the fictive world. More precisely, they are the fictive figures
who appear to speak as the creators and masters of the fictive world. Lanser doesn’t wish to lose
the distinction between narrators and authors, only to show that some narrators are more closely
associated with authors:
I have chosen the term ‘authorial’ not to imply an ontological equivalence between
narrator and author but to suggest that such a voice (re)produces the structural and
functional situation of authorship. In other words, where a distinction between the
(implied) author and a public, heterodiegetic narrator is not textually marked, readers are
invited to equate the narrator with the author and the narratee with themselves (or their
historical equivalents). This conventional equation gives authorial voice a privileged
status among narrative forms . . . Moreover, since authorial narrators exist outside
narrative time (indeed, ‘outside’ fiction) and are not ‘humanized’ by events, they
conventionally carry an authority superior to that conferred on characters, even on
narrating characters. (16)
“Author” and “narrator” are rightly two distinct entities in literary theory, but authorial voice
exists when we are encouraged to–or, perhaps more precisely, not discouraged from–equating the
narrator with the author. Authorial voice is that which seems like the author’s direct speech; like
the author’s unmediated or perhaps unmasked writing. Authorial narrators generally hold
discursive authority. In authorial discourse the unmarked case is that there is little or no ironic
distance between the author and the narrator. Also, the narrative voice has the power of author as
creator of the fictive world–as much knowledge as the author wants to have. Authorial narrators’
position outside of the fiction gives them their authority, but their authority also comes from their
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mastery of the dominant discourse. This is has generally been the unmarked case in American
literature. Until a text indicates otherwise, readers assume the narrator is using authorial voice.
For example, Twain’s narrator in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn announces his difference
from authorial voice in his first sentence. “You don’t know me, without you have read a book by
the name of ‘The Adventures of Tom Sawyer,’ but that ain’t no matter” (13). By his use of
nonstandard grammar, and his reference to himself as a character in an earlier fiction, Huck
marks himself as something very much other than an authorial voice. His voice is one that Lanser
calls “personal.”
I use the term personal voice to refer to narrators who are self-consciously telling their
own histories. I do not intend this term to designate all ‘homodiegetic’ or ‘first-person’
narratives–that is, all those in which the voice that speaks is a participant in the fictional
world–but only those Genette calls ‘autodiegetic,’ in which the ‘I’ who tells the story is
also the story’s protagonist (or an older version of the protagonist). (18-19)
The distinction between authorial and personal voice is quite clear. There is, however, a great
space between these two types of narrators that is unaccounted for in Lanser’s taxonomy,
primarily because this space is historically only available to male authors. For my purposes
another category is called for: genteel narrators exist in the interstices between authorial and
personal voice. Chaucer’s “pilgrim” and Longstreet’s Hall and Baldwin are genteel narrators, as
is the narrator that Twain will finally abandon when he writes The Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn. The genteel narrator claims the discursive authority of an author–the mastery of the
tradition and the wisdom associated with this mastery–while not enjoying the god-like powers
associated with omniscience. They do not claim to have created the fictive world. They claim to
be insightful observers of the real world, and as such they retain a status apart and above their
characters.
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I would contend that personal voice can be the voice of any homodiegetic narrator
because they all face the same challenge to their authority that Lanser correctly describes in the
following excerpt:
The authority of personal voice is contingent in ways that the authority of authorial voice
is not: while the autodiegetic ‘I’ remains a structurally ‘superior’ voice mediating the
voices of other characters, it does not carry the superhuman privileges that attach to
authorial voice, and its status is dependent on a reader’s response not only to the
narrator’s acts but to the character’s actions, just as the authority of the representation is
dependent in turn on the successful construction of a credible voice. (19)
All of a personal narrator’s actions reflect on his or her authority. In fact, the authority of a
personal narrator is often determined in much the same way as that of any storyteller. In authorial
voice, authority is contingent on the author being able to construct a narrator who conforms to
the language of the dominant group. The personal narrator, conversely, is judged by his or her
actions inside the fiction as well as the manner by which he or she presents the story. A personal
narrator has only the authority of the eye witness. Lanser adds that an “authorial narrator claims
broad powers of knowledge and judgment. While a personal narrator claims only the validity of
one person’s right to interpret her experience” (19). Because personal voice seeks no authority
beyond that of the individual, personal narrators like Huck Finn must be distinguished from what
I will call genteel narrators, like “Misto C– in “A True Story” and the Pilgrim in The Canterbury
Tales. These narrators generally seek and hold the authority as masters of the dominant discourse
and not merely as eye witnesses. Since Lanser’s study is of women’s writing, and the voice of
authority has, “with varying degrees of intensity, attached itself most readily to white, educated
men of hegemonic ideology” (6), for Lanser the line between authorial and personal voice is
relatively clear. In this study we will see male personal narrators who use the language of
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authority. These narrators have access to almost all the validity and credibility of authorial voices
because of their connection to elite culture. A difficulty arises when these voices seek to validate
folk culture using the medium of the elite.
These genteel narrators have access to almost all the validity and credibility of authorial
voices because of their connection to elite culture. A culture separate from that associated with
traditional orality. Carl Lindahl writes:
The superorganic authority of elite culture comes from outside the boundaries of one’s
community, from great distances of space and time. . . . The community of experience of
folk culture, on the other hand, is based almost wholly on what one sees and does.
Everything, even the most distant past, takes on the shape of the palpable present. A man
may tell a thousand-year-old tale, but its style, form, and content are determined by a
situational esthetic; the tale must reflect the exact circumstances in which it is told. The
‘rules’ of such a community, though unwritten, are constantly apparent in the behavior of
its members. (10)
Experience is valued in traditional cultures, as Tex Sample said it was in the culture of his youth.
Compare Lindahl’s discussion of authority during Chaucer’s time with what Henry Nash Smith
writes about Mark Twain. Smith writes that Twain was “in a society encumbered by a traditional
culture that had hardened into a set of conventions having little relation to the actual experience
of its members” (viii). The authoritative language—the literary language—was one alien to his
experience. However, in order to reach an audience of readers, he had to use this language and its
conventions. This is the challenge all three of these writers face: how to bring an evocative and
authoritative spoken voice into a medium that is ruled, because of convention and biomechanical
factors, by a different type of “voice.” Smith writes:
[Twain’s] efforts to find an alternative to the prevailing cult of gentility and to define his
own role in society appear in his work as a series of difficulties in the management of
narrative viewpoint. His degree of success in solving all three problems can be traced in
his progress toward the creation of a consistent fictional persona to serve as the
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protagonist in first-person narratives. Thus his technical innovations might be described
with equal accuracy as an ethical, a sociological, or a literary undertaking. (vii)
Twain, Faulkner and Smith were faced with literate forms of power that had less relevance to
their experience but still exerted great influence. Similarly, when they wrote novels they found
that the primary narrative voice of a work has a greater authority, by literary convention, than
other voices in the work. They were faced with the challenge of trying to represent something
important to them in a medium that is less than ideal for doing so. All of these authors wish to
publish the authority that the community of experience holds. What interests me is the literary
undertaking of creating voices that can speak in a manner other than that of the dominant
discourse. The author’s challenge is to try and create a community–a context–in which the
utterances of characters can be evaluated appropriately, where the spoken voice carries the
authority the author wishes it to have and not a structurally or culturally predetermined one.
These utterances are generally represented by the third type of voice I wish to discuss,
what Stephen Ross calls mimetic voice. Before I define mimetic voice, I want to first clarify my
definition of “voice” in literature. In Fiction’s Inexhaustible Voice, identifies four types of
“voices” in the works of William Faulkner. I will use his taxonomy in reference to the work of all
the authors in this study. He suggests that “together they can provide a taxonomy of voice in
Faulkner (and perhaps in fiction generally) that will allow us to explore systematically this
special source of Faulkner’s power” (15). The power Ross writes of is Faulkner’s ability to evoke
presence in his work. Ross argues that:
The word ‘voice’ has been employed traditionally as a metonymic designation for the
human presence we hear or imagine whenever we read a poem or a story. In its
commonsensical way ‘voice’ signifies expressive ‘sound’ in literary speech, those
inscribed, perceivable differences among characters’ talking, among narrators’ story
47

telling, and among authors’ styles. (4)
I would not concede that voice signifies sound, specifically because human presence can be
evoked through writing. Like “narrator,” voice as a literary term must cover more ground than its
metaphorical connection with speech implies. The baseline definition of voice will concern the
human presence we imagine whenever we read literature. We will see examples, in both The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and The Devil’s Dream, of a presence that does not speak in any
sense of the word. I would also, however, again quote Lee Smith, writing about her idea of
literature. “What I hear is a voice, always one particular human voice, telling the story” (xxxii).
She hears a voice, and the metaphorical relationship with speech is far from inconsequential.
Though writing often and quite naturally evokes the idea of the human voice, Gerald
Prince’s definition of voice does not refer to sound except through the use of Gerard Genette’s
distinction between “who sees,” (mood) and “who speaks” (voice) (Narrative Discourse 186).
Prince defines voice as the “set of signs characterizing the narrator and, more generally, the
narrating instance” He argues that the term “provides information about who ‘speaks,’ who the
narrator is, what the narrating instance consists of” (102-103). Voice is a set of signs, which
evokes presence, not necessarily speech.
I contend that voice should not be limited to narrators or speaking characters. With the
work of all of these critics in mind, I would argue that “voice” designates the set of signs
characterizing both the narrator and all expressive sound or represented speech in literary
discourse. I think it is important to note that not all the human presences who speak in a work are
narrators; some characters who speak are not narrating, some narrators are not speaking, and
some characters who tell stories should not be considered narrators. I will discuss the distinction
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between narrators and storytelling characters at length. Right now the important thing to
remember is that the word “voice” refers to the set of signs that characterize representations of
human presence. Not all voices are narrators or narrative voices. Though voice is the answer to
the question “who speaks?” we should remain aware that all literary voice is only a written
representation with no inherent sound qualitites–that “who speaks” is, for Genette and generally
speaking, a metonymic designation, and does not necessarily refer to speech anymore than
writing the sentence “Genette says ‘voice’ is the answer to the question ‘who speaks?’” suggests
that the writer heard Genette say those words. Literary voice that is specifically linked to human
speech is the third kind of voice we will be studying. Ross calls it “mimetic voice”:
The phrase ‘mimetic voice’ refers to a represented speech in fiction, to the illusion that a
person–character, narrator, even sometimes author–is speaking. ‘Mimetic voice’ is
constituted by those features of a text’s discourse that prompt readers to regard a
particular portion of the text’s total discourse as the utterance of an imagined person. (67)
This definition is certainly clear. What can be tricky is how this illusion is created. One method
of representing the speaking voice is to use dialect writing, which Sumner Ives calls literary
dialect. In “A Theory of Literary Dialect,” Ives defines a literary dialect as “an author’s attempt
to represent in writing a speech that is restricted regionally, socially, or both” (137). Literary
dialect is not merely dialogue. It is not merely words in quotation marks which are attributed to
characters. It is an attempt to represent speech in writing, specifically a speech that is markedly
different from standard English. Ives mentions a variety of techniques a dialect writer may
employ in order to represent speech:
His representation may consist merely in the use of an occasional spelling change, like
FATHUH rather than father, or the use of a word like servigrous; or he may attempt to
approach the scientific accuracy by representing all the grammatical, lexical, and phonetic
peculiarities that he has observed. (137)
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Though authors may wish to represent speech exactly, Ives writes that nearly all “examples of
literary dialect are deliberately incomplete; the author is an artist, not a linguist or a sociologist,
and his purpose is literary rather than scientific” (138). Even if the alternate spellings and other
techniques available to authors could adequately represent the variants of speech, an author may
not choose to use them. As Ives argues, “both the author’s desire to keep his representation
within readable limits and his difficulties in finding suitable spelling devices will inhibit his
portrayal of a speech type. Any literary dialect, therefore, will necessarily be a partial and
somewhat artificial picture of the actual speech” (152). The goal is to make this artificial
rendering seem as real as possible, at least for some authors. Ives’ definition only includes
“serious attempts to suggest an actual speech” (137) and includes Twain as one of the authors
whose aim is “the serious representation of a genuine speech or dialect” (137-38). What is
important is that all dialect writers, serious or not, use it to signal difference.
Paul Hull Bowdre Jr. differentiates substandard dialect from regional dialect, codifying
Ives’ distinction between regional and social differences by defining dialect writing primarily by
its use of non-standard spellings. Regional dialect consists of non-standard spellings used to
“indicate pronunciations that are standard in a certain region (or regions) of the United States”
(2). A substandard dialect, on the other hand, uses non-standard spelling to “represent
pronunciations which are not standard in any section of the country” (2). Obviously substandard
dialects can and often do have regional characteristics.
Literary dialect marks difference, and in order to mark this difference clearly, authors may
exaggerate the specific qualities of a dialect. Ives argues that characters whose speech is
represented by literary dialect are usually “set off, either socially or geographically, from the
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main body of those who speak the language. Usually the suggested difference carries some
connotation of inferiority, but not always” (138).
It is not only theoretically possible, but it is sometimes the case that dialect is meant to
represent the speech of a character of a social class superior to the narrator. But it is rarely the
case, and may be theoretically impossible. Also, some may hesitate to call this writing dialect. An
authorial narrator may present the speech of a member of the elite class or a scientist, but even
these representations may be condescending, as Ross argues. Ross writes:
Dialect writing epitomizes a condition of all literature that evokes mimetic voice.
Transcribed speech, the product of mimicry, always occupies an inferior position in
relation to the diegetic discourse of its production. The mimetic voices we hear are
always secondary, indulged and condescended to by the reader who shares (as an
audience shares the mimic’s knowledge) the author’s power over all the voices. (108)
For Ross, the way that transcribed speech is presented is not relevant–all mimetic voice is a copy
of a copy and therefore secondary to “the diegetic discourse of its production.” Lanser contends
that “within the hierarchical structures of the realist novel, any project to authorize characters
outside the social hegemony is already undermined by the conventions of narrative form” (125).
Writing specifically about African-American novelists, she argues that the containment of
vernacular “to orthographically marked and framed ‘dialect’ is an emblem of a larger
containment of folk cultures in novelistic worlds where social and textual success is measured by
educated white standards. Such a practice leaves formally unchallenged the implied race and
class of realism’s ‘generic’ voice, the overarching consciousness that adopts an authorized
language in order to forge a collusion between narrator and narratee” (125). It seems that Lanser
suggests a mimetic voice that conforms to the standards of the dominant discourse could hold
discursive authority. She also suggests that all of folk culture is necessarily secondary. Clearly,
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authorizing a literary dialect, which is by definition a nonstandard discourse, faces both structural
and social difficulties.
In the following chapters I will discuss voice and authority in the works of Mark Twain,
William Faulkner and Lee Smith while delineating the differences between narrators, storytelling
characters and other voices. I hope to show how all three authors attempt to give their characters
speaking voices which are not necessarily inferior to the other voices in their works. In the next
chapter I will discuss Mark Twain’s use of genteel and personal narrators, and the relationship
between these narrators and the storytelling characters they present. I will argue that the personal
voice he creates in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is an attempt to imbue a speaking voice
with discursive authority, with ideological validity outside of the fictive world.
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HOW TO TELL A STORY
GENTEEL, PERSONAL, AND MIMETIC VOICES IN MARK TWAIN
Critics never seem to tire of pointing out that both Ernest Hemingway and William
Faulkner cite Mark Twain as the father of the American novel. Apparently I’m no exception.
Actually, while calling Sherwood Anderson the father, Faulkner called Twain the grandfather of
his generation of American writers (Gwynn 281). Twain’s status hangs almost entirely on his use
of personal voice in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, which the narrator of Hemingway’s
autobiographical novel Green Hills of Africa calls the best American novel. “‘All modern
American literature comes from one book by Mark Twain called Huckleberry Finn. . . . All
American writing comes from that’” (22). Richard Bridgman writes: “Whatever the merits of
Mark Twain’s other writing, and whatever the weaknesses of Huckleberry Finn,
everyone–literary hacks, artists, and critics–agrees that the style of this single book has had a
major effect on the development of American prose” (5-6).
Twain’s stylistic achievement was to give a marginalized voice the primary position in
Huckleberry Finn and thus pave the way for other marginalized voices. Bridgman notes that this
was only one step in a longer process. For our purposes, we must remember that Huck’s values
gain no better than a pyrrhic victory in the novel; finally he cannot fight the dominant structures
because he cannot believe that they are wrong. After finally creating a vernacular character that
has as much authority as a speaking voice can have in a novel, Twain has that voice abrogate that
authority to someone the voice considers to have the authority of the dominant discourse
community.
Henry Nash Smith writes that Twain’s “efforts to find an alternative to the prevailing cult
of gentility . . appear in his work as a series of difficulties in the management of narrative
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viewpoint” (vii). One can quibble with particular phrases, but one of the goals in Twain’s
struggle with narrative viewpoint is to authorize vernacular voices–to show that the dominant
discourse does not necessarily have superior access to truth or wisdom. Twain found himself
trying to authorize speaking voices, ones outside of the dominant discourse, in a medium that
privileged the written. The method he finally arrived at was the removal of the standard
authorizing voice. One of the things we will see in this chapter is that Twain moved his authorsurrogate narrators, the authorial voices, farther into the background until, in the case of
Huckleberry Finn, he is almost imperceptible. In Huckleberry Finn, there is an authorial
presence, but he does not dominate the primary narrative voice.
The style of the narrative voice in Huckleberry Finn has been described as vernacular or
colloquial. Vernacular is broadly defined as the “native language of a country or people;
sometimes it is extended to include native customs as well” (Childers and Hentzi). Bridgman
notes that vernacular is the noun directly relating to the adjective “colloquial” (17). So vernacular
is language in a colloquial style.
Porter G. Perrin argues that the vernacular “now usually means Nonstandard and perhaps
Informal English, the native homely, spoken language as contrasted with formal or literary
English, usually with the implication that the vernacular has more vitality and force” (Qtd. in
Bridgman 18). While Perrin suggests that the vernacular “usually” contains an implication of
“vitality and force,” Bridgman finds this definition lacking, suggesting that Perrin believes this
usual implication is a defining characteristic:
The idiom marked by formality and appearing in print is ‘standard.’ However, the
definition continues, it is usually thought to be less forceful than the vernacular. For the
vernacular to be regarded as possessing more force and vitality than standard English is
perhaps a triumph of democratic sentiment, but it is no great advance over the opposite
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nineteenth-century assumption that the lower strata of society made animal noises (that is,
spoke the vernacular) while the upper, educated classes emitted harmonies (standard
English). If one attempts to particularize the general description of the vernacular offered
by this modern definition, one may find it difficult to imagine a ‘native homely, spoken
language,’ for such a definition reflects nostalgia for a rural simplicity no longer, if ever,
available. While the definition is emotionally accurate, it is practically useless. (18)
There is a certain amount of nostalgia in Perrin, but this doesn’t necessarily invalidate contrasting
the vernacular with a formal or literary language. The difficulty lies more in finding an apt
definition of the non-literary language than with saying that the vernacular has marked difference
from the literary language. Bridgman’s first attempt at defining vernacular–the colloquial style–is
a good starting place:
The answer most ready at hand is to define the colloquial mode as any prose written as if
it were spoken by someone. To this, one must add that the presence of a narrator is no
guarantee that the result will be colloquial, just as, conversely, the basic features of
colloquial writing may appear even without an announced narrator. Those colloquial
features are derived from the psychology of speech. (20)
It is particularly helpful to say that the features are derived from the “psychology of speech.” The
colloquial voice is not merely spoken; however, it is also indicative of a nonstandard dialect.
Certainly spokenness is not an adequate criterion, as one very significant example will
demonstrate. In George Washington Harris’ Sut Lovingood: Yarns Spun By a Nat’ral Born
Durn’d Fool almost all of the prose is written as if it were spoken by someone. The two most
prominent voices represented are of the narrator “George,” who obviously is meant to represent
the author, and the storytelling character Sut Lovingood. Both characters utterances are contained
in quotation marks in most works, though some of the chapters are made up only of Sut’s speech
and do not use even initial quotation marks. Every chapter of the book is a storytelling event
where Sut is the teller and George is the story listener, though sometimes, later in the book after
the setting has been established, this is only implied. It is a represented dialogue between these
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two characters with minimal diegesis; there is some description of Sut and his surroundings, and
occasionally phrases like “he said” are included. Only one of these characters, however, uses the
vernacular.
The entire preface of Sut Lovingood is quoted dialogue. George begins with a question:
“We must have a preface, Sut; your book will then be ready. What shall I write?” (viii). Ben
Harris McClary writes that “Sut’s mountaineer speech [is] set within the framework of George’s
stilted conventional language” (234). Sut’s language is almost immediately marked as different,
his syntax and word choice are different, and his pronunciation is marked as different by both
phonetic writing and eye dialect. He quickly states his difference explicitly. “‘Sumtimes, George,
I wishes I cud read an’ write, jis’ a littil; but then hits bes’ es hit am, fur ove all the fools the
worild hes tu contend wif, the edicated wuns am the worst; they breeds ni ontu all the devilment
a-gwine on’” (ix).
Though both of these characters are represented as speaking, their modes of speech are
markedly different. Sut speaks in what Paul Bowdre calls a substandard dialect. If George, who
Bridgman calls “the representative of normality” (27), is using any sort of dialect, it is not
marked in any way in the text. Even though he is represented as speaking, George still
distinguishes himself as a master of the dominant discourse. Quotation marks are the only
difference we see between George’s speech and his writing; there is no difference in vocabulary
or grammatical features. It is level of language that distinguishes the two characters; the narrator
is not using the vernacular, even when he speaks. It is not important that he be represented as
writing; it is important that he is a writer.
The writerly character’s status is based on his ability to adhere to the language of the
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dominant discourse community, and this assumes that he is also adhering to other social attitudes
and behaviors. Henry Nash Smith widens the definition of “vernacular” to also include ethical
and aesthetic assumptions.
The most obvious distinction between ‘straight’ and ‘low’ characters in writing of this
sort lay in their speech; the exploitation of local dialects was one of the most common
sources of comedy. It is therefore appropriate to use the term ‘vernacular’ to designate not
only the language of rustic or backwoods characters but also the values, the ethical and
aesthetic assumptions, they represent. (4)
We can define the vernacular only negatively, perhaps, particularly if we are going to
distinguish it from dialect and mimetic voice. Bowdre defines a dialect primarily by its use of
non-standard spelling. He differentiates substandard dialect from regional dialect. Regional
dialect consists of non-standard spellings used to “indicate pronunciations that are standard in a
certain region (or regions) of the United States” (2). A substandard dialect, on the other hand,
uses non-standard spelling to “represent pronunciations which are not standard in any section of
the country” (2). Dialect refers to mimetic voice while the vernacular refers to all nonstandard
dialect. Bowdre also distinguishes between these two types of dialect and eye dialect:
Eye dialect consists of words and groups of words which for any one of a number of
reasons have been spelled in a manner which to the eye is recognizably non-standard, but
which to the ear still indicates a pronunciation that is standard throughout the United
States or, in most instances, throughout the English-speaking world . . . Thus the two
spellings represent the same phonetic shape; no difference in what the represent is
detectable to the ear. The eye, however, detects a considerable difference in the
appearance of the two spellings. (1)
In the example of Sut’s dialect above, I would argue that “littel” for “little,” and “ove” for “of”
are examples of eye dialect. More clearly the use of “tu” for “to,” and “wuns” for “ones” signal
no pronunciation difference. They only signal that Sut’s speech is different from George’s. These
are not the only examples of eye dialect in the passage, which also contains many nonstandard
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spellings that are attempts to represent different pronunciations.
Bowdre’s distinctions will become particularly useful in discussion of The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn. Right now they are interesting because the short stories we are looking at
make little or no use of regional or eye dialect. As Sumner Ives points out, in the case of regional
dialects this may be merely because the regional dialects that educated people in these works
speak are considered the proper English pronunciation by the authors. “As a matter of fact, the
speech of educated persons is not ordinarily represented in ‘dialectal’ spelling by authors who are
portraying their own region. . . . the speech of persons from the educated classes is shown
without the ‘dialectal’ indication found in the speech of the less educated” (159). But there is
more to mark literary dialect than simply pronunciation. Ives writes that “an author’s . . .
representation may consist merely in the use of an occasional spelling change, like FATHUH
rather than father, or the use of a word like servigrous; or he may attempt to approach the
scientific accuracy by representing all the grammatical, lexical, and phonetic peculiarities that he
has observed” (137).
The language of the narrator of Sut Lovingood is unmarked by non-standard spellings,
and his level of vocabulary clearly marks him as educated. In all of the short stories I will discuss
in this chapter, there are only three types of voice: the genteel, which is the voice of a personal
authorial surrogate, and two levels of mimetic voice. The genteel voice is an individual voice
which displays mastery of the dominant discourse and is represented as the writer of the work.
Even if he is represented as speaking, he uses substandard spelling or idioms only in an ironic or
condescending manner. The second type is a storytelling character–a character represented, in
these examples, in literary dialect–a mimetic, speaking voice which, in these instances, would
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have to be considered as speaking in a substandard dialect. The third consists of any other
mimetic voices used by the previous two.
In The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, the narrator is not a writer; he is not part of the
dominant discourse community. In what may now seem an inevitable and logical progression,
Twain, along with some of his contemporaries, reduced the mediating presence of the educated,
genteel narrator characteristic of Southwestern humor and thereby raised the potential for the
marginalized speaking voice to have discursive authority. The personal voice of Huck Finn was
developed from the dynamic where an intradiegetic narrator, writing in the voice of cultural
authority, presented a mimetic voice–a metadiegetic narrator–a storytelling character. Huck is an
example of mimetic voice used by an author, instead of a narrator. Twain’s achievement was to
make the mimetic voice of Huckleberry Finn the intradiegetic narrator, and therefore the most
authoritative voice in the work. Through this he attempted to give the power of the pen to what
Kenneth Lynn calls “an ignorant river waif” (96).
Before we look more closely at Huck, we will look at some of Twain’s most important
short stories. We will see Twain progressively move his authorial presence further into the
background, and how these short stories negotiate the speakerly paradox. In “How to Tell a
Story,” Twain frames a traditional story inside an essay describing proper storytelling technique
because it is a story that cannot be effectively translated to print in a conventional manner. All of
the versions of the Jumping Frog story and “A True Story” are represented storytelling events
that Twain claimed were based on actual storytelling events where he was a story listener. They
both employ a framing device similar to that of what Walter Blair calls the “mock oral tale”
characteristic of Southwestern humor. Though both stories follow some generic conventions of
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southwestern humor, they also show an author who is struggling with the conventional notions of
narrative authority and who has a deep understanding of storytelling events.
There is no question that the cultures of traditional orality that Mark Twain experienced,
both in his childhood in Missouri and his travels in the west, had a tremendous influence on his
thought and writings. Twain’s love of storytelling is unquestioned. In “How to Tell a Story,”
Twain writes “I do not claim that I can tell a story as it ought to be told. I only claim to know
how a story ought to be told, for I have been daily in the company of the most expert story-tellers
for many years” (263). His success on the lecture platform and the anecdotal evidence from
family, friends and acquaintances suggest that his disparaging his own skill is modesty of some
sort. He certainly participated in a great many storytelling events. Fred Lorch writes of Twain’s
“exposure to a number of exceptionally able raconteurs and his own gradual absorption of their
skills. The importance of this has long been recognized in the development of Mark Twain as a
writer” (9).
Lorch’s description echoes Albert Bates Lord’s description of the development of
Yugoslavian epic singers. “Before he actually begins to sing, he is, consciously or unconsciously,
laying the foundation. He is learning the stories and becoming acquainted with the heroes and
their names, the faraway places and the habits of long ago. . . . at the same time he is imbibing
the rhythm of the singing and to some extent the thoughts as they are expressed in song” (21).
There are differences, of course, but Twain was raised in the midst of a storytelling tradition and
that experience influenced his life and his fiction. This influence is not limited to the stories
themselves. He also absorbed the uses of language characteristic of traditional storytelling–the
rhythm, the mannerisms and the particular language. This language also influenced the way he
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engaged the world. Lorch cites Twain’s mother as one able storyteller he learned from:
But in those early years Mark Twain had the high fortune of listening to other masterful
raconteurs besides his mother . . . It was during these early years, also, that he heard and
never forgot the stories told at his Uncle John Quarles’ farm, near Florida, Missouri,
where, up to the age of twelve, he spent most of his summers. (10)
In his autobiography Twain specifically recalls storytelling events at his uncle’s farm. The
primary storyteller was the slave Uncle Dan’l.
I know the look of Uncle Dan’l’s kitchen as it was on privileged nights when I was a
child, and I can see the white and black children grouped on the hearth, with the firelight
playing on their faces and the shadows flickering upon the walls, clear back toward the
cavernous gloom of the rear, and I can hear Uncle Dan’l telling the immortal tales which
Uncle Remus Harris was to gather in his books and charm the world with, by and by; and
I can feel again the creepy joy which quivered through me when the time for the ghoststory of the ‘Golden Arm’ was reached–and the sense of regret, too, which came over me,
for it was always the last story of the evening, and there was nothing between it and the
unwelcome bed. (121-22)
We see that the story “Golden Arm” was, in itself, an important one to Twain. He
performed it on the platform frequently, and sent a version to Joel Chandler Harris in 1881
“suggesting that it would make a good Uncle Remus story” (Burrison 44). Harris asked around
and found a different version (Shiny Pennies) of the story being told in Atlanta. Harris published
a version of Shiny Pennies as “A Ghost Story” in Nights with Uncle Remus shortly afterward. “It
is interesting to note that on Mark Twain’s reading tour with George Washington Cable in 18841885, during which Twain’s ‘Ghost Story’ was a constant feature, he would alternate, from city
to city, his own ‘Golden Arm’ version with Harris’ ‘stolen coins’ versions, presumably to avoid
the monotony of telling the exact same story time and again” (Burrison11-12).
As Burrison writes, Twain “acquired the tale in his childhood through an unselfconscious
traditional process” (13). Twain inserts the Golden Arm into his work “How to Tell a Story.” He
also makes it clear that the experience of this story cannot be adequately realized in print. As
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Burrison notes, “‘The Golden Arm,’ even more than many other folktales, is ear literature, far
more effective when heard than when read to oneself” (13). While describing the American art of
humorous storytelling, which he specifically qualifies as “by word of mouth, not print” (264),
Twain describes four important features. For our purposes now, the fourth is of some interest.
“The fourth and last basis of the American art of storytelling is the pause” (267). He justifies the
use of the “Golden Arm” as an example of a story that relies on well-measured pauses to have its
effect.
His interest in the tale extended beyond this short story. Twain inserted excerpts from his
daughter Suzy’s biography of him into his autobiography. In one excerpt she mentions the
“Golden Arm” specifically:
He read ‘A Trying Situation’ and ‘The Golden Arm,’ a ghost story that he heard down
South when he was a little boy. ‘The Golden Arm’ papa had told me before, but he had
startled me so that I did not much wish to hear it again. But I had resolved this time to be
prepared and not to let myself be startled, but still papa did, and very very much; he
startled the whole roomful of people and they jumped as one man. (61-62)
Twain writes that the secret to making a whole roomful of people jump is a well-measured pause
followed by abrupt movement and speech. Part of the reason Twain includes this excerpt is the
pride he takes in correctly executing the pause to startle Suzy, even though she had already heard
the story told and been startled. Like a two-out-of-three rock-paper-scissors match, Twain knows
that Suzy knows that he hopes to startle her, and still he does. The exact pause necessary to
startle a little girl a second time, one who is far less likely to be a far-gone auditor is different, as
each pause is in each performance.
He frames “the Golden Arm” in the form of storytelling instruction. In the script of the
story he inserts parenthetical stage directions, for example “(pause–awed, listening attitude)”
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(269). The last parenthesis never closes:
Den de voice say, right at his year–‘W-h-o--g-o-t--m-y--g-o-l-d-e-n arm?’ (You must
wail it out very plaintively and accusingly; then you stare steadily and impressively into
the face of the farthest-gone auditor–a girl, preferably–and let that awe-inspiring pause
begin to build itself in the deep hush. When it has reached exactly the right length, jump
suddenly at that girl and yell, ‘You’ve got it!’
If you’ve got the pause right, she’ll fetch a dear little yelp and spring right out of her
shoes. But you must get the pause right; and you will find it the most troublesome and
aggravating and uncertain thing you ever undertook. (270)
Even the last bit of dialogue is inside the parenthetical stage directions. It is in parentheses, or at
least can be, because it cannot be adequately dramatized in the kinds of represented speech
available to writers. The dramatic effect of the story is neither heightened nor diminished by this
method because it can only be properly realized aurally. Obviously the narrator of a written work
cannot single out a particularly susceptible reader and write in a pause in such a way as to make
that reader yelp, dearly or otherwise. Also, dramatizing this moment is not particularly effective.
In fact the only way to dramatize this is too have a represented story-listening character.
Twain frames the Golden Arm in such a way that the mimetic voice of the storyteller is
also the authorial voice, albeit in a different context. He shows that the spoken voice is a
different means of expression–not necessarily a secondary or a better one–simply a different one.
The mastery of oral storytelling is as practiced a skill as any literary venture. In this instance the
master of literary discourse is also the master of spoken discourse–a discourse learned at the feet
of a slave.
One speculation I want to make is that the storytelling events he participated in as a
listener and as a teller were very important to Twain, and the Golden Arm was closely related to
his memory of these experiences. So important that he not only performed it frequently (publicly
and privately), he also included his daughter’s writing about it in his autobiography, as well as
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his personal reminiscences of hearing it as a child, sent a version to Harris encouraging him to
print it, and made the story a crucial part of “How to Tell a Story.” He mentioned this story in
print in all of these instances even though he clearly understood that the story could not be
adequately realized in that medium.
In “How to Tell a Story,” Twain shows how one part of the art of humorous storytelling
cannot be realized in print. Another part of that art, and the mastery of it, concerns what many
critics have come to call the deadpan style. Twain’s use of the deadpan style in his platform
performances and his advocacy of it in print have heightened what Peter Messent calls the
indeterminancy of “The Jumping Frog of Calaveras County.”
Twain explains part of the deadpan style, and names Artemus Ward as one of the masters
of it, in “How to Tell a Story.” Its foundation is in the storyteller’s pretending to be unaware of
the humor of his story. “The humorous story is told gravely; the teller does his best to conceal the
fact that he even dimly suspects that there is anything funny about it” (264). Henry Wohnam
writes that Twain’s platform speaking technique “owed a great deal to Artemus Ward, whose
deadpan absurdities Twain had witnessed and appreciated” (147). Wohnam also argues that his
style was not learned from Ward:
Twain’s platform technique was a direct and uncomplicated extension of the yarnspinning style he had known since childhood. The persona he invented for the stage was
that of a tall-tale teller who speaks gravely but knows better. His drawling speech and
affected seriousness served as an invitation to excessively naive listeners–if any such
listeners could really have existed–to adopt a correspondingly grave interpretation of his
words, while the yarn-spinner shared a tacit joke with those members of the audience who
saw through the deadpan and appreciated its crafted absurdity. (147)
The challenge in interpreting the Jumping Frog story lies in determining who exactly is
appreciating what and whether the absurdity of the tale is crafted or unconscious. The actual
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story inside the frame may be merely an amusing oral performance, but the frame calls the
purpose and meaning of the event into question. The genteel narrator, who we are called on to
identify directly with the author, claims to writes the story as an example of a trick played on
him. Apparently, a friend has tricked him into listening to a pointless narrative told by a boorish
storyteller. He flees the event at the earliest possible moment because it is, among other things,
rambling and disjointed. Of course in “How to Tell a Story,” Twain identifies the humorous story
as one that is “rambling and disjointed” (264). So we are left with a narrator, a genteel narrator
who is supposed to act as our guide and mediator, who finds a deadpan performance, the height
of humorous storytelling, dull and pointless. Our educated guide is ignorant of the proper way to
interpret the story. But before we talk more about this narrator and establish the meaning of the
frame of the story, we have to address the fact that the frame itself is not stable.
“First published as ‘Jim Smiley and His Jumping Frog’ in the New York Saturday Press
(18 November 1865), the story was reprinted ten times in the ten years following its initial
publication” (Wilson 163). There were some changes in some of those versions; “the many
authorial changes were designed, for the most part, to increase both the number and consistency
of nonstandard spellings so as to enrich the regional flavor of the tale” (Wilson 163). The version
that appeared in Twain’s first book, The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County and
Other Sketches, which was published by Charles Henry Webb in 1867, has significant changes in
the frame. Twain published a version that included a French translation and his translation back
into English in 1875. This version was occasioned in response to a French version of the story
published by Revue des Deux Mondes. “Private History of the ‘Jumping Frog’ Story,” which was
written in response to Twain’s receiving a copy of a version of the story that Arthur Sidgwick
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claimed was of ancient Greek origin, was first published in the April 1894 issue of the North
American Review (Wilson 164). All of these versions, published in a span of twenty-nine years,
include the basic story that Twain first recorded in his notebook in 1863, which is here quoted in
full:
Coleman with his jumping frog–bet stranger $50–stranger had no frog, & C got him
one–in the meantime stranger filled C’s frog full of shot and he couldn’t jump–the
stranger’s frog won. (80)
The available evidence strongly suggests that a miner named Ben Coon told Twain this story. In
a letter to Jim Gillis, who was with Twain when he heard the story, Twain reminded Gillis of the
specific storytelling event that helped make his literary reputation:
You remember the one gleam of jollity, that shot across our dismal sojourn in the rain and
mud of Angel’s Camp–I mean that day we sat around the tavern stove and heard that chap
tell about the frog and how they filled him with shot. And you remember how we quoted
from the yarn and laughed over it, out there on the hillside while you and dear old stoker
panned and washed. I jotted down the story in my notebook that day and I would have
been glad to get ten or fifteen dollars for it–I was just that blind. I published that story,
and it became widely known in America, India, China, England–and the reputation it
made for me has paid me thousands and thousands of dollars since. (qtd. in Williams 90)
There are two speculations I’d like to make based on this letter. One is that there is no
evidence in this private letter, or from Twain’s notebook, what kind of narrator Coon was. It does
suggest that hearing him tell stories was a pleasant experience, but it gives no indication of the
manner of his telling. Perhaps, then, the description of the deadpan storyteller, Simon Wheeler, is
entirely fictional. Certainly his calling the event a “gleam of jollity” conflicts with Twain’s
description of the event in “A Private History”: “in my time I have not attended a more solemn
conference” (624).
The second speculation I’d like to put forth is that Twain’s memory of quoting from the
yarn and laughing about it with friends during their work could have been a strong enough that
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some of Coon’s language may have survived, even though Twain made no notes about it. I am
thinking specifically about the stranger’s repeated phrase “I don’t see no p’ints about that frog
that’s any better’n any other frog.” Retelling the story among friends could lodge some catch
phrases in his mind.
I cannot hope to prove either of these speculations, nor are they vitally important in our
effort to understand the story itself. However, in my discussion of “A True Story,” the question
of Twain’s recall of specific language will come up again, and I want to advance the possibility
that a key phrase like that would have stuck with Twain. And, more importantly, that his sparse
notebook entry could have evoked more of the experience in his memory of the experience than
it may suggest. On the other point, Coon could have been consciously or unconsciously deadpan
or he could have been as animated as the Big Bear of Arkansas. What certainly is important is
Twain’s consistent insistence in print that Coon always seemed in dead earnest and that he never
betrayed knowledge that the story was funny. In “The Private History” he calls the man who told
the story a “dull and solemn Californian” (264). However Ben Coon told the story, the
storytelling character Simon Wheeler never betrays that he is aware of the comedy inherent in his
tale.
Though it is generally held that Coon was Twain’s source for the basic story, there were
three versions of the story published before Twain’s. Jim Townsend’s “A Toad Story,” was
published in the Sonora Herald on 11 June 1853; Henry P. Leland’s, “Frogs Shot Without
Powder,” appeared in the New York Spirit of the Times, 26 May 1855; and the San Andreas
Independent published Samuel Seabough’s, “Tricks and Defeats of Sporting Genius,” on 11
December 1858 (Wilson 166). Twain probably wrote his first version in 1865. In all of these
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tales, a frog ends up with buckshot in his mouth. Even though Seabough’s version, which
Bernard De Voto argues Twain had read, is set in Calaveras County, it has no jumping contest,
and only makes a weak pun on the word “shot.” As Roger Penn Cuff argues, Twain “may have
read any or all of the three accounts mentioned or he may have seen none of them” (156). It is
theoretically possible for Twain to have read all of these, but he need not have in order to have
created his version. George Williams III summarizes the argument that I find the most
convincing:
‘Lying’ Jim Townsend wrote a brief version of the jumping frog story which appeared in
the Sonora Herald in 1853. Angel’s Camp, where Twain would first hear the story of the
jumping frog, was but twenty miles from Sonora. After Townsend’s publication of the
jumping frog story, miners retold it throughout the mining camps until the original source
was forgotten. Twain was to rehear Townsend’s story in Angel’s Camp eleven years after
Townsend originally published it. (64)
If we are to believe Williams, Twain had heard a story created by a newspaper writer that entered
an oral tradition in Northern California. But this is not the only source Twain used for his short
story. The basic story of the jumping frog contest is central to the work, but Twain augmented
this story with two episodes which demonstrate Jim Smiley’s penchant for gambling, and provide
a great deal of the humor of the work. This sort of stringing together of discrete episodes,
sometimes from different sources, is common in oral storytelling.
After some iterative examples of Smiley’s gambling, which steadily escalate in absurdity
to a specific example of Smiley betting against the survival of the ailing wife of a Parson,
Wheeler tells of a horse of Smiley’s that people called the fifteen-minute nag. Along with
containing humorous description of the horse, the episode helps establish Smiley’s adeptness at
gambling, and at deception. “He used to win money on that horse, for all she was so slow and
always had the asthma or distemper, or the consumption, or something of that kind” (264).
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Despite the horse’s seeming incapacity and a tendency to start races poorly, she consistently
finished “just about a neck ahead, as near as you could cipher it down” (264). Edgar M. Branch
establishes that Twain had written several newspaper reports of horse races that are similar in
theme and tone to the “fifteen minute nag” section; specifically tales of horses whose character
overcomes their lack of physical ability (493-94).
The second episode concerning an animal Smiley owned is more unlikely than the first,
and becomes more unlikely as it goes on. Smiley’s bull-pup, Andrew Jackson, appears as
unimpressive as the fifteen-minute nag, and has the same ability to appear like a loser early in
contests and finally emerge victorious. His victories hinge on his “pet holt.” When victory for the
other dog seemed insured he would grab on to his opponent’s hind leg and hold on until he
secured victory. In a classic bit of comic escalation, Andrew Jackson is defeated when he comes
up against an opponent with no hind legs, which is unlikely enough, but his reaction is more
unlikely still. After losing to the crippled dog, the pup “he give Smiley a look as much to say his
heart was broke, and it was his fault, for putting up a dog that hadn’t no hind legs for him to take
holt of, which was his main dependence in a fight, and then he limped off a piece and laid down
and died” (264-65).
An item in the Dramatic Chronicle, published two days after Twain had published his
first sketch in that paper, notes that White’s Museum had a “three-quartered dog, a fine
handsome fellow, and as intelligent and good-natured an animal as we have ever had the pleasure
of being introduce to, [which] is a most wonderful freak of nature” (qtd. in Branch 595) The item
goes on to compare the dog to Richard III. Branch persuasively argues that Twain wrote this
item. Whether he did or not, he clearly used it as a springboard for this episode in “The Jumping
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Frog.”
In summary, one can argue that there are three separate sources for the episodes that make
up the story inside the frame of “The Jumping Frog.” Twain used these sources, some from his
own work, to create a larger work. Some might find this method of composition less than
imaginative, lazy, or even plagiarism, but I don’t think Twain saw it that way. He saw the
composition process as oral storytellers see it. Ong writes that in oral storytelling:
Narrative originality lodges not in making up new stories but in managing a particular
interaction with this audience at this time–at every telling the story has to be introduced
uniquely into a unique situation, for in oral cultures an audience must be brought to
respond, often vigorously. But narrators also introduce new elements into old stories. In
oral tradition, there will be as many minor variants of a myth as there are repetitions of it,
and the number of repetitions can be increased indefinitely. (41-42)
Oral composition is not the creation of a new work from the artist’s imagination. Instead the
storyteller creates a unique text by combining pre-existing stories and/or parts of stories
(commonly called “motifs” by folklorists) in response to his specific needs at the moment of
composition, he does not create a completely original story. Havelock writes that “bold invention
is the prerogative of writers, in a book culture”(46). Bruce Rosenberg argues that originality in
oral narrative “as we conceive of it does not exist–it is not valued–as every writer on the subject
has noticed, but originality exists . . . in plot combinations of subsumed, previously discrete
narratives” (161). My point is that, as someone reared on traditional storytelling, Twain was
capable of and comfortable with synthesizing preexisting episodes and stories in order to create
his original version of the jumping frog story.
He was also comfortable with reusing it and altering it in response to new situations. As
Messent writes, “‘The Jumping Frog’ story was something of a work in continual progress for
Twain, subject to authorial change and revision at any stage of its (many) reprintings” (25). There
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is no one version of the jumping frog story that we can privilege as the authoritative text.
Messent argues, “there was no ‘authentic’ version of the text generally available to those who
actually read Twain at the time, just a story that tended to change its shape at each reappearance”
(25). Some of these reappearances were spurred by outside influences–in fact by competing
versions of his story. He framed two versions of the story in direct response to competing
versions. In other words, different contingencies spurred Twain to publish different versions of
the story.
Oral performers don't work from a fixed text as literates understand it. Instead, the
moment of performance is also the moment of composition, and each performance reflects the
teller’s goals in that particular moment. They develop a large repertoire of tales, motifs and
phrases that they use to form the specific texts of their unique performances. In effect, the
"jumping frog" story was one in Twain's repertoire and he retold and reprinted it in different
forms because he had different goals in the different instances, and because it was an audience
favorite.
Almost all of Twain’s works are episodic. Whether or not he was capable of a sustained
and intricate plot, he was more comfortable stringing episodes together and using this structure to
show characters’ arcs. Part of the reason he was comfortable with this method is because it is
analogous to methods of traditional storytelling composition that he had learned.
Bernard De Voto discusses Twain’s form, and suggests that it is based on the oral
anecdote:
His imagination was rich and vivid, but incapable of prolonged creation. He could not
sufficiently objectify his material to give it the discipline of form. His fiction is
episodic–as loosely constructed as the picaresque romances of eighteenth-century Spain
or France. Form, as a reasoned and achieved technique, was not possible to him. The
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mode of creation that expressed him was a loosely flowing narrative, actually or
fictitiously autobiographical–a current interrupted for the presentation of episodes, for,
merely, the telling of stories. It is in these stories that the best of Mark Twain exists, from
the humbler level of the Jumping Frog, to the episodes in ‘Huckleberry Finn’ that are shot
with fire. The oral anecdote thus becomes a narrative interlude, a sophisticated art form
charged with the expression of genius. (244-45)
Ong writes: “We must not forget that episodic structure was the natural way to talk out a lengthy
story line if only because the experience of real life is more like a string of episodes than it is like
a Freytag pyramidal plot” (148). Ong argues that tight pyramidal plots, De Voto’s prolonged
creations, are the result of the selectivity literate artists have because of their ability to revise their
work, saying this “selectivity is implemented as never before by the distance that writing
establishes between expression and real life” (148). As Lord explains, “For the oral poet the
moment of composition is the performance. In the case of a literary poem there is a gap in time
between composition and reading or performance; in the case of the oral poem this gap does not
exist, because composition and performance are two aspects of the same moment” (13).
Though Twain would revise his work before publishing it, his composition process was
in some ways analogous to the oral process:
Twain was not much bothered by the fact that he could not write from some well-defined
plan because, by writing first to acquire his plan, Twain learned to consider creativity as
essentially an act of discovery. He discovered his subject not before, but as he wrote. In
the process of composition Twain felt that organization would occur simultaneously with
his immersion in his subject and that a unique form would arise from the spontaneous
adaptations of his heated imagination. (Krause 172)
Twain’s discovery of his material took place as he wrote–as he composed. He did not start with a
grand outline that he then executed. This resonates very strongly with Lord’s description of the
oral traditional composition process. “An oral poem is not composed for but in performance”
(13).
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This isn’t to suggest that Twain was purely an improvisational artist. He was a tireless
reviser of his work. What I am suggesting is that what he carefully revised for publication were
works that were initially created in a way that were to some extent analogous to oral
performance. Another way he is like an oral performer is that his creative process included
recreation of earlier works at different times. For example, in The Complete Sketches and Tales
of Mark Twain, there are two versions of the same story. “How the Author Was Sold in Newark“
is basically an elaborated version of “A Deception.” In both stories the narrator is meant to be, in
fact, Twain. He is fooled into trying to make a blind and deaf audience member laugh. The
elaborated version places the story specifically in Newark and includes more material. Both end
in very similar manners. “A Deception” ends “Now was that any way to impose on a stranger and
orphan like me?” (208), while the more elaborate version ends, “Now was that any way to
impose on a stranger and orphan like me? I ask you as a man and a brother, if that was any way
for him to do?” (218). They are clearly two versions of the same story.
As I have mentioned, Twain revised and republished the jumping frog story several times.
One important change between the first published versions and the version published in Twain’s
first book is in the outermost frame. The first published version is framed as a letter from Twain
to “A. Ward,” who Twain mentions as a master of the deadpan style in “How to Tell a Story,”
and dramatizes as one in “First Interview with Artemus Ward.” Ward was a western humorist
who also was closely associated with literary hoaxes. In the sketch “First Interview with Artemus
Ward,” Twain is the narrator and primary audience for a deadpan storyteller, as he is in the
jumping frog stories. Twain meets Ward in a restaurant. Ward ostensibly has a question about
silver mining. In fact, Ward rambles disjointedly in an authoritative sounding language about
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silver mining and ends his two jumbled disquisitions with questions Twain is at a loss to answer
or even understand (186). In the second instance he becomes “even more fearfully impressive
than ever” (187). As readers we know Twain is being sold, because of the set up which suggests
a disjunction between Ward’s superhumanly earnest countenance and his purpose in speaking,
and because of Ward’s rambling discourse. But the narrator only finds out when “Hingston,” who
we were told earlier is present, is unable to contain himself and is observed by the narrator
“quaking with a gentle ecstasy of laughter” (188).
Only the inability of a copresent auditor to maintain the deadpan manner allows the
protagonist to understand he is being sold. This third party, a member of Ward’s interpretive
community, helps Twain catch the joke and thereby enter into the community of insiders.
Through this understanding–this initiation–Twain can begin to become a deadpan narrator
himself. In the jumping frog story, there is no third party to help us negotiate the communication
breakdown between Wheeler and the narrator. There is no insider who is willing to let anyone in
on the joke:
In the tale the character Mark Twain (in life, the relatively unknown but promising
humorist) is directed by the character Artemus Ward (in life, the nationally acclaimed
maker of laughs) to find ‘a cherished companion’ of Ward’s boyhood, ‘Rev. Leonidas W.
Smiley–a young minister of the gospel.’ The minister turns out to be a chimera, a shade.
(Branch 600)
Instead of Reverend Smiley, the narrator finds Simon Wheeler4 dozing. When he is asked, he has
never heard of Leonidas Smiley. Instead he recalls Jim Smiley and begins a monologue that is
uninterrupted by the narrator until it abruptly ends, conveniently subsequent to the conclusion of

4

Actually, in the first published version his name is Greeley. Since there is no substantive
difference between the two characters, I will refer to the character as Wheeler throughout.
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the jumping frog episode, when Wheeler is temporarily called away and the narrator is able to
effect his escape. Wheeler’s being called away is in the same kind of brackets that the stage
directions of “How to Tell a Story” are: “[Here Simon Wheeler heard his name called from the
front yard, and got up to see what was wanted.]” (264). He returns shortly and begins another tale
of “thish-yer Smiley;” this one about a “yaller one-eyed cow that didn’t have no tail, only just a
short stump like a bannanner” (267).
The narrator makes a hasty and less-than graceful exit. “‘Oh! hang Smiley and his
afflicted cow!’ I muttered, good-naturedly, and bidding the old gentleman good-day, I departed”
(267). He flees the storytelling event, incapable of understanding or silencing Wheeler. Even
retrospectively, while writing the account, the narrator is not certain a joke has been played on
him:
I have a lurking suspicion that Leonidas W. Smiley is a myth; that my friend never knew
such a personage; and that he only conjectured that if I asked old Wheeler about him, it
would remind him of his infamous Jim Smiley, and he would go to work and bore me to
death with some exasperating reminiscence of him as long and as tedious as it should be
useless to me. If that was the design, it succeeded. (262)
The narrator only has a lurking suspicion based on the fact that he was finally subjected to a long,
tedious and useless narrative. We are certainly encouraged to believe a joke has been played on
him, but it is not explicitly stated. And we don’t know if Wheeler is a knowing participant in the
prank. Though Wheeler certainly inflicts the tale on the narrator, the narrator cannot tell us what
level of awareness Wheeler has of Twain’s reaction to the narrative. Wheeler’s storytelling
manner is described immediately before he begins his narrative:
He never smiled, he never frowned, he never changed his voice from the gentle-flowing
key to which he tuned his initial sentence, he never betrayed the slightest suspicion of
enthusiasm; but all through the interminable narrative there ran a vein of impressive
earnestness and sincerity, which showed me plainly that, so far from imagining that there
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was anything ridiculous or funny about his story, he regarded it as a really important
matter, and admired its two heroes as men of transcendent genius in finesse. (263)
Having read “First Interview with Artemus Ward” and “How to Tell a Story,” we know that
never betraying “the slightest suspicion of enthusiasm” and having “impressive earnestness and
sincerity” are dead giveaways that a humorous story is being told. But this narrator, who should
be our authoritative guide–who should be the one to tip us off to the joke–instead, himself,
betrays no knowledge of Wheeler’s actual purpose. Instead the narrator believes that Wheeler
plainly shows that he regarded it as “a really important matter.” Though we are certainly
encouraged by the narrator to believe that a trick is being played on him, he, himself, remains
unsure, and is convinced that Wheeler is entirely in earnest. As Messent argues, “if Wheeler is
deceiving his auditor, there is no hard evidence of it. The author, Mark Twain, remains silent
throughout the tale, and there are no other members of the Angel’s Camp community represented
who might give evidence–as ‘privileged members’ of Wheeler’s audience–of a deliberate joke
being played on the stranger” (30).
Messent’s argument is convincing, but one important point to make here is that it is based
on the version published in Twain’s first book, and not the original version which explicitly
mentions Artemus Ward. I think the use of Ward as the instigator of the joke because of his close
connection to the deadpan delivery, requires us to believe that not only Wheeler, but the narrator
are in on the joke and do not drop their deadpan masks at any time in the story. If we aren’t yet
initiated in the ways of the American humorous story, we are not equipped to correctly interpret
the manner of telling of Wheeler or the narrator. But if we are, we know that Wheeler knows the
humor of the story and we know that the narrator knows. Using Ward as the instigator of the joke
makes it clear that Wheeler is a deadpan storyteller, and so is Twain.
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Most versions of the jumping frog story, however, make no mention of Artemus Ward.
Wilson argues that the most “significant change introduced in the text of the Webb edition
[Twain’s first book] is Mark Twain’s abandonment of the frame letter to ‘Mr. A. Ward’ . . . the
Webb text replaces the references to A. Ward with one that more securely identifies the
gentleman narrator’s ‘eastern’ connections” (163).
I think it is fair to say that the new frame does create an eastern connection, though it only
strongly implies it. “In compliance with the request of a friend of mine, who wrote me from the
East, I called on good-natured, garrulous old Simon Wheeler” (262). The friend who wrote may
have only been visiting the east when he wrote, but this new friend does suggest that both the
initial prankster, and the narrator could be from the east, and therefore less well-equipped to
appreciate a humorous story. If the narrator is a stranger from the east, he may be more likely to
consider Wheeler’s performance boring–he would be less likely to belong to the proper
interpretive community.
The narrator’s language is markedly different than Wheeler’s dialect, as Messent points
out. “The first narrator’s language is both grammatically and orthographically correct, and it only
departs from Standard American English in its somewhat elaborate formality (‘hereunto append’
and ‘conjectured,’)” (31). He seems to be the genteel narrator characteristic of southwestern
humor, while Wheeler’s nonstandard pronunciation puts him on a lower discursive plane.
The contrast of speech patterns of the first narrator does accordingly point to some
regional dimension to the story (western vernacular versus eastern genteel), however
relatively undeveloped and even blurred the boundaries between the various voices might
be. The first narrator clearly belongs to a different world than Wheeler and has, as his
response to the latter’s stories suggests, a different value scheme. But we are kept as
readers from any substantial form of identification with him. (Messent 31)
Forrest G. Robinson comments that “generations of readers have found out too late that
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identifying with the narrator of ‘The Jumping Frog’ is perilous business” (47). Yet the structure
of southwestern humor relies on the reader identifying with the genteel narrator. If he decides
that the vernacular character is noble or filled with an admirable vigor, we can readily agree. But
this narrator flees from a storytelling event he finds boring that we can see is funny. The authorial
figure isn’t the semantic authority. He states he was fooled into asking for a long and boring
narration, then inflicts this narrative on us as evidence of the tedious, infuriating narrative. But it
is not tedious; it is not infuriating. It is off the point if Leonidas Smiley is the point, but that is
not the point–the performance of an engaging tale is the point.
Wilson argues that the narrator’s inability to understand that Wheeler is a deadpan
storyteller “reverses the typical pattern in southwestern humor, for the obtuseness of Mark Twain
as character disqualifies him as an authority who explicitly describes the real situation before
him” (168). He cannot explain the real situation before him. He presents it with what we assume
is reasonable accuracy, but he doesn’t appreciate Wheeler’s skill and artistry. The cultural
authority who is supposed to guide us to understanding instead flees in confusion. Critic Richard
Gray observes that:
as critics have observed time and time again, the classic humorist tale consists of a
narrator, identifiable as superior in class and education, setting up the scene and bringing
on the rustic characters, putting them through their violent routines complete with comic
dialect, and then returning us at the end of the story to his own stable, secure world and
standard English. (63)
At the end of the jumping frog the “superior” narrator flees to his stable and secure world, while
the chaotic Wheeler talks on. That is, perhaps, the point. Oral storytelling doesn’t fit neatly into a
newspaper sketch. It is a free-flowing, associative process that cannot be contained in a sketch or
by a genteel narrator, however superior his social and language skills. The tale also suggests that
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the genteel narrator’s superiority may only be imagined–perhaps the voice of the vernacular
storyteller should be the authoritative one. But it only suggests it.
In “A True Story, Repeated Word for Word as I Heard It,” Twain tries to break the
containment of the southwestern frame tale and give the platform over to a vernacular storyteller.
It is an attempt that, as we shall see, requires Twain to be very aware of the role of the two voices
in his story. One thing of particular interest in this story, as it is in the jumping frog stories, is
how Twain adapted and organized his recollections of an actual storytelling event and how he
framed it for publication. Twain changed the story he was in told in several ways, all of them, I
believe, in order to better realize the oral tale in the medium of print. Also, he ends the story, not
with a coda from the genteel narrator, enclosing and containing the vernacular speaker, but with
the voice of the storytelling character, ending her own narrative in her own way. And he had to
end it this way in order to avoid having her voice being indulged and condescended to, as Ross
argues is the case for all mimetic voices. In fact, Twain keeps the narrator out of the last twothirds of the story in order to allow the storytelling character to establish and maintain her own
authority–the authority of her own personal voice. In order to do this and to dramatize all the
aspects of the storytelling event, Twain puts words that describe the character’s movements into
the mouth of his storytelling character.
Former slave Mary Ann Cord was a cook at Quarry Farm in Elmira, New York, where
Twain stayed in 1874. Cord apparently told Twain a story from her personal experience, and after
Twain had retold it to friends who gave him positive feedback, he wrote “A True Story, Repeated
Word for Word as I Heard It.” He submitted it to William Dean Howells, editor of the Atlantic,
who published it in November of 1874.

79

This story was somewhat of a departure for Twain, as he admitted to Howells. “I enclose
also a ‘True Story’ which has no humor in it. You can pay me as lightly as you choose for that,
for it is rather out of my line” (Smith and Gibson 22). The lack of humor baffled some
contemporary critics, but Howells lavished enthusiastic praise on it whenever the opportunity
presented itself. In a review of Sketches New and Old, Howells writes that “evidently the critical
mind feared a lurking joke. Not above two or three notices out of hundred” recognized the story
for what it was, “a study of character as true as life itself, strong, tender and most movingly
pathetic in its perfect fidelity to the tragic fact” (104). As we have already seen, critics could be
forgiven for fearing a lurking joke in the story, as Messent argues. “The elements of
sentimentality, melodrama, and generic predictability (the separation and emotional reunion of
mother and son) in the narrative are rather too close for comfort to those Twain would
mercilessly burlesque elsewhere” (61). But, Messent goes on, there is no doubt in critic’s minds
now that there is no joke being played and that “in terms of his control of the vernacular voice,
his changing attitude towards race, and the very nature of his subject matter, this story marks an
important stage in Twain’s literary development” (61).
Though the story is subtitled “Repeated Word for Word as I Heard It,” it clearly is not a
word-for-word transcription. I will argue later that Twain put some words into his storytelling
character’s mouth that describe her gestures during the storytelling event. There is also evidence
that Twain changed one important phrase from the manuscript to the printed version. This phrase
is, in itself, interesting.
At one point Aunt Rachel, the storytelling character based on Cord, describes a twentyseven-word phrase her mother commonly used as “her word,” and even “one word.”
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“she always had one word dat she said. She’s straighten herse’f up an’ put her fists in her
hips an’ say, ‘I want you to understan’ dat I wa’nt bawn in the mash to be fool’ by trash!
I’s one o’ de ole Blue Hen’s Chicken’s, I is!’ ’Ca’se, you see, dat’s what folks dat’s bawn
in Maryland calls deyselves, an’ dey’s proud of it. Well, dat was her word. . . . So I says
dat word, too, when I’s riled.” (203)
In Huckleberry Finn, Huck says that his father took a jug and “said he had enough
whiskey for two drunks and one delirium tremens. That was always his word” (41). In both of
these works, the vernacular character uses the word “word” to describe a phrase another speaker
commonly repeated–so commonly that they became identified with the phrase. Lord addresses a
similar phenomena in his study of epic singers. He argues that in oral cultures “the word for
‘word’ means an ‘utterance’” and that singers will not understand questions which ask
specifically for a word (25). “Man without writing thinks in terms of sound groups and not in
words, and the two do not necessarily coincide. When asked what a word is, he will reply that he
does not know, or he will give a sound group which will vary in length from what we call a word
to an entire line of poetry, or even an entire song” (25). The length of these utterances is not
determined by how any system of writing organizes meaningful units of sound; it is determined
by the fact that they are inextricably linked. Pap would not say he had enough whiskey for two
drunks and then stop. The utterance would not be complete. Both of these vernacular characters,
Huck and Aunt Rachel, use and understand “word” in an oral way.
Aunt Rachel uses her “word” to establish her identity. Neil Schmitz calls it a “familial
trace” and a “documentary text” (“Mark Twain’s Civil War” 83). It is a formulaic phrase that
both helps her long-lost son recognize her and a proud statement of family heritage. The part of
the phrase that Twain changed was written in the original manuscript as “I ain’t no hound dog
mash to be trod on by common trash.” The “mash” “trash” rhyme is retained in both versions.
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There is no compelling evidence that explains the change. Susan Fisher Fishkin wonders “was he
improving on Mary Ann Cord’s original story, or merely revising his record of it to read more
accurately?” (33). There is no way we can establish if the change is a more accurate rendering or
one that Twain did for thematic reasons, or because he thought it looked better.
Whether or not he changed this phrase, or any other phrase, this does not necessarily
invalidate his claim to not have altered the story. Again, comparing Twain to singers of oral epic
may provide us with some insight. Epic singers do not replicate even their own works word for
word as they heard them, or as they sang them in the past, even though they sometimes claim to
sing their own songs exactly the same way:
What is of importance here is not the fact of exactness or lack of exactness, but the
constant emphasis by the singer on his role in the tradition. It is not the creative role that
we have stressed for the purpose of clarifying a misunderstanding about oral style, but the
role of conserver of the tradition, the role of the defender of the historic truth of what is
being sung; for if the singer changes what he has heard in its essence, he falsifies truth.
(Lord 28)
Traditional storytellers feel a responsibility to their tradition and to the tellers who came before
them. If Cord’s story moved Twain as much as he claims, his feeling of responsibility could be
very strong, both to the tradition and to the historical truth of her story. This responsibility does
not entail parroting the tradition, but in internalizing it and recreating it as a new living entity.
The exact mechanical reproduction that we may now equate with accuracy, is not the accuracy a
traditional storyteller strives for. He cannot help but change the wording because memory is to
imperfect a record to produce word-for-word accuracy.
We think of change in content and in wording; for, to us, at some moment both wording
and content have been established. To the singer the song, which cannot be changed
(since to change it would, in his mind, be to tell an untrue story or to falsify history), is
the essence of the story itself. His idea of stability, to which he is deeply committed, does
not include the wording, which to him has never been fixed, nor to the unessential parts
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of the story. He builds his performance, or song in our sense, on the stable skeleton of
narrative, which is the song in his sense. (Lord 99)
Traditional storytellers recreate the stories they have learned from their memory, and from their
experience of other stories. When they recreate the story, when they tell their unique version of
the story, they will not repeat it word for word, even if they could, but the commitment to their
role as part of the preservation of a tradition and to the truth of the experience binds them to what
they believe is the essence of the story. This emphasis on essence and truth is echoed by Fishkin,
in her discussion of Twain’s work on the sketch. “Whether the words on the page were Mary
Ann Cord’s exact words, as Twain claimed, or whether they were shaped by Twain’s own ear
and imagination, Twain allows the sheer force of her character and the concrete truth of her pain
to shine through her colloquial speech with clarity and radiance” (99). Transmitting the force of
her character and the truth of her pain on to the page is more important than exactly replicating
her words.
Whatever changes he made in specific words, critics agree that Twain took great pride
and made an earnest effort to reproduce her language in print in an authentic manner. Wilson
writes that it is his “concern for language that reveals Mark Twain’s care in composing and
revising this story to give it authenticity. He copied as exactly as he could the speech and
demeanor of Auntie Cord and carefully revised the dialect in proof” (268).
Twain did revise the dialect carefully in proof, but exactness was not his primary goal.
His goal was to create the best representation of exactness and authenticity he could in print. His
goal was to evoke the storytelling event for the reader, and to do this required something other
than exact transcription. Fishkin writes that Twain “had a genius for transferring the oral into
print” (4). This returns us to the speakerly paradox, to the challenge authors face who wish to
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represent the spoken in print. One way Twain faced this challenge was to talk his work out.
Through this exercise, and his reading of the results, Twain realized that exact phonetic
reproduction wasn’t the answer. He discusses his revisions of “A True Story” in a letter to
Howells:
I amend dialect stuff by talking & talking & talking it till it sounds right–& I had
difficulty with this negro talk because a negro sometimes (rarely) says ‘goin’’ &
sometimes says ‘gwyne’, & they make just such discrepancies in other words–& when
you come to reproduce them on paper they look as if the variation resulted from the
writer’s carelessness. But I want to work at the proofs & set the dialect as nearly right as
possible. (Smith and Gibson 26)
Pronunciation of individual words is not always stable regardless of who is speaking. “Quite a
few words in the English language have different pronunciations when they occur in an
unstressed position in a sentence from those they have in a stressed position” (Bowdre 84).
Twain saw this while working on his literary dialect, in this instance with the word “going,” and
also saw that representing this faithfully in print looked wrong. Note that they may have sounded
right when spoken aloud, but they looked wrong on the page. Print is a medium of uniformity;
specific situational variations do not always translate. If he wrote his dialect as correctly as
possible it would not look like an accurate representation–it would look like carelessness. Twain
acknowledged that he could not get the dialect “right” and still appear authentic; he strove,
instead, to get it as “nearly right as possible.”
Sumner Ives, in his work “A Theory of Literary Dialect,” writes that nearly all “examples
of literary dialect are deliberately incomplete; the author is an artist, not a linguist or a
sociologist, and his purpose is literary rather than scientific” (138). Even if the alternate
spellings available to authors could adequately represent the variants of speech, an author may
not choose to use them. As Ives argues, “both the author’s desire to keep his representation
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within readable limits and his difficulties in finding suitable spelling devices will inhibit his
portrayal of a speech type. Any literary dialect, therefore, will necessarily be a partial and
somewhat artificial picture of the actual speech” (152). The goal is to make this artificial
rendering seem as real as possible.
Making Aunt Rachel’s literary dialect as real as possible may have required changing
Cord’s words, but Twain was clearly impressed by her words and her delivery of them. Fishkin
writes that Cord “told her story so artfully that Twain felt he had to do little to its structure other
than start it at the beginning rather than in the middle. Her story impressed Twain as a ‘curiously
strong piece of literary work to come unpremeditated from lips untrained in literary art’” (36-37).
As Fishkin points out, Twain felt it necessary to make what I would call a significant change in
transferring the oral tale to print. In his letter to Howells about the story Twain writes, “I have not
altered the old colored woman’s story, except to begin it at the beginning, instead of the middle,
as she did–and <worked> traveled both ways”5 (Smith and Gibson 22-23).
Cord’s structuring her story in this way is not odd; neither is Twain’s changing it. Robert
Georges argues that “most narrators do not characterize events simply, straightforwardly, and
sequentially” (“Communicative Role” 54). As Ong argues, it is common for oral storytellers to
begin stories at a significant point in the narrative, and then to add expository material as
necessary. In fact, the idea that epics should begin in media res is a result of this type of narrative
ordering. “Starting in ‘the middle of things’ is not a consciously contrived ploy but the original,
natural, inevitable way to proceed for an oral poet approaching a lengthy narrative (very short
accounts are perhaps another thing)” (Ong 144). The impulse to begin at the beginning, and then
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In Twain’s letter the word “worked” is crossed out.
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move directly forward, is in a way the result of the influence of the technologies of writing and
print. More precisely, the ability to maintain a narrative in strict chronological order is the result
of that technology. Working purely from memory one is bound to leave parts out that must,
therefore, be alluded to outside of the chronological order. This is part of the art of oral
storytelling.
Twain isn’t telling a story orally. However strong the influence of traditional orality on
his work and on his life, he was a professional writer transferring this story into the medium of
print. Both in his manipulation of language and of the structure of the story, Twain was adapting
traditional material to better suit the medium of print. Changing the structure of Cord’s story
made it conform more closely to the notion of story that Twain’s audience had.
The story he did publish hinges on the relationship between the storytelling character,
Aunt Rachel, and the story listening narrator, Misto C– . When the story begins their relationship
seems unproblematic, even idyllic. She is seated respectfully below her employer and enjoying
some good-natured teasing. “It was summer time, and twilight. We were sitting on the porch of
the farm-house, on the summit of the hill, and ‘Aunt Rachel’ was sitting respectfully below our
level, on the steps,–for she was our servant, and colored” (202). The relationships are set. It is a
beautiful happy farm where the contented servant jokes easily with the benign master. She begins
literally below the narrator’s level, physically, socially and in terms of her position in the
narrative–she is the secondary voice in the diegesis. She is literally being indulged and
condescended to. She appears to be contented and carefree; happy and satisfied as she sits at the
foot of the steps laughing. As she laughs the narrator tells us that she is a “cheerful and hearty
soul, and it was no more trouble for her to laugh than it is for a bird to sing” (202). Note that the
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word “trouble” is introduced here. Watching her laugh, a question occurs to the narrator, one that
uses the word “trouble” again, and puts the word “into play” (Schmitz “Mark Twain’s Civil
War” 82).
“‘Aunt Rachel, how is it that you’ve lived sixty years and never had any trouble?’” (202).
This question abruptly ends her laughter, and Neil Schmitz argues causes her pain.
It is the lie of the euphemism that gives Aunt Rachel her sudden stab of pain, that snaps
into sharp focus her relation to Misto C and her family, her alienated difference. ‘Trouble’
is Misto C’s cloaking term for slavery, his denial of its experience and its consequences.
How is it you’re so merry–you who were once a slave? Slavery could not have been that
bad since it has left you the joyous creature that you are. (“Mark Twain’s Civil War” 82)
Schmitz may be overstating the case, but Aunt Rachel’s reaction to the comment is immediate
and drastic. “She stopped quaking. She paused, and there was a moment of silence. She turned
her face over her shoulder toward me, and said, without even a smile in her voice:–
‘Misto C–, is you in ‘arnest?’” (202-03).
This is the first time the narrator is addressed, and note that the narrator is not Mark
Twain. He is not the noted humorist; he is a representation of the private citizen Samuel
Clemens. He is not the genteel narrator, or at least not the burlesque of one that the name Mark
Twain indicates. He is perhaps a representation of the authentic individual, one who truly
believed she had known no trouble. This narrator is asked if he is a humorist or in earnest. This
question “surprised me a good deal; and it sobered my manner and my speech, too” (203).
Whatever his attitude before this time, he is not now a humorist, he is in earnest. He stammers
out a reply:
“‘Why, I thought–that is, I meant–why you can’t have had any trouble. I’ve never heard
you sigh, and never seen your eye when there wasn’t a laugh in it.’” (203). The narrator’s
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response to her demeanor is not typical of a genteel narrator. Already he has lost control of the
event. He stutters out an explanation that he has already begun to doubt.
“She faced fairly around, now, and was full of earnestness” (203). She asked if he was in
earnest and then she is represented as full of earnestness. This is not the seeming earnestness, the
appearance of earnestness of Simon Wheeler; she is full of earnestness–it is a fact the narrator
supplies us with, as certain as her sitting on the steps. And in all earnestness, and with all due
respect, she answers his question with a story.
‘Has I had any trouble? Misto C–, I’s gwyne to tell you, den I leave it to you’” (203).
She going to tell the story then allow the narrator to judge for himself. She is not going to
overstep her boundaries–the truth of the story she will tell will be the evidence that the wise man
will be able to evaluate. She claims, here, that the authority to judge remains with the socially
superior narrator. Her authority stems only from her knowledge of her own history, whatever else
her tone might foreshadow. Lanser argues that an “authorial narrator claims broad powers of
knowledge and judgment. While a personal narrator claims only the validity of one person’s right
to interpret her experience” (19). Like personal narrators, storytelling characters claim only the
authority of their own experience. Here the genteel narrator, the representative of authority, has
presented an interpretation that the subordinate voice, the voice that is indulged and
condescended to, will demonstrate is incorrect.
In order to establish the scope of her trouble, she must first argue that she can have any
sort of trouble analogous to her listeners. She must establish, respectfully, her own humanity. She
starts slowly but strongly:
I was bawn down ‘mongst the slaves; I knows all ‘bout slavery, ‘case I ben one of ‘em my
own se’f. Well, sah, my ole man–dat’s my husban’–he was lovin’ an’ kind to me, jist as
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kind as you is to yo’ wife. An’ we had chil’en–seven chil’en–an’ we loved dem chil’en
jist de same as you loves yo’s chil’en. Dey was black, but de Lord can’t make no chil’en
so black but what dey mother loves ‘em.’ (203)
She acknowledges that blackness is a handicap given from the Lord, but that still her love for her
spouse and children is just the same as his, and therefore the grief she will shortly tell of should
be a type he could imagine.6 I am not claiming that she ascribes to any sort of white/black
good/evil dichotomy; however, by speaking from within these terms she is able to establish a
common ground with her audience. Here she maintains her difference while stressing her
sameness. She will, as the story moves on, deny her difference, but for now she maintains her
position at the bottom of the steps. Even though she has upset Misto C–‘s comfort already, she
still has to retain her social role as a servant and an inferior at this point in the telling. As she
continues, however, her ability to transcend her social role will increase.
Robert Georges argues, in “Communicative Role and Social Identity in Storytelling,” that
storytellers and story listeners form a sort of contract during a storytelling event. They agree to
“assume contrasting, but complementary, communicative roles, and that they can and will behave
in ways that they and others judge to be appropriate, first and foremost, to those roles” (52).
Though Misto C– and Aunt Rachel have social identities that require Aunt Rachel to defer to
Misto C–, the act of becoming a storyteller gives her some rights appropriate to formulating and
effectively communicating the message that Misto C– has asked for in earnest. “The implicit or
explicit agreement to interact as narrator and audience member indicates a willingness to
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Twain has Huck come to a similar conclusion about Jim in The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, when Huck sees Jim pining for his missing family. “I do believe he cared as
much for his people as white folks does for theirn. It don’t seem natural, but I reckon it’s so”
(170).
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subordinate behavior appropriate to social identity to that appropriate to communicative role,
while at the same time acknowledging that identity-based and role-based behaviors are intricately
and inextricably interrelated” (Georges 52-3). Though she is a servant, she is also a storyteller,
and she is allowed and obligated to transmit this message in answer to her superior’s query. One
of Georges’ more interesting claims is that as the event continues “the social identities of
storyteller and story listener become increasingly prominent while the other social identities
coincident with these during the storytelling event decrease in relative prominence” (“Towards”
319). Participants become caught up in the event and tend to lose sight of their other social roles.
Of course social roles are never entirely forgotten, but one thing that this story clearly illustrates
is how the storyteller can bridge the boundaries of social identity and make a significant contact
with her audience inside the boundaries of the storytelling event.
After Aunt Rachel has completed her exposition, she introduces the story’s complication.
She tells of when she discovered that she and her family were to be auctioned off by their longtime owner. She has already established that the love and respect in a colored family, and of a
colored mother, are as strong as any. If this is so, then the tragedy that she now speaks of is
inescapable. This point is where we hear from the narrator for the last time.
“Aunt Rachel had gradually risen, while she warmed to her subject, and now she towered
above us, black against the stars” (204). She has apparently risen from her seated position below
the narrator on the steps. Realistically that shouldn’t be enough to be now towering over them.
This rising, which is the last word from the narrator, describes also how she has metaphorically
risen in the estimation of her auditors. They cannot ignore or explain away her story, and the
experience which authorizes it. This is the only interruption in her monologue, and the last word
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from the narrator. She goes on to describe the last time her family was together.
“‘Dey put chains on us an’ put us on a stan’ as high as dis po’ch,–twenty foot high,–an’
all de people stood aroun’, crowds an’ crowds’” (204). It is entirely acceptable and indeed
common to use objects in the sight of event participants in order to describe objects in the story.
There is nothing inappropriate or transgressive about saying the owner’s porch is the same height
as the auction block where her children were taken away from her. In doing this, however, the
porch is transformed into a slave block, and the white residents are implicated in the culture of
slavery. She towers above them, black against the stars, and implicates them in the tragedy that
befell her family.
At this point, the narrator has removed himself from the story, so any information we are
to glean about the event has to now come from Aunt Rachel’s speech. The first indicator she
gives of her movements is a small one: “‘an’ I drops a kurtchy, so’” (205). Georges argues that
the codes involved in a storytelling event are not only linguistic, but also paralinguistic and
kinesic (“Towards” 318). The use of the word “so” here indicates to the reader that she has
replicated the curtsey for the present story listeners–that part of the message is conveyed by her
physical movements.7 The narrator, however, does not tell us this, because his intrusion into the
monologue at this point would undermine her authority as a storyteller, as the authority of this
literary work. Instead, words Mary Ann Cord may not have spoken are put in Aunt Rachel’s
mouth. She narrates her own movements two more times in the work. Both of these instances
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In The Jumping Frog story, Simon Wheeler indicates his gesture with speech as well.
“Dan’l give a heave, and hysted up his shoulders–so, like a Frenchman.’”(39). Even though the
genteel narrator doesn’t interrupt Wheeler’s telling either, he does re-enter the story at the end.
This is also interesting because the narrator’s initial description of Wheeler’s storytelling
technique suggests that he is so solemn as to be immobile.
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bear close scrutiny.
Right before she narrates the third repetition of her “word,” the repetition that will help
identify her to her son, Aunt Rachel replicates her past movements for her present audience. “I j i
s t straightened myself up, so,–jist as I is now, plum to the ceilin’, mos’–an’ I digs my fists into
my hips” (206). Again the use of the word “so’ signals that her actions are part of the message
being constructed. This indicator would be enough for physically present auditors. Twain gives
his readers a clearer indication of this by having her add “jist as I is now.” Having already been
describe by the narrator as towering over him, she now describes herself as rising even
further–“plum to the ceiling.” Again, most of this elevation seems metaphorical, whatever the
ceilings actual height, because the next time we are made aware of her orientation she is stooping
at Misto C–‘s feet.
Aunt Rachel describes in detail the climactic scene where she and her son recognize each
other, and she helps dramatizes the scene by using Misto C– as a prop. “I was a-stoopin’ down by
de stove,–jist so, same as if yo’ foot was de stove,–an’ I’d opened de stove do’ wid my right
han’,–so, pushin’ it back, jist as I pushes yo’ foot” (207). She begins, appropriately enough for
her station, stooping at the narrator’s feet. She uses one of his feet as a representation of a stove
door–a relatively neutral and harmless analogy, and her pushing his foot is neither intimate nor
threatening. Her next actions, though following logically and seemingly effortlessly in terms of
the story she is engaged in telling, break down all pretense of the narrator’s superiority. She rises
from her subservient position and faces the narrator, eye to eye. Or nearly so.
–an’ I’d jist got de pan o’ hot biscuits in my han’ an’ was ‘bout to raise up, when I see a
black face come aroun’ under mine, an de eyes a-lookin’ up into mine, jist as I’s a-lookin’
up clost under yo’ face now; an I jist stopped right dah, an’ never budged!’” (207)
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Again, there is an overt indicator in her monologue that her past actions are being staged
inside the storytelling event, and that these actions are necessary to successfully transmit the
message of the event. Aunt Rachel is up close under the narrator’s face. This violation of the
appropriate deferential distance that existed at the beginning of the story is not describe by the
narrator, because his description or commentary, positive, negative or otherwise, would have
reestablished the hierarchy inside the story. It would have made the narrator the explicit semantic
authority–our guide to understanding the meaning of Aunt Rachel’s monologue. Instead we are
not given his reaction, we are merely given Aunt Rachel’s words and her description of her
actions. Perhaps we can then judge for ourselves.
She looks at her son, and at the narrator, and she realizes that she sees her son. “‘I jist
gazed, an’ gazed, so; an’ de pan begin to tremble, an’ all of a sudden I knowed! De pan drop’ on
de flo’ an’ I grab his lef’ han’ an’ shove back his sleeve,–jist so, as I’s doin’ to you,–an’ den I
goes for his forehead an’ push de hair back, so.’” (207) She first touches his arm; she expressly
states what would be obvious to present auditors, telling the reader that she is touching the
narrator, and then pushes his hair back, “so,” all the while gazing into his eyes, and recognizing
“her own.” “‘Boy!’ I says, ‘if you an’t my Henry, what is you doin’ wid dis welt on yo’ wris’ an’
dat sk-yar on yo’ forehead? De Lord God ob heaven be praise’, I got my own ag’in!’” (207). The
narrator has gone from a social superior to an inanimate object, to her long-lost son–one of her
own. Aunt Rachel has gone from implicating Misto C– in the culture of slavery and her own
tragedy to acknowledging their common humanity. In doing this she establish, above all, her own
humanity.
The story closes with Aunt Rachel’s last word on the subject an ironic evaluative
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comment, which returns us to the present and what we now all know was an ignorant question:
“‘Oh, no, Misto C—, I hadn’t had no trouble. An’ no joy!” (207). Her coda returns us to the
frame and the genteel narrator, enclosing the narrative and bringing it to a conclusion, but this is
not a humorous sketch, and his world is no longer safe and secure. The frame is reasserted, but
the storytelling character, not the narrator, does it. Instead of reporting an observation of quaint
rustic behavior, the narrator has been struck mute by an experience richer and more deserving of
narrative authority than his own, and a teller who deftly conveys that experience. I would argue
that her evaluative comment is an extrarepresentational act. Through her story she has
demonstrated her discursive authority inside and outside the fiction If Aunt Rachel does not gain
authority outside the fiction, her authority is certainly greater than the narrator’s. her authority
has been expanded to “‘nonfictional’ referents and [she is allowed to engage], from ‘within’ the
fiction, in a culture’s literary, social and intellectual debates” (Lanser 17).
Critics have called the narrator of “A True Story” the butt of Twain’s joke–equating him
with other genteel narrators that Twain subjected to ridicule for their ignorance and naivete. This
is not, however, an overconfident, self-assured ass who is hoisted on his own petard for our
amusement. This is an earnest witness, a man who even Aunt Rachel says is a kind and loving
husband and father, a man who has also deluded himself as to Aunt Rachel’s personal history of
suffering. As Lee Smith writes “we as readers become the oblivious questioner, all of us, first
showing our ignorant bias in even asking such a question, then forced to open our minds and
hearts as we listen to the answer” (“Introduction” xl). A comedic narrator who carries these kind
of misconceptions can be dismissed as a fatuous ass, but a kind and wise narrator who still holds
these beliefs suggests that all of us hold these beliefs, all of us are willfully blind, all of us are
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accountable, and all of us are “our own.” The importance of Aunt Rachel transforming the
narrator from a stove to her son is both striking and well documented. What I want to stress is
that assuming the role of storyteller authorizes her to make these connections–to touch Misto C–,
physically and metaphorically, personally and meaningfully. She is allowed to go from that
contact to a coda that can chastize him for believing that her life could have had no trouble.
The other point is that only by withdrawing the voice of the primary narrator from the
work can the author allow his storytelling character to establish her own authority. Of course,
Twain is still the one authorizing this voice–the author still has the power to decide where and
how Aunt Rachel may establish a voice. However structurally inevitable her secondary status is,
during the act of narration her authority is established–she knows more about this topic than the
narrator; she holds more knowledge and more wisdom. She remains a mimetic voice that is being
presented by a narrator inside quotation marks, but she establishes her own discursive authority.
This type of mimetic voice is analogous, I would argue, to Lanser’s notion of personal voice.
Personal voice, for Lanser, is used only by narrators who tell their own story inside the
fiction. If we were to call Aunt Rachel a narrator (which I wouldn’t do, but Genette would) hers
is a personal voice–one whose authority is contingent upon her actions inside the fiction. She is
certainly not the primary narrator; she is a storytelling character, which is a specific type of
mimetic voice, one whose authority is contingent in the same way as a personal voice, but one
that is also represented as speaking to present auditors. For there to be a storytelling character
there must be a defined storytelling event. In this case Aunt Rachel tells her story to Misto C– in
the evening on the front porch.
A storytelling character uses a private voice, which Lanser defines as “narration directed
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toward a narratee who is a fictional character.” She contrasts this with public voice: “narration
directed toward a narratee ‘outside’ the fiction who is analogous to the historical reader” (15).
The two most common types of private personal voice are letter-writing and storytelling
characters. Both of these types of characters engage in acts of narration that are private in
Lanser’s sense. I would argue that both of these voices are presented by narrators of some sort.
Neither of these types of characters directly address the reader–they often do not know that there
will ever be any readers to address. Their intended audience is inside the fiction. Simon Wheeler
is talking to the unnamed narrator, who is closely identified with the author, and not to any
reader; Aunt Rachel is directly addressing and touching Misto C–, and however much Miss Rosa,
in Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, may or may not wish that Quentin (her story listener) will
some day write her story, she is telling it to him and not to the historical reader. Aunt Rachel and
Simon Wheeler are storytelling characters. They are both, clearly, mimetic voices presented by
narrators. Their methods of gaining discursive authority are analogous to those of personal
narrators and of oral storytellers.
It may be problematic to call Aunt Rachel a personal voice, but she is certainly an
example of mimetic voice. As Ross writes “‘Mimetic voice’ is constituted by those features of a
text’s discourse that prompt readers to regard a particular portion of the text’s total discourse as
the utterance of an imagined person” (67). The use of the narrator to set the scene and quotation
marks show that this is the character’s utterance. This mimetic voice is presented by a narrator,
an authorial presence, who then withdraws from the stage. Regardless of her exact status, Aunt
Rachel establishes her authority, or is allowed to establish her authority by an authorial voice that
chooses to withdraw into the background after setting the stage. At the end she has established
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her authority both inside and outside the fictive world. Her experience has given her the wisdom
and the right to speak.
In The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Twain sets the stage for Huckleberry Finn and
then allows him to speak in his own voice throughout the entire work. The difference between
Huck and Aunt Rachel as narrative voices, as narrators, as storytelling characters, as mimetic
voices, is only one of degree. The genteel narrator–the authorial voice–has taken one step further
into the background. But it is the step that distinguishes narrators from storytelling characters.
Aunt Rachel’s private narration to Misto C– is mimetically presented by a genteel narrator.
Though there is an authorial voice in Huck Finn, he presents a public narration that has no clear
setting and is not as obviously mediated. Huck is aware that his audience is a readership. Aunt
Rachel is a storytelling character; Huck is a narrator. Though he is one step back, the authorial
presence is still felt in the novel. Tom Quirk writes:
It is not for nothing that Twain added the elaborate introductory apparatus to his
novel–the heliotype image of him as a frontispiece, sternly presiding over his book; his
parenthetical identification of Huck as ‘Tom Sawyer’s comrade’; his setting of the scene
and the time of the novel; his ‘Notice’ and his ‘Explanatory.’ These were no doubt, in
part, attempts to reassert his own authorial presence in the narrative to follow. (99)
There is an authorial presence that makes itself felt before the first chapter. Lanser notes that
“substantive prefaces, generalizations in the narrator’s voice, explicit allusions by the narrator to
literature or history, direct addresses to a public narratee, and explicit references to the narrating
subject or the narrative act” are “extrarepresentational structures” which are “constituents of
authoriality”(48). Though these prefatory sections are very short, they are direct addresses to the
readership and are explicit references to the narrating subject (in the case of the “Notice”) and to
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the narrating act (in the case of the “Explanatory”).8 A physical image of the author and the
signature “the author,” strongly encourage us to equate this voice with the author. Sometimes you
have to state the obvious. This voice never again explicitly speaks, but remains responsible for
the novel’s production.
In his explication of James Joyce’s Ulysses, David Hayman identifies an “arranger” who
“should be seen as something between a persona and a function, somewhere between the narrator
and the implied author . . . Perhaps it would be best to see the arranger as a significant, felt
absence in the text, and unstated but inescapable source of control” (122-23). This “felt absence”
is an authorial presence. There is an “unstated but inescapable source of control” in The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Genette names a similar “directing function” as one a narrator
performs (255), but he gives no indication how we should react if this is performed by a presence
separate from the other functions. The closest he comes to describing this is an “author absent
from the story” (187). I find myself forced to name this arranger as a kind of covert narrator,
particularly because “narrator” denotes, in the novel, a literary function which facilitates
storytelling as opposed to a representation of a storyteller. A narrator does not necessarily tell.
We have defined voice as a set of signs indicating presence, and this “felt absence” is a presence
regardless of whether it speaks or not. There is an authorial voice, but he is barely if at all evident
throughout the novel. As in “A True Story” the character’s speech is framed by an authorial
presence who then withdraws and does not overtly reappear. This framing allows the speaker to
establish his or her own authority.
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We saw, in the last chapter how Longstreet and Chaucer used their prefatory sections to
establish and protect their authorial privileges.
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What is framed is Huckleberry Finn’s voice, speaking. Though Huck says towards the
end that “there ain’t nothing more to write about” (295), even there he doesn’t say he was doing
the writing. When he complains about the trouble he had he describes it as trouble in “making a
book.” Though he is the narrator there is no compelling evidence to suggest Huck is represented
as having physically put the words on paper. There is compelling evidence to suggest that
someone other than Huck did the writing.
Quirk notes that originally, “Twain had given his story the working title ‘Huckleberry
Finn/Reported by Mark Twain,’ thus placing himself in a rather definite relation to his created
character” (6). In his other works narrated by Huck, Twain does explicitly state a relationship
between the figure of the author and Huck. In Tom Sawyer Abroad he explicitly names Huck as
the author and Mark Twain as the editor. The authorial credit for Tom Sawyer, Detective is “as
told by Huck Finn,” with Twain being the implied amanuensis. These credits are consistent with
what Twain writes about the genesis of the novel’s narrative voice:
‘if I tell a boy’s story, or anybody else’s, it is never worth printing, it comes from the head
and not from the heart, and always goes into the wastebasket. To be successful and worth
printing, the imagined boy would have to tell his story himself and let me act merely as
his amanuensis.’ (Qtd in Knoper 94)
All of these suggest that we should consider the novel as the transcription of Huck’s speech, but
they do not prove it. All of these pieces of evidence are outside of the published work. The proof
inside the final work lies in the uses of nonstandard spellings. Richard Bridgman sums up one
argument:
Ostensibly Huck writes his own story, but in fact his story is recorded as if he were telling
it to someone. So when Tom Sawyer writes a letter warning that Jim is going to escape,
Huck calls the letter a ‘nonamous’ one, a neologism faithfully reproducing Huck’s
misapprehension of the word ‘anonymous.’ On the other hand, the letter itself contains
such words as ‘religgion,’ ‘helish,’ and ‘leasure,’ the results of Tom’s uncertain spelling
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(ch. 39). A stenographer would have spelled them correctly, but since Tom is understood
to have written the letter himself, the misspellings stand. Therefore, when the writer plays
the role of the vernacular character writing, the misspellings are no longer employed
solely for the sake of phonetic accuracy. (57-58)
Misspellings in Tom’s writing, misspellings that don’t appear in the diegesis, reflect his
ability to spell. In the scene where Huck asks Buck Grangerford to spell his current alias, Buck
spells the name George Jackson “Gorge Jaxon,” and Huck recounts how he wrote the misspelling
down “private, because somebody might want me to spell it, next, and so I wanted to be able to
rattle it off like I was used to it” (120). There is no suggestion that Huck is any more aware of his
mistake during his subsequent narration than when he originally made it. Yet “Jackson” and
many other names and relatively difficult words are spelled correctly throughout the work,
“conscience” being, perhaps, the most interesting example. How can anyone spell “conscience”
correctly and misspell “George”? This demands that we posit the intervention of someone more
literate than Huck.
Bridgman also makes an important distinction between different nonstandard forms. A
dictating Huck’s substandard dialect is reproduced by the amanuensis. For instance, Huck says
“warn’t” instead of “wasn’t,” “carlessest” instead of “most careless,” “catched” instead of
“caught” and “clum” instead of “climbed;” these are not corrected. All of Huck’s nonstandard
morphological and syntactical constructions are preserved in the written text, as they would be in
a text he himself had inscribed. Other nonstandard spellings are employed for “the sake of
phonetic accuracy,” as Bridgman puts it. In the diegesis “risk” is spelled “resk,” and “rather” is
spelled “ruther” in order to reflect Huck’s pronunciation, not his conception of how these words
are spelled. How Huck, the narrator, speaks is represented in the written text, which is produced
by a literate mediator.
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As in other dialect writing, some words are given alternate spellings in order to signal
pronunciation differences. Bridgman describes these varying uses of language in all dialect
writing as “vernacular tricks.” He argues that “the reader’s mind is more than normally engaged
by the actual structure of the vernacular word” (25). He gives some examples to illustrate the
different techniques.
Norate is no word, cowcumber is a partly familiar one, salt and batter are familiar words
in the wrong context, and yellocution is at once no word and a neologism superior to the
proper one. The effort to understand in each of these instances accentuates the word itself.
(Bridgman 25)
All nonstandard forms a writer uses bring the facts of language and difference into view. The
effort it takes to interpret “nonamous” makes us think about the word “anonymous,” the meaning
of that word and about the reasons someone might make this mistake. “Nonamous,” like
“yellocution,” isn’t a particularly rich example; it is more of a humorous play on words than it is
indicative of a gap in understanding between two discourse communities. It does, nonetheless,
point to such a gap. It makes us aware that the user’s language, and perhaps his entire
engagement with life, is markedly different.
In his insightful explication on the uses of language in Huck Finn, Neil Schmitz
incorrectly imagines Huck writing. More importantly, he doesn’t differentiate between the
different vernacular techniques, placing all of them under the heading of “phoneticized writing.”
“There sits the writer at his manuscript,” he writes, “all scrunched up in his chair, his face
screwed, speaking aloud the words he painstakingly inscribes: sivilize, nonnamous, considerble”
(Of Huck and Alice 27).
These three words are very different. When the word “considerable” is used in Huck’s
direct discourse, the standard spelling is used. It is also spelled correctly when it is used in the
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diegesis.9 It is misspelled only in the direct discourse of other characters, characters whose level
of discourse is represented as lower than Huck’s. Pap Finn and the King use “considrble” and
this spelling is meant to represent a substandard pronunciation. Jim pronounces it differently. He
tells Huck “You gwyne to have considable trouble in yo’ life, en considable joy” (30).10 In every
case, the nonstandard spelling is used to indicate a nonstandard pronunciation. As we have just
seen “nonamous” is not a nonstandard pronunciation, it is a misapprehension of the word
anonymous, which could also be considered a neologism. It is a vocabulary–not a
pronunciation–error.
I am less interested in criticizing Schmitz than I am in pointing out what we can clearly
see by differentiating the different vernacular tricks in the work. All of these techniques make the
reader aware of the structure of language. Though they are all generally indicative of speech, the
different techniques behind the words sivilize, nonnamous, and considerable are in and of
themselves important. The latter two are not eye dialect. Twain uses nonstandard constructions
both in the diegesis and in reported speech. He uses more nonstandard spellings in Huck’s
reported speech than in the diegesis, though his other nonstandard constructions are substantially
the same in both. His literary dialect clearly signals class and education differences among the
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Twain is not consistent in his spelling of this word. Later in the novel the nonstandard
spelling is used in the diegesis, and in Huck’s direct discourse. As David Carkeet shows, “In the
parts of the novel written in the summer of 1883 (the latter half of the novel and the chapters 1214 interpolation), Huck shows several nonstandard features which do not appear in the parts of
the novel written earlier”(328). This is all a little bit academic: “considrble” is an example of
“phoneticized writing,” or nonstandard pronunciation. My point remains that it is a different
vernacular technique than sivilize and nonamous.
10

Fishkin, in Was Huck Black? and Jon Powell in “Trouble and Joy from ‘A True Story’
to The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn: Mark Twain and the Book of Jeremiah” discuss the
connection between the use of “trouble” and “joy” here with its use in “A True Story.”
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various characters. I would say that the two functions his literary dialect perform are to signal
class and education differences and to create an aura of authenticity in character’s speech.
Twain’s literary dialect throughout the work does not include the use of eye dialect, with the
possible exception of his African-American dialect.
As Bowdre demonstrates, many authors who take literary dialect very seriously (he
specifically names Joel Chandler Harris, Twain and Faulkner as well as some others) rarely if
ever use eye dialect. Instead, they show difference by techniques that one would have to call
more mimetic. They only use nonstandard spellings to indicate nonstandard forms. Discussing
Harris’ eye dialect Bowdre writes “The fact that there is very little of it, considering the large
number of nonstandard spellings he uses, indicates that Harris was making a real effort to see to
it that his nonstandard spellings actually represented pronunciation differences” (30).
As we’ve already discussed with “A True Story,” Twain took great pains to make his
literary dialect as authentic seeming as possible in print. Apparently his representation of dialects
was so important to him that he felt compelled to explain the dialects in Huck Finn. In his
explanatory note, Twain claims that “a number of dialects are used,” and then explicitly mentions
three, including “the ordinary ‘Pike-County’ dialect; and four modified varieties of this last” (5).
Some critics have found different numbers of dialects in the work, but as Fishkin writes,
“whatever position one stakes out on the ‘number of dialects’ question, Twain clearly was
fascinated by the variety and distinctiveness of American vernacular speech” (103).
Neither the number nor the actual authenticity of these dialects interests me as much as
one might think. What does interest me is Twain’s claim that the “shadings have not been done
in a hap-hazard fashion, or by guess-work; but pains-takingly, and with the trustworthy guidance
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and support of personal familiarity with these several forms of speech.” As I have already
mentioned he asserts and establishes his authority as a master of vernacular discourse. He signs
this note “THE AUTHOR” (5). Schmitz argues that this “is his last word in Huckleberry Finn”
(Of Huck and Alice 97). But perhaps this isn’t actually the author’s last word. What Twain
certainly does with this note is take direct responsibility for the variety and quality of the literary
dialects in the work. Huck may be telling his own story in his own words, but the author has
transcribed the different types of speech accurately, and his authority as a master of both spoken
and written discourse is behind their authenticity. If we can differentiate the various dialects and
draw conclusions about the speakers it is because the author, the source of authority, has
authentically replicated them.
There is an authorial voice in the work, or at least near the work, but he never uses his
own voice inside the work. He never speaks, but his presence, which is what Ross says voice
evokes, is felt. He takes credit for controlling the literary dialects. All of these things signal
authorial control, but they are all very much in the background in an important sense.11 From the
start of chapter one, the “me” of the work is Huck. His voice, however, is transferred to print by
this presence, and it is this authorial presence that gives us the most famous use of eye dialect in
American literature.
There is only one notable example of eye dialect in Huck Finn. As Schmitz says, “the first
misspelled word in Huckleberry Finn, and the last, is sivilize” (Of Huck and Alice 32). It is the
only example of eye dialect in the work that is not contained inside quotation marks. Huck uses
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We will see a similar, though more overt, example of authorial voice in Lee Smith’s The
Devil’s Dream.
104

the word “sivilize” in the diegesis on both the first and last pages of the novel. He uses it another
time as well, but these two instances are particularly notable. Bridgman writes about the passages
on the two extreme pages: “Three terms appear in both passages: ‘sivilize,’ ‘can’t stand it,’ and
‘light out.’ although some of the efforts to make Huckleberry Finn a unified book seemed
strained, here is evidence of significant verbal repetition at the two extremes of the book” (113114).
The repetition of these terms frames the novel, and hints at an authorial control that many
find lacking. On the first page of the text, after Huck has introduced himself and summarized
Tom Sawyer, he picks up the story shortly before the end of the earlier novel. He explains that the
widow Douglas “allowed she would sivilize me . . . and so when I couldn’t stand it no longer, I
lit out . . . and was free and satisfied” (13).
The narrator of Tom Sawyer explains the same situation in a more elevated discourse.
Huck’s “sufferings were almost more than he could bear. . . . he had to talk so properly that
speech was become insipid in his mouth; whithersoever he turned, the bars and shackles of
civilization shut him in and bound him hand and foot” (205). On the next page Huck twice tells
Tom that he “can’t stand” his current situation, and Tom convinces him to endure it in order to
become a robber. Already in Tom Sawyer, Huck’s conflict is laid out. This narrator, however, is
clearly condescending, though somewhat sympathetic, overstating Huck’s conflict and thereby
reducing it. Civilization “shackles” him, but they are benign shackles that reduce his ability to
smoke and cuss while providing him an opportunity for the happy life that proper education
provides. What civilization does to him in the sequel is something very different.
The word sivilize is clearly significant. It is the only example of eye dialect in the diegesis
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and one that is on both the first and last pages of the work. Every competent reader of the text
knows that the word sivilize is important, because of its prominent positions in the text and its
clear thematic importance. However, by differentiating eye dialect from Twain’s other techniques
of representing dialect we can empirically prove what we already know: the word sivilize is
uniquely marked in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.12
Sivilize is clearly and uniquely marked in the novel. The question is who exactly marks
this word in the text. A speaker does not use eye dialect. Eye dialect is a writer’s tool, used for
specific purposes while representing speech, usually as a signal for the lower status of the
speaker. “The writer of Eye Dialect wishes to convey the impression of differentness with his
nonstandard spellings” (Bowdre 105). If Huck is speaking to an unnamed amanuensis, he
shouldn’t be able to use this tool of the writer.
The word may be strange for Huck–the author may wish to suggest that his pronunciation
of the word is somehow different, but this spelling does not represent that. And if Huck is not the
one doing the writing–inscribing the words on to the paper–then some other presence, a writer,
has made this term strange for us. The word sivilize is different, and Hayman’s arranger, a covert
narrator not Huck, has made it so. Only writers can use eye dialect. Huck would no more
recognize this misspelling than he would notice his misspelling of the name “Jackson.” Twain
does not mark the word in order to signal class or educational difference, at least not primarily.
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One thing I’ve done with students is to go over the difference between eye dialect and
other vernacular techniques before they begin reading Huckleberry Finn, and then tell them that
one of the daily quiz questions will be to give an example of eye dialect from the first section of
the novel. This invariably has two very gratifying results: a great many students read the first
section of the novel aware that the word sivilize is somehow important, and, less noble but still
gratifying, students who skipped the last class don’t even understand the question.
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He marks it in order to put the specific word into play–to cause the reader to think about the word
itself and what it means to us and to Huck. What this does at the beginning of the novel is signal
the author’s contention that there is something wrong with the process which this word describes.
And at the end of the novel there is still something wrong.
Though the novel ends with Jim free from slavery, Huck safe from his father and Tom
once again envied by all his peers, the spelling of the word sivilize has not changed and neither
has Huck’s resistance to it. “I reckon I got to light out for the territory ahead of the rest, because
aunt Sally she’s going to adopt me and sivilize me and I can’t stand it. I been there before”(296).
The ending of Huck Finn has been called everything from fitting to uncomfortable to
unforgivable. Questions about whether the ending is somehow flawed or inappropriate avoid “a
full reckoning with the novel’s conclusion” (Robinson 179). What is interesting about the ending
for our purposes is that Huck denies the authority he builds throughout the novel, or that the
author allows him to build. Fishkin writes that “by making Huck the ‘author’ of his own book,
Twain validated the authority of vernacular culture more boldly than any book that had gone
before” (116). But at the end of the novel, the vernacular representative has ceded this authority;
he has allowed his voice to be silenced. He has given his “own” book to someone else,
specifically to Tom Sawyer. As Leo Marx writes, “Huckleberry Finn is a masterpiece because it
brings Western humor to perfection and yet transcends the narrow limits of its conventions. But
the ending does not” (205). What the ending does is conform to the narrow conventions of
Western humor, of comedy in general, and make us acutely aware of how inadequate these
conventions are.
The achievement of Huck Finn centers on Twain turning a storytelling character into a
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narrator. He authorizes a speaking voice by placing it in the primary position–by making the
speaker the narrator. Huck is not a storytelling character even though he is a speaking character.
We don’t know where, when or to whom Huck is speaking. There is never a hint of any of the
dynamics of Huck’s telling, or of his auditors. There is only his speaking voice, acting the role of
narrator. Huckleberry Finn is a personal narrator–a public personal voice. Huck’s authority
remains contingent in the same way as every personal voice, but it also holds the primary
position in the novel, making the other voices secondary to his. He has the potential for more
discursive authority than any vernacular character before him.
Huck’s is a personal voice, in a way a mimetic voice used by an author, and his voice is
initially, like Aunt Rachel’s in “A True Story” and perhaps all mimetic voices, “secondary,
indulged and condescended to” (Ross 108). Bridgman argues that in the novel “we hear no
condescending adult voice by which Huck can be judged insufficient. His idiom is the standard”
(9). I would argue that the adult voice is heard in the introductory section, and this is enough to
create an initial condescension and judgment. The comic absurdity of many of Huck’s
observations early in the novel also paint him as a comic figure. Huck’s voice becomes, however,
the standard in the novel. The reader is aware that there is the authorizing presence of the author
somewhere behind Huck, but this voice is not constantly reasserted in the work. As Henry Nash
Smith writes, Twain eliminates “the author as an intruding presence in the story” (113). No
authorial voice inserts evaluative comments–Lanser’s extrarepresentational acts. Huck is able to
establish his own authority, in the same manner as Aunt Rachel.
As a personal narrator, Huck builds his own authority outside of the dominant discourse
while using its medium. We come to believe that an “ignorant river waif” holds knowledge and
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wisdom–access to the truth. When Huck sees the King and the Duke tarred and feathered, we
believe his reaction is the truth because we have learned that he has the “sound heart” that Smith
writes about13, and because we know that he has experienced cruelty in his life and that he has
been wronged by these two. If Huck “couldn’t ever feel any hardness against them any more in
the world” (239), how can we? We absolutely trust in his wisdom when he says that it “was a
dreadful thing to see. Human beings can be awful cruel to one another” (239). While we see the
wisdom in his words, we must also see that the society that Huck resists is responsible for this
cruelty–supports and justifies this cruelty. As Smith argues “the satire of the towns along the
banks insists again and again that the dominant culture is decadent and perverted” (117). We see
Colonel Sherburn gun down a man in cold blood, then almost be lynched himself; we see the
Grangerford’s and the Sheperdson’s slaughter each other, and we see that the society Huck resists
should be resisted, and should not finally sivilize him. It does not hold the moral authority inside
the fiction to dictate Huck’s actions.
While Huck tells his story, the reader is shown that he has at the very least a capacity for
wisdom and a viewpoint with validity outside of the fictive world. We also see that Jim, who has
the thickest substandard dialect in the work, is also imbued with wisdom and dignity. In fact,
Huck comes to see Jim as an equal almost immediately after he mimics his dialect.
One of the pivotal episodes of the novel is when Huck and Jim are separated in heavy fog
and Huck finally finds Jim asleep on the raft which is “littered up with leaves and branches and
dirt” (93). Huck feigns sleep and convinces Jim that their separation was only a vivid dream that
Huck encourages him to relate. “So Jim went to work and told me the whole thing right through,
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Smith entitles his chapter on Huck, “A Sound Heart and a Deformed Conscience.”
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just as it happened, only he painted it up considerable. Then he said he must start in and ‘’terpret’
it” (95).
Here Huck uses “‘terpret” in what is otherwise Jim’s indirect discourse. Huck signals the
secondary status of Jim’s language. Huck condescends to Jim, and then expresses his
condescension when he reveals his trick, using the standard pronunciation: “‘Oh, well, that’s all
interpreted well enough as far as it goes, Jim,’ I says; ‘but what does these things stand for?’”
(95). Jim stares at the debris which confirms it was no dream. Huck describes the debris as
“trash’ twice. Jim then describes the genuine concern he had for Huck safety and his knowledge
that Huck had tricked him and says “‘Dat truck dah is trash; en trash is what people is dat puts
dirt on de head er dey fren’s en makes ‘em ashamed’” (95). Even though Jim’s dialect continues
to be substandard, his dignity and humanity are undeniable. He has the authority to label Huck as
trash. Huck, even with his superior position in society and language ability, must accept this
assessment.
In one of the two most significant decisions of the novel Huck determines he is in the
wrong and must apologize to Jim, though he doesn’t refer to him as “Jim.” “It was fifteen
minutes before I could work myself up to go and humble myself to a nigger–but I done it, and I
warn’t ever sorry for it afterwards, neither” (95). Henry Nash Smith argues that “Huck’s humble
apology is striking evidence of growth in moral insight” (119). He certainly grows in the eyes of
the reader. The reader sees that Huck may be able to overcome his clear prejudice and treat Jim
as a human being and a friend. But he still has a great deal to overcome. Even when he makes the
decision to help free Jim, he hasn’t overcome it. Smith argues that the novel is, in part, a satire of
“decadent slaveholding society” and that the satire:
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gains immensely in force when Mark Twain demonstrates that even the outcast Huck has
been perverted by it. Huck’s conscience is simply the attitudes he has taken over from his
environment. What is still sound in him is an impulse from the deepest level of his
personality that struggles against the overlay of prejudice and false valuation imposed on
all members of society in the name of religion, morality, law, and refinement. (122)
Twain shows that Huck has been perverted by society, by having Huck believe himself to be
wrong when he decides to do the right thing. While he is debating whether to turn Jim in or not,
Huck knows that his impulse to help Jim is morally wrong. He believes it is wrong because he
has been taught it is so. We have seen, through Huck’s narration, that society was wrong to teach
him this. Meanwhile, He chastises himself for his sinfulness:
Well, I tried the best I could to kinder soften it up somehow for myself, by saying I was
brung up wicked, and so I warn’t so much to blame; but something inside me kept saying,
‘There was the Sunday school, you could a gone to it; and if you’d done it they’d a learnt
you, there, that people that acts as I’d been acting about that nigger goes to everlasting
fire.’ (222)
This something inside Huck is connected to the same force attempting to sivilize him. Huck
absolutely believes that he will burn in everlasting fire if he helps Jim. In Huck’s mind this crisis
of conscience does not result in him choosing the right action. He chooses to break the law; he
chooses, according to all the authorities he knows, to do the wrong thing–the thing that will
literally damn him as a low-down abolitionist.
He can’t do the appropriate thing because his heart is not as hard as that of the society
around him. He tries to steel himself to betray Jim, but “somehow I couldn’t seem to strike no
places to harden me against him, but only the other kind” (222-23). Huck sees his inability to
harden up against Jim as weakness, as he does his failure to betray Jim earlier. “I warn’t man
enough–hadn’t the spunk of a rabbit. I see I was weakening; so I just give up trying” (111). He
gives up trying to do what he believes is the right thing and instead protects Jim from slave
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hunters, which we know is the right thing to do.
When he makes his final decision to free Jim, it is in his mind a decision to go to hell. He
doesn’t decide to tell society to go to hell, confident in the knowledge that he knows what is true
and right. He decides to damn himself to hell. We see that what he decides is true and right, at
least that his actions are, but he does not. This choice for hell is not insignificant. It is awful:
It was awful thoughts, and awful words, but they was said. And I let then stay said; and
never thought no more about reforming. I shoved the whole thing out of my head; and
said I would take up wickedness again, which was in my line, being brung up to it, and
the other warn’t. And for a starter, I would go to work and steal Jim out of slavery again;
and if I could think of anything worse, I would do that, too; because as long as I was in,
and in for good, I might as well go the whole hog. (223)
Though Twain does put some comic escalation in here, having Huck decide to go “whole hog”
towards damnation, we should not let this blind us to the fact that Huck believes he is wrong,
and, in fact, evil. Concomitantly, he believes that the society that condemns him to hell is wise
and just. As Robinson observes:
At no point in his famous crisis in Chapter 31 does Huck seriously question the premise
that Jim has ‘got to be a slave.’ True, he bridles against the Christian civilization which
enforces the institution, and thus betrays an impulse to question the justice of slavery. In
the main, however, he concedes the necessity and propriety of slavery, and centers his
troubled soul-searching on his own sinfulness in failing to ‘do the right thing and the
clean thing.’ His decision to ‘go to hell’ is quite unmistakably an assertion of the justice
of the system that enslaves Jim. (200-01)
As Robinson argues, Huck’s decision is his affirmation of the moral authority of the society that
his narration has shown us does not have this moral authority. Cox argues that Huck’s rebellion
is “negotiated in a society which the reader’s conscience indicts as morally wrong and which
history has declared legally wrong” (169). Huck has built his own authority in our eyes, but he
doesn’t trust it himself. He believes that the dominant discourse holds the truth, the wisdom, and
that he is in error. The reader sees that he is wrong, that he should trust what Smith calls his
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sound heart, but he does not. This is the tragedy that pervades the comic ending of the novel.
Shortly after Huck decides to free Jim, Tom arrives on the scene and Huck blurts out his
intentions. Tom almost tells Huck that Jim is already free, but quickly stops himself. As Smith
writes, “Tom withholds the information, however, in order to trick Huck and Jim into the
meaningless game of an Evasion that makes the word (borrowed from Dumas) into a devastating
pun. Tom takes control and Huck becomes once again a subordinate carrying out orders” (133).
He evades responsibility because Tom has given him the ability to do so. Huck allows himself to
be secondary, indulged and condescended to because he believes that is the appropriate state of
affairs. Huck resumes a subordinate position after we have seen him appear to be stronger and
more mature. But he isn’t actually changed; his belief system still holds sway. Things seem
somehow wrong to him; he bridles against becoming sivilized, as he has from the start, but he
firmly believes that his resistance is indicative of a fundamental flaw in his character, not in
society.
What makes the ending so important for our purposes is that, as a personal narrator, Huck
does build authority, even though his voice does not conform to the standards of the dominant
discourse community. After having built this authority through the novel, he cedes it to Tom
because, in Huck’s mind, Tom has greater access to the truth. As a representative of the dominant
discourse community, as an educated white male of hegemonic ideology, Tom holds the cultural
authority. Tom is in some ways a surrogate for the genteel narrator, using the rustic experience as
fodder for his fiction. However much he bridles against his methods, Huck has faith in the
rightness of Tom’s actions. He feels this faith despite Tom’s outrageous acts, partly because he
lacks faith in himself, and because of the awful consequences of his decision to free Jim.
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Huck’s psychological equilibrium is more precarious than ever precisely because of his
heroic resolve to rescue Jim; for that decision is a conscious and manifestly consequential
violation of social prohibitions which he has internalized. Thus divided against himself,
the real Huck Finn–the marginal, ambivalent, guilt-haunted fugitive–falls prey to demons
that arise from within his troubled mind. In this perspective, it is neither inconsistent nor
surprising that he should take refuge in the comparatively unambivalent and supremely
socialized identity of Tom Sawyer. (Robinson 201)
What is inexplicable is not Huck’s deferring to Tom, but Tom’s decision to help. Huck wonders
about this, and reveal his opinion both of Tom and himself:
One thing was for sure and that was, that Tom Sawyer was in earnest, and was actuly
going to help steal that nigger out of slavery. That was the thing that was too many for
me. Here was a boy that was respectable, and well bring up; and had a character to lose;
and folks at home that had characters; and he was bright and not leatherheaded; and
knowing, and not ignorant; and not mean, but kind; yet here he was, without any more
pride, or rightness, or feeling, than to stoop to this business, and make himself a shame,
and his family a shame, before everybody. I couldn’t understand it, no way at all. (242)
This passage is particularly significant because we will soon see clearly that Tom is
certainly not kind, nor is he what we would consider knowing or respectable; he is all of these
things in Huck’s eyes. However much we hope Huck will resist Tom’s influence, that he will
rebel against the society that we can clearly see is in the wrong, Huck believes in the rightness of
Tom’s actions. As James Cox writes, Huck
is certainly not a rebel; he is in a tight place and does the easiest thing. The role of
Abolitionist is not comfortable nor comforting to him and in turning over to Tom Sawyer
the entire unpleasant business of freeing Jim, Huck is surely not acting out of but
remarkably in character. (173)
He is acting in character because Tom Sawyer has always been his model for a right thinking
boy. And why wouldn’t he be? In The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, Tom always wins. Tom
transgresses the boundaries of appropriate behavior and is rewarded in the end with wealth and
acclaim. This book ends no differently. Tom is, in fact, right. His successful evasion results in a
gunshot wound that he can show off, along with the bullet itself, for years to come. He does it
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because he “wanted the adventure of it” (292), and he gets the adventure, and no punishment that
we are told about. The sequel to Tom Sawyer ends the same way as the original: tragedy is
averted and everyone lives happily ever after. And yet the reader is left unsatisfied, or at least
should be. Though Huck believes he is doing the right thing, “when he submits to Tom’s role, we
are the ones who become uncomfortable” (Cox 181).
Though we see how wrong Huck’s actions are, he is acting entirely in character.
Throughout the novel, Tom is held up as the standard for cleverness and right action. Before the
ending of the novel Huck makes some evaluative statements that assert and demonstrate his
authority outside of the fiction. One of the longest ones, presages some of Twain’s later remarks
about conscience. After Huck makes his strong comments about a subject that has validity
outside of the novel, he appeals to authority: “ “It takes up more room than all the rest of a
person’s insides, and yet ain’t no good, nohow. Tom Sawyer he says the same” (240).14 He is the
authority of the novel, and his authority over Huck comes from books–from his perceived
mastery of the dominant discourse. Tom is in control, and he revels in it. In a discussion of Tom
Sawyer, Schmitz writes:
For Tom the pleasure of play is in the manipulation of it. He directs the play, controls the
players, and always comes into the play referring to the authority of a script: it is written
that we do this or that. The scripture of Tom’s ‘adventures’ reveals the character of his
personality. (Of Huck and Alice 70-71)
When he is leading the band of robbers early in Huckleberry Finn, Tom expressly states the
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Other examples: “I was just a-biling with curiosity; and I says to myself, Tom Sawyer
wouldn’t back out now, and so I won’t either; I’m a going to see what’s going on here” (77); “I
felt very good; I judged I’d done it pretty neat–I reckoned Tom Sawyer couldn’t a done it no
neater, himself. Of course he would a throwed more style into it, but I can’t do that very handy,
not being brung up to it” (205).
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source of his authority. Though the reader knows that Tom doesn’t understand what the word
“ransom” means, and the other children see that his plan isn’t logical, Tom crushes their
resistance by appealing to the authority of the written word. Things are to be done Tom’s way,
and not Ben Rogers’s,
‘Because it ain’t in the books so–that’s why. Now Ben Rogers, do you want to do things
regular or don’t you?–that’s the idea. Don’t you reckon that the people that made the
books knows what’s the correct thing to do? Do you reckon you can learn ‘em anything?
Not by a good deal. No, sir, we’ll just go on and ransom them in the regular way.’ (22)
Tom’s authority comes not from his own wisdom or experience, but from his knowledge of
written works that hold authority. Tom’s power, like that of an author and of a genteel narrator,
comes from his knowledge of and “adherence to the authority of cultural antecedent” (Pease
105). The cultural antecedents that Tom cites are the written romances he has modeled his play
after.
Twain has removed the authorial presence, the genteel narrator, from the position of
primary narrator, but he has not dispensed with the genteel perspective and values. In some
important sense Tom plays the role of the genteel narrator at the end of the novel and closes the
frame that the authorial figure opened. Recall that Gray argued that:
the classic humorist tale consists of a narrator, identifiable as superior in class and
education, setting up the scene and bringing on the rustic characters, putting them through
their violent routines complete with comic dialect, and then returning us at the end of the
story to his own stable, secure world and standard English. (63)
At the end of Huckleberry Finn, Tom arrives, superior in class and education, and puts Jim and
Huck through “violent routines complete with comic dialect” and then through the power of his
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voice sets Jim free15 and returns us to “his own stable, secure world and [such as it is] standard
English.” The narrator doesn’t bring us back to stability, but Huck heeds Tom’s voice and
submissively allows the novel to be returned there. In fact, the narrator can’t stand this stability.
The primary voice of the novel doesn’t use the dominant language, but the power of this
discourse to determine what can be said is reasserted. In the end we are returned to the safety that
the frame tale structure provides, but we see that this safety relies on the denial of the character’s
basic humanity.
Smith argues that this is necessary if “everything is to be forced back into the framework
of comedy” (133). At the ending of a comedy equilibrium is established. Societies rules are
reimposed, allowing everyone noble the opportunity to live happily ever after. For this to happen
in this society, Jim must become a nigger who can be bought for forty dollars and Huck must not
only be marginalized, but he must feel that his marginalization is appropriate. However
uncomfortable the ending may feel, it is very conventional. Cox calls the ending a “cost which
the form exacted” (181). “Turning the story over to Huck brought into view previously
unsuspected literary potentialities in the vernacular perspective” (Smith 113). One possibility it
created was “transforming the vernacular narrator from a mere persona into a character with
human depth” (114). Smith goes on to argue that Twain could not complete the novel in a
manner consistent with his initial conception and allow Huck and Jim to maintain the depth they
had established.

15

Tom regains consciousness and, upon hearing that Jim is imprisoned, roars: “‘They
hain’t no right to shut him up! Shove!–and don’t you lose a minute. Turn him loose! He ain’t no
slave, he’s as free as any cretur that walks this earth!’” (291). Tom’s performative utterance only
carries power, however, because Aunt Sally arrives and confirms it.
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Mark Twain’s portrayal of Huck and Jim as complex characters has carried him beyond
the limits of his original plan: we must not forget that the literary ancestry of the book is
to be found in backwoods humor. As Huck approaches the Phelps plantation the writer
has on his hand a hybrid—a comic story in which his protagonists have acquired
something like tragic depth. (133)
Smith argues that Twain found that he could not end the novel in a way that allowed Huck his
humanity. “The perplexing final sequence on the Phelps plantation is best regarded as a
maneuver by which Mark Twain beats his way back from incipient tragedy to the comic
resolution called for by the original conception of the story”(114).
The original conception was influenced by the clash of discourses characteristic of
southwestern humor, though the traditionally contained voice was given a far looser rein and a
more prominent position. Schmitz argues that the “familiar structure of the conventional
exchange in humorous writing, that opposition of illiterate speech and literary writing, is the
structure of Huckleberry Finn. Jim and Tom struggle fore and aft for the mastery of Huck’s
discourse” (112-13).
At the end, Tom wins. Order is restored. The reader is returned to safety, but it a hollow
and twisted safety. The representative of the dominant discourse, the educated white male of
hegemonic ideology, is no wiser than Huck. In fact, he is clearly disconnected from reality. His
romantic ideals deny the humanity of all of the other characters involved in his story, and yet they
prevail. Jim is no longer a father figure or a potential equal, or a slave–he is a character in Tom’s
play.
In a sense, Tom should have the authority, as should the widow Douglas and Judge
Thatcher. The masters of the dominant discourse, the educated, those who are successfully
integrated into society, should be wiser than Huck. The people who have mastered the language,
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whose speech is judged as standard, or at least better, should know the right actions. And people
whose speech is marked as substandard, as uneducated, shouldn’t hold the greater wisdom. This
isn’t the case. Those who master the dominant discourse are more successful, they aren’t ridden
out of town on rails or hunted by dogs, but this isn’t because they are morally superior to those
who speak in substandard dialects.
This is because that in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, the speech itself isn’t the
point; the point is that mastery of the dominant discourse or lack of mastery of this discourse is
not the measure of moral value. Judge Thatcher and Colonel Sherburn have this mastery; Huck,
Jim and Pap do not. Tom has a childishly perverted ability to appropriate the dominant discourse
to his own ends. Noting Pap Finn’s lack of moral authority, Smith writes: “speaking in dialect
does not in itself imply moral authority” (122). This is certainly true, but I would argue that there
is no correlation between speech levels and levels of wisdom or morality. We are forced, in the
novel, to judge people by something other than their speech. Instead we must judge them by the
content of their speech and by their actions. We learn this lesson; Huck does not.
Huck builds as much authority as a personal voice can; as much as Aunt Rachel does, but
he does not believe in the authority to make moral decisions that we are willing to grant him. We
see he is wiser and kinder and more moral than Tom, but he cannot see it. The fact that he defers
to authorities that his narration has convinced us are wrong is the point of the novel. He defers to
Tom’s authority, the authority of the dominant discourse and the written word, because he never
truly believes in his own authority. We sees this, and we see that authority should not derive from
the conventional sources.
The authority he gains through the act of narration is what makes the ending

119

uncomfortable because we know that we are complicit in his misjudgments. At the end things we
laughed at in the beginning are no longer funny. However, no one has been transformed–Tom is
still as inexplicable and powerful and confident as ever. Tom is not different, nor is Huck, nor is
the society in which they live. The reader is different. The reader sees that Huck’s method of
viewing the world has been inextricably warped by the society that maintains authority over him.
In “The Jumping Frog stories the genteel narrator flees Wheeler’s interminable and
inexplicable storytelling. He flees back to the safety of genteel society. There is no such comfort
in “A True Story”–the frame does not close and return us to safety, but as Twain wrote to
Howells, there is no humor in that story. The strength of Huckleberry Finn’s ending is that all of
the conventions of the romance and of comedy are met, but the reader sees that society’s
equilibrium is unjust and Huck’s marginalization is not only hurting him, but perpetuating an
unjust system. At the end of Huckleberry Finn Huck flees genteel society, equally unable to
understand or stand it.
This is part of the reason George Santayana, in “The Genteel Tradition in American
Philosophy,” claims that American humorists:
only half escape the genteel tradition; their humour would lose its savour if they had
wholly escaped it. They point to what contradicts it in the facts; but not in order to
abandon the genteel tradition, for they have nothing solid to put in its place. When they
point out how ill many facts fit into it, they do not clearly conceive that this militates
against the standard, but think it a funny perversity in the facts. Of course, did they
earnestly respect the genteel tradition, such an incongruity would seem to them sad, rather
than ludicrous. Perhaps the prevalence of humor in America, in and out of season, may be
taken as one more evidence that the genteel tradition is present pervasively, but
everywhere weak. (139)
Because the vernacular perspective does not have the power to become the dominant discourse
the only way that Huck Finn, the novel and the boy, can survive is to conform to the expectations
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of the dominant discourse community or to light out for the territory. Huck, certainly, can put
nothing in the place of the genteel tradition because he has no other tradition that he believes in.
The power of the tradition is so strong that Huck cannot imagine its replacement, nor that it
should be replaced.
At the end of Huckleberry Finn the personal narrator abrogates the authority he has
established through his telling, and this acts as a critique of the conventions of authority in the
novel. There is a similar movement in Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! where a relatively
conventional authorial narrator brings his own authority into question and thereby authorizes the
novel’s storytelling characters.
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“HE SOUNDS JUST LIKE FATHER”
STORYTELLING AND AUTHORIAL VOICE IN ABSALOM, ABSALOM!
William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! is the reason I began looking at storytelling
characters in fiction. As James Matlack writes, “Absalom, Absalom! is self-consciously devoted
to an analysis of oral narration. It is not so much a book about a story as about storytelling itself”
(343). Though each of the characters tells the “same” story, their versions differ in ways great
and small. Critics often disagree about the number of narrators in this novel because almost
everyone who speaks is telling a story–almost everyone is narrating. Cleanth Brooks reminds us,
however, “that in spite of the many conversations between characters and the long reveries and
monologues of a single character, Absalom, Absalom! is finally a novel written in the third
person by an omniscient narrator” (308). The narrator of the novel is an example of authorial
voice. He is a public extra-diegetic narrator who is closely identified with the author. I will argue
that he may also be an example of one type of communal voice–the type that Lanser calls
“singular”: “in which one narrator speaks for a collective” (21). This collective is the people of
Faulkner’s fictional Yoknapatawpha County. It is debatable whether this narrator is an example
of only either authorial voice or communal voice, but it is more useful to note that he shares
qualitites of both types. Part of the continued interest in the novel rests on the fact that it is such a
rich field for the study of voice. The novel also contains other types of communal voice. When
Quentin and Shreve are collaborating on the Sutpen story towards the end of the novel, they are,
with the narrator, creating “a simultaneous form, in which a plural ‘we’ narrates.” This plural we
is sometimes realized through a communal type of free indirect discourse. The entire novel could
also be considered an example of the “sequential form in which individual members of a group
narrate in turn” (21).
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Almost all of the voices in the novel use what Ross calls “oratorical voice,” where the
voices reflect the specific discourse associated with southern colloquial oratory. Since the
primary storytelling characters in the novel and the narrator speak in this voice, which, as Ross
argues, is closely associated with Faulkner, their voices could be considered to be on the same
dialogical plane as the narrator, and perhaps by having his characters speak in oratorical voice
Faulkner has evaded the structurally secondary status of mimetic voice and written what Mikhail
Bakhtin calls a dialogical novel.
Absalom, Absalom! has examples of communal and authorial voice, as well as oratorical
voice. Other critics have contended that it is a dialogical novel where all of the voices (or at least
some of them) exist on the same dialogical plane as the narrator’s, with none of the voices having
final semantic authority. One reason all of these theories have explanatory power is because they
all touch on the fact that this novel is an exploration of authority in novels and in oral traditions,
and it is about how Quentin Compson uses the oral tradition of his community to try to arrive at a
truth he can live with.
The novel has a public extradiegetic narrator–an authorial voice–who seems to refuse to
take all the authority he possesses by literary convention. By refusing to take authority, he
encourages his voice to be on an equal dialogic plane with the voices of the individual
storytelling characters in the novel. However, the narrator makes no overt statements that bring
his authority into question until Quentin and Shreve begin their intensely collaborative
storytelling event at the novel’s end. Until then he exerts a fairly conventional amount of
authority and tacitly endorses the narratives of Mr Compson and Thomas Sutpen. After these
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events have been presented, Shreve and Quentin begin their telling, which the narrator’s overt
comments simultaneously problematize and, in a sense, legitimize.
The relationship between the narrator, the storytelling characters, Quentin and the Sutpen
story seems to change as the novel progresses. Later in the novel the storytelling seems to have
greater evocative power and the author seems to give up authority he has exerted earlier. As we
look at this novel we will see a narrator who seems to refuse to take the authority that is his by
narrative convention. In fact, the narrator is always authoritative when it comes to relating the
facts of the events dramatized in the novel. What the novel dramatizes is Quentin’s attempt to
understand the Sutpen story. “The attempt to reconstruct Sutpen’s life and to evaluate his
character, particularly by Quentin, is more important than the life and characters themselves. The
attempt is always made in the role of a teller of tales” (Matlack 343). These character’s attempts
are presented by an extradiegetic narrator.
Estella Schoenberg usefully differentiates between what she calls the “Sutpen” and the
“Quentin material.” This split is not entirely distinct because the narrator directly gives “Sutpen
material” in the second chapter. Most of the story of the Sutpen family, however, is related by
storytelling characters, and this is what Schoenberg calls “the unknowable past” while calling the
Quentin material “the observable present” (79). She shows that all of the much discussed
discrepancies in the novel (save one) are relayed by storytelling characters, and not by the
narrator, whom she labels the “objective or impersonal author–Faulkner himself–who offers no
information at all about Sutpen or his immediate family and only minimal stage directions for
Quentin and his informants” (73). I would argue that the narrator plays a greater role than this,
and that he is no more objective than any authorial narrator, but I want to focus here on his
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reliability in terms of the action of the novel’s diegesis, which Schoenberg shows is very strong.
“The Quentin part of Absalom, Absalom! is left in no doubt whatever and contains no
miscalculations except the count of months between September and January” (79). Except for
this one minor error, the diegesis of the novel is reliable.
Absalom, Absalom! has an authorial voice that exercises its authority over the events that
take place in the present of the novel. Quentin certainly sits in a room with Rosa Coldfield and
listens to her tell about Thomas Sutpen. This event is narrated completely reliably. The authorial
voice of the work is less reliable, or authoritative, when discussing the events these characters tell
stories about. This is because this is a novel about the truth that oral traditions can give us, not
about the historical events this particular tradition uses. It is, as Bakhtin argues the dialogical
novel is, about “only the truth of the hero’s own consciousness” (Problems 55). The only time
the narrator tells the Sutpen story he seems completely authoritative, but he only narrates public
acts, so his authority is very similar to Mr Compson’s, who is a master of the local oral tradition.
Quentin strives, in this novel, to arrive at his own truth through an exploration of an oral
traditional story of his community. “Absalom, Absalom! is not primarily about the South or about
a doomed family as a symbol of the South. It is a novel about the meaning of history for Quentin
Compson” (Poirier 4). He attempts to use the discourse and symbols of his community to
understand his own existence. Through storytelling he seeks to define himself.
Like Twain before him and Lee Smith after him, Faulkner’s love of storytelling and his
interest in committing the spoken word into print came from more than one source. In his
biography of Faulkner, David Minter writes:
At home he spent much of his time reading. . . . At the stove in his father’s office he
watched and listened as his father’s friends drank whiskey and swapped tales. At the
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courthouse he listened to old men tell stories about the War. At the fireplace in Mammy
Caroline Barr’s cabin he found another place to listen. (12)
Like Twain, part of Faulkner’s love of storytelling came from listening to African-Americans as
a child. Minter writes that while listening to Barr, a former slave and a family servant, “secure in
her presence, he [Faulkner] crossed from listening to speaking, and so he began telling tales of
his own–versions, one judges, of those he was hearing at his father’s livery stable, at the
courthouse, or on the porch of ‘The Big Place,’ his other regular stop” (13). Minter describes an
apprenticeship that, as Twain’s did, echoes the experience of epic singers that Lord writes about.
Before he actually begins to sing, he is, consciously or unconsciously, laying the
foundation. He is learning the stories and becoming acquainted with the heroes and their
names, the faraway places and the habits of long ago. . . . at the same time he is imbibing
the rhythm of the singing and to some extent the thoughts as they are expressed in song.
(21)
Lord describes a transition from listening and absorbing the discourse to becoming proficient
enough to begin singing on one’s own. Faulkner learned not only specific stories and characters,
historical and fictional, from the people around him; he also learned cultural values and
storytelling techniques. Of course, you cannot reduce Faulkner’s influences to any one medium.
Ross reminds us that Faulkner was a voracious reader:
but listening fed his imagination’s growth, as did reading, not simply because specific
told tales became sources for his own, but because the very act of listening placed him in
a certain relationship to the discourse of the world: ‘I was just saturated with [history] but
never read about it,’ he claimed, and his image of saturation speaks accurately even if his
denial of reading does not. (2)
Here, as in other instances, Faulkner stresses the importance of his oral traditional background to
his work. Ross’s writing that “listening placed him in a certain relationship to the discourse of
the world” resonates for me with Tex Sample’s statement that traditional orality is a culture
where the people’s “appropriation and engagement with the world is oral” (6). Part of Faulkner’s
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appropriation and engagement with the world was profoundly influenced by his exposure to
traditional orality.
Sample’s statement also strongly resonates with the description of Quentin Compson in
the first chapter of Absalom, Absalom! where Quentin is described as having grown up listening
to stories:
Quentin had grown up with that; the mere names were interchangeable and almost
myriad. His childhood was full of them; his very body was an empty hall echoing with
sonorous defeated names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth. He was
a barracks filled with stubborn backward-looking ghosts. (7)
What resonates here even more strongly is how the stories are tied in with Quentin’s sense of
community and his sense of self. I don’t want to argue too strongly for anything more than a
certain similarity between Quentin and Faulkner, but I would argue that both of them felt the
influence of both written and oral traditions and this is the significant difference between the
“two Quentins” described in the first chapter:
Then hearing would reconcile and he would seem to listen to two separate Quentins
now–the Quentin preparing for Harvard in the South; the deep South dead since 1865 and
peopled with garrulous outraged baffled ghosts, listening, having to listen, to one of those
ghosts which had refused to lie still even longer than most had, telling him about old
ghost-times; and the Quentin Compson who was still too young to deserve yet to be a
ghost but nevertheless having to be one for all that, since he was born and bred in the
deep South the same as she was–the two separate Quentins now talking to one another in
the long silence of notpeople in notlanguage. (4-5)
One could say that the two Quentin’s represent the literate and oral cultures–the dominant and
the marginalized discourses that Quentin is being pulled between (and wouldn’t that be handy?),
and there is certainly is something to be said for this. The stories of the oral tradition, the
mythology of a defeated culture, stay with Quentin as he goes north to the seat of the genteel
tradition. I will argue later that it is more important to establish that the two Quentins who
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struggle here with understanding the past can be compared with the divided Sutpen who tries to
understand his rejection at the door. This is important not only because it suggests a parallel or
identification between the two characters but also because the similar presentation of the two
character’s internal monologues lends authenticity to Sutpen’s dialogue, which is mediated by
three generations of storytellers.
Faulkner felt a pull between oral and literate cultures. He was tremendously well read, he
has been rightly described as a high modernist and some of his works have been described as
post-modern, but he also was deeply influenced in his life and in his writing by the oral traditions
that persisted in his community. In an interview with Simon Claxton, Faulkner said: “I’m a storyteller. I’m telling a story, introducing comic and tragic elements as I like. I’m telling a story–to be
repeated and retold” (277). In his book, Telling and Retelling: The Fate of Storytelling in Modern
Times, Karl Kroeber argues that there is a “fundamental–and paradoxical–fact that is addressed
by none of the contemporary essays and books about narrative theory I have consulted: stories
improve with retelling, are endlessly retold, and are told in order to be retold” (1). One of the
reasons narrative theory does not generally address this is because of the relative permanence of
printed texts. Written narratives seem finalized, fixed, and therefore not eligible for retelling. The
written text resists the retelling that is constitutive of the oral story which is meant to be retold.
No American author demonstrates this fact about storytelling more consistently than Faulkner,
and none of his novels enact this paradoxical fact more effectively than Absalom, Absalom!
where several individuals tell and retell the story of one family.
Which of these tellers are we to believe? In “The Fundamental Unfinalizability of
Absalom, Absalom!” Minghan Xiao adapts some arguments from Bakhtin's Problems of
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Dostoevsky's Poetics, calling Absalom, Absalom! a polyphonic novel, where “instead of a
‘multitude of characters’ silenced by the overwhelming unified voice of the author, we find a
group of, in Bakhtin's words, ‘thinking human consciousnesses’, all speaking for themselves”
(Xiao 34).16 All of these thinking human consciousnesses try to tell Sutpen’s story. We see the
story told and retold. Xiao argues that the novel has five narrators: Rosa Coldfield, who was
engaged to Sutpen; Mr Compson, whose father was Sutpen's “first Yoknapatawpha County
friend” (Absalom, Absalom! 309); his son, Quentin; his Harvard roommate, Shreve McCannon;
and a third-person narrator who sets the scenes and gives us Quentin's thoughts. These narrators
sometimes quote other characters during their narrations. Quentin is the focal consciousness of
the novel; every word we get from the other characters who speak in the novel’s present is said in
Quentin's presence. I would argue that these four characters, and perhaps Thomas Sutpen, are the
potential “thinking consciousnesses” of this novel, if it is to be considered dialogical.
There has been some disagreement as to the number of narrators in the novel. Schoenberg
claims there are “nearly a dozen of them in the novel” (73). Lynn G. Levins writes of four
narrative perspectives, without mentioning the role of the third-person narrator (35). Finally,
though it is valid to label these storytelling characters as narrators, there is only one narrator in
the novel–there is one third-person omniscient narrator who narrates part of the Sutpen story, the
three primary storytelling events and the other action of the novel. There are four characters who
tell stories about Sutpen in the novel’s present during three storytelling events (other storytelling
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Other studies of Absalom, Absalom! as a polyphonic novel include Olga Scherer, “A
Dialogic Hereafter: The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom!”, and Stephen H. Ross,
“Oratory and the Dialogical in Absalom, Absalom!” Intertextuality in Faulkner. Michel Gresset
and Noel Polk, editors. Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1985:73-86.
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events are flashed backwards or forwards to from the novel’s present) and whose tellings I am
primarily interested in; Rosa, Mr. Compson, Quentin and Shreve. One other storyteller who is
mediated by at least two tellers is particularly significant: Thomas Sutpen tells his own story, and
in many ways understands it no more than any other teller.
Quentin is clearly the focal consciousness of the work. Though all the information is not
filtered through him, he is present with the reader at all times. However, Xiao argues, no one “is
dominated by the others in the sense that he discovers the truth of the Sutpen legend, as some
critics believe that Quentin does, or that he has the truth all the time, as others hold the third
person narrator to have” (Xiao 34). Terrell Tebbets states that the third person narrator is
“repeatedly noncommittal about the accuracy of the facts supplied by the roommates” in the final
section of the novel (17). The narrator is “noncommittal.” If he knows the final truth, he's not
telling. Quentin and Shreve sit “creating between them . . . people who perhaps had never existed
at all anywhere” (Absalom, Absalom! 243). “Perhaps” they had never existed: the tone of the
third person narrator doesn't reveal whether he has the facts or not. It is important to distinguish
where the narrator does exert authorial control, because he is reliable and authoritative
throughout most of the novel. It is more interesting and useful to look at why Faulkner created a
narrator who either will not use the knowledge it is conventional for him to have or somehow
does not have it.
In his study of Absalom, Absalom!, James Matlack states a simple truism: “by literary
convention, one accepts portions of omniscient narration as truthful” (345). This novel’s narrator
does not violate this convention. There is nothing the narrator says is a fact that we shouldn’t
trust. The characters may all speak for themselves; none of them may hold a privileged position
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in terms of knowing the truth of the Sutpen story, but to discuss the facts suggests that the
historical truth about Thomas Sutpen is the point of the novel.
The truth in a polyphonic novel is not a historical one. “The ‘truth’ at which the hero
must and indeed ultimately does arrive through clarifying the events to himself, can essentially be
for Dostoevsky only the truth of the hero’s own consciousness” (Bakhtin Problems 55). The
primary question of the novel is not what the actual truth of Sutpen’s life is, but what truth
Quentin can take from the story to live with–how he can clarify the events for himself. Louis
Rubin argues that “he is the one upon whom the events that take place . . . have their emotional
impact. . . [he] has by the close of the story experienced pity and terror through remembering,
retelling, and coming to understand the meaning of those events” (339). This is what stories do
for people. Whether Quentin truly understands the events or not, his experience with the story
helps him arrive at his own truth. One he may be unable to live with.
Each of the storytelling events, and how the narrator presents them, bear close scrutiny.
Our ideas about Quentin and the Sutpen story may evolve throughout the novel, but they are all
dealt with in detail in the first chapter. The context for the novel’s exploration of narrative
authority is established by the narrations in the early chapters.
The arrangement of scenes and the narrative voice at the beginning of the novel are
relatively conventional. The first chapter begins with an undramatized narrator describing the
room where Quentin and Rosa Coldfield sit. The participants and the setting for the first
storytelling event are described. This is the first storytelling event in the novel, but it is not the
first one Quentin has been a part of. The first page gives us the room which is described as
almost dead.
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They sat in what Miss Coldfield still called the office because her father had called it
that–a dim hot airless room with the blinds all closed and fastened for forty-three
summers because when she was a girl someone had believed that light and moving air
carried heat and that dark was always cooler, and which (as the sun shone fuller and fuller
on that side of the house) became latticed with yellow slashes full of dust motes which
Quentin thought of as being flecks of the dead old dried paint. (3)
Here we have an authorial narrator who tells us definitively, or almost definitively, why Rosa17
keeps the room the way it is. Someone believed that shuttered, dark rooms were cooler, and she
believes it. We are also given a description that is Quentin’s–he thinks of the dust motes as dead
old dried paint, not the narrator. This is a limited omniscient narrator–the only thoughts he gives
us are Quentin’s. It is Quentin who thinks of the paint as “dead and old;” it is the narrator who
describes the room as dim hot and airless.
Part of the initial description of Rosa deserves closer scrutiny because the narrator
appears not to have all the facts. She is described as sitting in “the eternal black which she had
worn for forty-three years now, whether for sister, father, or nothusband none knew” (3). The
narrator knows that she has worn similar clothes for forty-three years but seems not to know why.
Specifically, he says “none knew.” What that means is that no one in Jefferson knows exactly
why she wears black. The “none” here is, more specifically, “no one in the community.” The
narrator is telling us the level of the community’s knowledge. He is, even here, at least partly a
communal narrator, speaking for the town. I don’t wish to read too closely, particularly at this
point, because the narrator here has all the knowledge a limited omniscient narrator should have.
He often gives us the information an authorial narrator can and is expected to give, including
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He calls her Miss Coldfield. One of the easiest ways to distinguish voices, at least early
in the novel, is by the names they use.
132

what we must believe is an accurate representation of Quentin’s thoughts. In this chapter, there is
nothing unconventional about the narrator.
In the first section of the chapter the effect of Rosa’s storytelling on Quentin is described,
even though her words are not presented. Her words are not given, but the effect of her words is.
Her speaking is described without the author using mimetic voice. This is an example of what
Ross calls phenomenal voice, which he describes as “a voice depictive of speech (or writing) as
an event or object in the fiction’s world” (15).
When voice is named, described, commented upon, employed metaphorically, or in any
way explicitly presented, phenomenal voice is created. . . . Whereas voice in some sense
always results incidentally from represented speech acts, phenomenal voice exists only
when explicitly mentioned in the diegetic discourse as sound, act, gesture, or the power of
speech irrespective of speech’s semantic ‘content.’ (19)
The following example may be slightly outside of what Ross was trying to describe, but I want to
highlight this section anyway because it clearly describes the “power of speech.” It is a diegetic
passage describing speech and storytelling and the power it has. Rosa Coldfield is described as:
talking in that grim haggard amazed voice until at last listening would renege and
hearing-sense self-confound and the long-dead object of her impotent yet indomitable
frustration would appear, as though by outraged capitulation evoked, quiet inattentive and
harmless, out of the biding and dreamy and victorious dust. (3-4)
There are two important things in this quotation. The first is the narrator’s authoritative
description of Rosa’s ‘grim haggard amazed voice” and her “impotent yet indomitable
frustration.” Both of these evaluations are the narrator’s, and they are entirely authoritative.
These evaluations effect our understanding of Rosa’s subsequent narration. These evaluations are
not the only factor in our understanding of her telling, but they are examples of overt and
authoritative evaluation on the part of the narrator.
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The second point is how her voice disappears and the figure of Sutpen appears in its
stead. He is evoked by Rosa’s storytelling. This image is created in Quentin’s mind, and it is
clear that the act of telling evokes a very powerful image. It is also important to note that this
does not signal a cessation either of her speaking or in Quentin’s listening; it is an explicit
mention of the power of speech–it is phenomenal voice. The next excerpt directly describes the
effect of her telling on Quentin.
Her voice would not cease, it would just vanish . . . and the voice not ceasing but
vanishing into and then out of long intervals like a stream, a trickle running from patch to
patch of dried sand, . . . Out of a quiet thunderclap he would abrupt (man-horse-demon)
upon a scene peaceful and decorous as a schoolprize water color, faint sulphur-reek still
in hair clothes and beard. (4)
Sutpen abrupts into Quentin’s imagination in response to Rosa’s telling. He appears to Quentin
as the demon that Rosa would have him be remembered as. What is important to note is how
powerful and evocative this storytelling event is for Quentin. Some critics privilege the power of
the collaborative storytelling of Quentin and Shreve in the later chapters, and this is a persuasive
argument, but this event, initiated by a frustrated and impotent old ghost, has a very strong effect
on Quentin which should not be underestimated. Even here the story and the telling of it are very
powerful.
At this point a brief abstract of the Sutpen story has been related: Sutpen arrives, builds a
plantation and a family, there is some destruction, and he dies. The story will be retold and
expanded upon innumerable times throughout the novel, as Kroeber says all stories are meant to
be. This is not the first time Quentin has heard it, nor is it anywhere near the last. In a prolepsis
set off in parenthesis Quentin asks his father why he has to hear it yet again. “‘But why tell me
about it?’ he said to his father that evening” (7). This prolepsis is very straight forward–the time
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shift is explicitly stated and then clearly signaled by the parentheses which close to indicate our
return to the novel’s present.
After this further explanation of the context of this storytelling event, the parentheses
close and we are transported back to the novel’s present. The transcription of this first part of her
telling begins after it has taken six pages to create the context for it. The narrator has established
the storyteller’s social role in the community, her status relative to her story listener and a
compelling theory to explain why the event is taking place, along with the time and place. We
have also been shown an internal conflict in the story listener. Even though Quentin gives her
almost no feedback during the ensuing pages, we know that this event is powerful and important
to him. He may not be particularly active, but he is nonetheless deeply involved.
Her words are presented in quotation marks with only two interruptions for five pages;
there are five pages of her direct discourse–of mimetic voice. Having established a context for
the event, the narrator stays out, somewhat like Twain’s narrator in “A True Story”. He does not
relate her movements, any changes in her tone of voice, nor does he state what Quentin’s
reactions are. He does not even use any “she said” tags. Often in the novel, the narrator
withdraws, encouraging us to forget his presence–to forget the frame–but, unlike the case of “A
True Story,” it is always reestablished, often abruptly, jarringly, as we will see it is at the end of
the first chapter.
Rosa’s story is centered on Sutpen and is almost unremittingly negative. All of his
admirable qualities spring from his demonic strength, but the facts of the story make it
impossible for her to be completely negative. She begins with one of her primary theses: “‘He
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wasn’t a gentleman. He wasn’t even a gentleman’” (9). Here, as she does later on, Rosa
establishes her authority as a witness to events:
‘I saw what happened to Ellen, my sister. I saw her almost a recluse . . . I saw that man
return–the evil’s source and head which had outlasted all its victims–who had created two
children not only to destroy one another and his own line, but my line as well, yet I agreed
to marry him.’ (12)
She, like Mr Compson, derives part of her authority from her knowledge and mastery of the
communal tradition, even though she has isolated herself from the community, and we might
assume that she is not as conversant with the communal tradition as Mr Compson. Part of her
authority comes from her being a first-hand witness to the events in her narrative; she recounts
what she saw, but she also sees clearly how her judgment is suspect. She sees Sutpen as evil and
yet acknowledges that she was unable to reject his initial proposal of marriage. Also here we as
readers hear about her agreeing to marry Sutpen, but no others details about that. Part of the
reason she doesn’t expand on this part of the story is that Quentin already knows it. She also
doesn’t tell that part of the story here because it does not support the argument she is making at
this point. And at this point she is making an argument.
Philip Egan rightly argues that Rosa’s first monologue, which is contained in chapter 1,
has two distinct parts, and that the first part’s structure is less like a narrative than the second, or
than her other monologue contained in chapter 5. Egan writes that the tone of this first part is
“more like oratory than conversation or storytelling” (203).
I would argue that all of her tellings are close to oratory, but Rosa’s style here is more
closely aligned with oratory than the other tellings because she is more overtly arguing a thesis
than any of the other tellers. The argument that Rosa is seeking to prove is that Sutpen was not
even a gentleman and was a demon (in a metaphorical sense, I assume) and that the entire
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community, the entire South, is to blame for allowing him to flourish, and that it is no wonder
“Heaven saw fit to let us lose the War” (13). She has other motivations, but I am more interested
in the fact that she is arguing than in what she is trying to argue. All of the primary storytelling
characters in the novel sound very much alike. I wish to establish that the marked difference in
Rosa’s telling arises not because she is using a different type of discourse, but because she is
using the same discourse in a different manner. Egan points to some of the differences in Rosa’s
section: “Rosa summarizes events rather than dramatizes them. She rarely sets a scene in the first
part of the monologue: rather, she alludes to incidents and people in brief statements and
catalogues them with her parallel structures” (203). Rosa’s voice is clearly the most oratorical,
but I would argue that part of the reason for this is that she is more intent on making and
supporting specific arguments than in telling a cohesive story. The incidents and people she
catalogues are evidence to support her argument. Of course, she does not need to tell a cohesive
story to Quentin because they have already told him; he has heard the story countless times. The
reader needs the information provided in chapters 1-4 more than Quentin because he already
knows much of the story.
Displaying oratorical style is not a cause but a symptom of Rosa’s effort to argue her
case. The first section’s broad strokes ease the reader into the stream of traditional narrative.
Rosa introduces the reader to a mythic figure, and to the ornate language that the other
storytelling characters will use. While she establishes the myth, she also helps establish the form
by which the myth will be related in the tradition. She introduces both the communal language
and her own terminology. Both will be used by subsequent tellers. One of her most obvious
contributions is the term “demon,” which Ross argues affects our response to all subsequent
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tellers: “The demon image will be carried through to the end of the novel, revised and humanized
but never fully rejected. Our succeeding responses to Sutpen depend on Rosa’s demonology”
(207). Both readers and subsequent tellers form their image of Sutpen in response to the term.
Her authority, with Quentin and with the reader, comes primarily from the fact that she
was there. We have good reasons to doubt that she is anywhere near objective about the object of
her “impotent yet indomitable frustration.” She was, however, a first-hand witness to some of the
events she describes, though not all of them. In fact, most of her telling recount events that
occurred before her birth. We should remember that her story is also shaped by the communal
understanding of the Sutpen story. Rosa cannot stray too far from what the community believes
to be the truth, and if she does, she must more strongly rely on her personal authority.
The first diegetic section after five pages of transcribed speech, excepting two short
statements by Quentin, describes how Rosa’s telling has evoked an image of her as a child for
Quentin.
‘Yes,’ the grim quiet voice said from beyond the unmoving triangle of dim lace; and now,
among the musing and decorous wraiths Quentin seemed to watch resolving the figure of
a little girl, in the prim skirts and pantalettes, the smooth prim decorous braids, of the
dead time. (14-15)
Rosa will resume telling with little authorial intrusion right after this reminder of the setting for
the event and its importance to Quentin. Again the storytelling evokes very strong images for
Quentin. This section also marks a change in her telling that Matlack describes:
When she picks up the thread again, she is spinning it quite differently. She still uses
many of the same techniques, but her emphasis changes in important ways: the prominent
word becomes ‘yes’ instead of ‘no’; the mode becomes drama instead of summary; the
style depends less upon parallel structure and oratory; and the subject changes from
Sutpen to his children . . . She does not summarize large tracts of plot here but focuses on
two specific scenes involving Judith. (204)
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Rosa has begun to argue less and to tell more; she has put forth her primary argument and is now
relaying events that support it. She relates the story of Judith and Sutpen’s wedding, which
includes an image of Sutpen standing silently in front of a crowd of angry townspeople.18 The
wedding took place before she was born. She ends the chapter by describing an episode which
took place when she was about seven and includes an important part of the Sutpen legend–his
public fighting with his slaves (21). Ellen is described as also seeing her son and daughter
observing the fight, both with very different reactions. The image of the young Sutpens is
important to the Sutpen legend, but what is important for our purposes is the admission that Rosa
closes the chapter with: “‘But I was not there. I was not there to see the two Sutpen faces this
time–once on Judith and once on the negro girl beside her–looking down through the square
entrance to the loft’” (22).
At the end of the first chapter we find that Rosa has realistically narrated an event she was
not witness to, directly quoting dialogue and describing individuals, even though much of her
authority is as a first-hand witness to events. This is also important because we do not doubt her;
we are given no reason to do so. We believe that Sutpen said “‘I don’t expect you to believe that.
But I swear to it’” (21), and we have no reason to disbelieve that Henry was unable to watch the
fight while his sisters looked on. The chapter doesn’t end with the image of Judith and Clytie
watching the fight. It ends with an admission by the storytelling character that she has this vivid
and compelling image second-hand.

18

Sutpen stands before so many angry groups that it should be considered an important
motif in his story.
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Chapter 1 ends with Miss Rosa’s admission that she was not there for the scene she has
just narrated and with our awareness of the frame being aggressively reasserted; chapter 2 begins
with the narrator once again setting the scene for a storytelling event–creating a new frame for a
second portrait of Sutpen. Quentin is again the listener; this time his father is the storyteller. But
Mr Compson’s is not the first voice that tells in this chapter, either directly or indirectly. Instead
the narrator takes his turn at telling the Sutpen story; he summarizes what Mr Compson may be
telling Quentin in the novel’s present. There are examples of indirect discourse in the novel, but
here the narrator is telling Sutpen’s story. He gives information that Quentin already knew before
this event and which, therefore, Mr Compson may or may not have told him during this sitting.
What the narrator does is fill in the reader, who was not born in and did not breath the same air as
Sutpen–who was not raised with the Sutpen story as part of his heritage. But first he sets the
scene:
It was a summer of wistaria. The twilight was full of it and of the smell of his father’s
cigar as they sat on the front gallery after supper . . . It was a day of listening too–the
listening, the hearing in 1909 even yet mostly that which he already knew since he had
been born in and still breathed the same air in which the church bells had rung on that
Sunday morning in 1833. (23)
That Sunday was the first day Sutpen was seen. The narrator describes the surroundings and he
says that Quentin already knew most of the story. And then, in what Brooks describes as a “fade
out dissolve” (317), he sends us back to the day when Sutpen arrived, or at least drove through,
Jefferson, and gives us a view from behind the townsfolk, but it is a well-informed view. The
narrator knows what the town knew and thought and when they learned the facts. The narrator is
also able to talk about how the town’s attitude was formed and how it evolved.
That was all that the town was to know about him for almost a month. He had apparently
come into town from the south–a man of about twenty-five as the town learned later,
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because at the time his age could not have been guessed . . . That was what they saw,
though it was years before the town learned that that was all which he possessed at the
time. (24)
The town is clearly a separate entity from the narrator. At the same time, he clearly speaks about
their level of knowledge and it is their perspective, not Quentin’s that we see from. Quentin has
heard all of this information before, but the narrator is not merely relating “mouth-to-mouth
tales.” He is stating facts from a limited omniscient viewpoint. He tells of “two pistols of which
Miss Coldfield told Quentin, with the butts worn smooth as pickhandles and which he used with
the precision of knitting needles” (24-25). For Lanser, a singular communal voice “is manifestly
authorized by a community” (21). This narrator is one who, in effect “speaks for a collective”
(21). However, his authority comes from authorial sources–he speaks for the collective in that he
relates the information and attitudes of the collective, but he is outside of this collective, even if
the knowledge he relates is no greater than the community’s. The Beowulf narrator says “we”
while this narrator says “the town.” This narrator is an authorial narrator rather than a communal
one, but he gives us the community’s version of events.
The narrator is stating the town’s knowledge–he is telling us the story that Quentin has
already heard. He is also putting his authority behind this version of the story. Instead of saying
that Miss Coldfield told Quentin about the two guns, the narrator says “the two pistols of which
Miss Coldfield told Quentin.” The guns did exist–they are not a product of her imagination–and
the pistols’ butts were “worn smooth as pickhandles”. The narrator asserts that this is a fact that
Rosa related to Quentin; it is not a speculation or distortion of the truth on her part, nor is she
mistaken about the facts of the pistols. “Later Quentin’s grandfather saw him ride at a canter
around a sapling at twenty feet and put both bullets into a playing card fastened to the tree” (25).
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In fact Sutpen did this. This is a historical event that the narrator tells us that General Compson
saw. Quentin learned of this through hearing the story told, but it is a fact that he has learned in
this manner. Sutpen is not merely a mythical figure–a demon. Here, in the first chapters there is a
relatively conventional authorial narrator who confirms elements of the Sutpen story.
It may seem that there is little warrant to make this fine a distinction, but to have the
narrator assert something “of which” Quentin was told is a far stronger assertion of truth than
evaluations like “true enough” that Quentin and Shreve will receive later in the novel. It would
be simple enough to write that she told Quentin that he had two pistols, but the narrator instead
says that there are two pistols. Faulkner has chosen a distance and perspective for his narrator
that does not allow him to reveal other’s thoughts, but he does reveal some facts which includes
the general attitude of the town. This section is from the town’s perspective. Since it is a public
perspective it is one that Mr Compson and the narrator, regardless of his omniscience, or lack
thereof, can know. Because of the limits of his omniscience and his being situated as, in effect,
the voice of the town, the narrator’s authority, his entire discourse, is little different from Mr
Compson’s, who is a representative of the communal tradition–one of the town’s voices. At the
same time it is different, and it is an entirely conventional level of authority for a narrator to
have. Ross argues that: “Mr Compson’s account, especially in chapter 2, blends more smoothly
with the authorial voice than the other narrators’ accounts, picking up without missing a beat the
story of Sutpen’s arrival in Jefferson and his marriage” (225). He writes that Mr Compson picks
up the story “without missing a beat,” and the musical metaphor is apt. Mr Compson picks up the
narrative very smoothly, but the change is nonetheless clearly marked. We cut to Mr Compson
with the very real sense that we are coming in to the middle of his telling. What has happened is
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that the narrator has told us the story up to the point where we are able to join Mr Compson as he
tells. It has not been an example of indirect discourse; it is not a summary of what he has just told
Quentin. The narrator has been telling, and we should assume that his telling is different because
the reader’s level of knowledge is different from that of Mr Compson’s audience. When we are
up to speed, when what Mr Compson is telling is similar to what the narrator would be telling,
we shift to Mr Compson’s direct discourse. A new paragraph starts with quotation marks:
“‘Then one day he quitted Jefferson for the second time,’ Mr. Compson told Quentin”
(33). The change in tellers is clearly signaled, but there is no discernable difference other than the
quotation marks and the fact that “Miss Coldfield” is now “Miss Rosa” and “General Compson”
is “your grandfather.” Mr Compson cannot give us Quentin’s thoughts, but the narrator hadn’t
been involved in Quentin’s thoughts directly before this, so only these small, yet distinct,
differences mark the difference between the two voices.
Though the musical metaphor works well, it is perhaps better to follow Brooks in his use
of cinematic metaphors. We begin the chapter on the Compson’s porch and then flashback to
Sutpen’s arrival. We are then returned to the point where Mr Compson’s direct discourse is
presented. The debatable question is whether his voice fades into the background, making the
section pseudo-diegetic, or if the constant reassertion of his sources of information leaves us too
aware of the frame to become absorbed in the story, or to trust his authority. Mr Compson does
tell a vivid and compelling story but he also constantly reminds us that it is a story–that he is
retelling what he has heard from a variety of sources. He has to remind us of his sources because
he is not an author or a narrator; he is a storytelling character and his authority as a storyteller
comes in part from his familiarity and adherence to the communal tradition.
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He has two sources of authority; he is familiar with two oral traditions. First, he is a
bearer of the communal tradition; whenever he says “All I ever heard,” “I have heard” or even
“no one ever knew” he is relating the communal knowledge similar to that which the narrator
was relating earlier in the chapter. Much like the narrator of Beowulf, Mr Compson’s authority
comes from his adherence to the communal tradition. Both he and the narrator know what the
community knows. Later in the novel he will also explicitly state where the community gained
specific pieces of information. Though it is a level of knowledge close to that of the narrator, the
narrator never suggests that he “heard” anything–he is the source of his knowledge.
The second of Mr Compson’s sources is his father. He relates a description of Sutpen:
“‘your grandfather said that his eyes looked like pieces of a broken plate and that his beard was
strong as a curry-comb. That was how he put it: strong as a curry-comb’” (34). Here Mr
Compson repeats exact words and reinforces them as exact words–the words of an eye-witness to
Sutpen’s appearance. This is another example of Mr Compson’s effort to establish and maintain
his authority. Note that the exact words are used to describe a specific physical feature, much like
the pistol butts. He also directly quotes here because it is an interesting turn of phrase. Interesting
turns of phrase like “strong as a curry-comb” or “demon” will tend to be retained in subsequent
versions of any story. He sticks to his sources both because of his commitment to the tradition
and because he finds them interesting and useful.
This could be called a family tradition both because it is transmitted from grandfather to
father to son, and because Mr Compson relates parts of the family’s history, including what his
mother (Quentin’s grandmother) had to say, or, in one instance, what his mother was unwilling to
talk about (42). Here Mr Compson is relating not the communal tradition, but a story of his own
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experience and that of his family. He does it in part as evidence to the veracity of his story but
mainly to show the effect of the Sutpen family on his own family. His mother’s reaction was to
Miss Rosa’s aunt who helped arrange the wedding that ends with townspeople throwing things at
the couple. The chapter ends with a version of Sutpen and Ellen’s wedding, one that is certainly
more sympathetic towards Sutpen than Rosa’s. He ends the chapter saying of Sutpen that, “‘He
did not forget that night, even though Ellen, I think, did, since she washed it out of her
remembering with tears’” (45).
Chapter 2 ends with a version of Sutpen’s marriage, and Mr Compson’s speculation about
Ellen’s tears. The marriage part of the Sutpen story has been told by two characters. There are no
discrepancies between the two versions, but Mr Compson’s is more sympathetic towards Sutpen,
which certainly isn’t difficult. These two chapters have had two different storytelling characters.
Mr Compson will continue to tell for two more chapters, though each chapter has individuating
characteristics. Chapter 3 continues chronologically from the end of chapter 2. There are,
however, some differences. Though they are all part of the same storytelling event, they are
presented differently and the level of detail Mr Compson gives and his use of qualifiers are
different in each chapter.
Chapter 3 looks different. It begins with Quentin asking his father a question, that leads
him to tell a different part of the story. “If he threw her over, I wouldn’t think she would want to
tell anybody about it Quentin said” (46). The only quotation marks in the chapter surround the
voices that Mr Compson quotes. Instead the difference between Mr Compson and Quentin’s
voice and the diegesis is marked by standard type and italics, respectively, and the only diegesis
consists of the initial Quentin said, one Mr Compson said, and one other Quentin said. I don’t

145

want to overemphasize this, but this does mark this chapter as different from the ones flanking it
and it clearly has the effect of making Mr Compson’s direct discourse the unmarked case in the
chapter. It makes his mimetic voice appear like diegesis, even while the reader remains aware
that it is his speech. Since Mr Compson tells in the two flanking chapters, the narrator only needs
to confirm for the reader, with the first exchange, that Mr Compson is still telling during the
same storytelling event. The narrator does not need to tell us that they are still on the porch, that
it is still that evening. He can present only the speaking voices because we have enough of the
other pertinent information. We know the frame exists, so the narrator does not need to
emphasize it, and this lack of emphasis gives the mimetic voice more weight.
This suggests an increase in Mr Compson’s authority. He also uses terms like “I heard”
significantly less, and when he does it is in relation to thoughts or events that the narrator also
has not given us. In chapter 2 Mr Compson describes what he had “heard” about the
confrontation between Sutpen and townspeople–a public event. In chapter 3 all of his qualifiers
are in relation to events that had very few or no witnesses. He still seems to take no liberties with
the story or to go outside the realm of what is plausible for him to know, but he reminds Quentin
of the secondhand nature of his knowledge far less frequently. He speculates more and more as
he establishes his authority. In each chapter he describes events in more and more detail and
presents more and more speculations that he cannot know with any certainty, however reliable
the tradition is. De-emphasizing the frame like this while also increasing the amount of specific
detail cannot help but increase his authority.
Mr Compson tells about Rosa’s childhood and Judith and Charles’ courtship. The
important event in this chapter for our purposes is the confrontation between Henry and Thomas
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Sutpen where Henry reportedly rejects his father and subsequently leaves Jefferson with Bon. Mr
Compson’s description of the event reflects his level of knowledge:
And then something happened. Nobody knew what: whether something between Henry
and Bon on one hand and Judith on the other, or between the three young people on one
hand and the parents on the other. But anyway, when Christmas day came, Henry and
Bon were gone . . . and so the tale came through the negroes: of how on the night before
Christmas there had been a quarrel between . . . the son and the father and that Henry had
formally abjured his father and renounced his birthright . . . and that he and Bon had
ridden away in the night. (62)
In chapter 4 he will imagine this scene, but here he only repeats what the town knew, and how
the town came to know about these particular private events. The negroes are the source of
information about what took place behind closed doors. They are, of course, both an integral part
of and entirely separate from the communal tradition. “No one knew” until the negroes, who
already knew, told. They are not part of the communal tradition even though they are an
important source of knowledge. Here Mr Compson does not go beyond his plausible knowledge
and his authority–his knowledge of events and the reliability of this knowledge–is, for all
practical purposes, the same as the narrator’s.
Mr Compson’s “nobody knew what” in this chapter is functionally the same as the
narrator’s “none knew” in the first chapter. Mr Compson and the narrator have the same
perspective. The perhapses and doubtlesses that Mr Compson uses are in regard to speculations
about motivations; they are not about facts. In this chapter Mr Compson has the same kind of
knowledge, the same kind of perspective, as the narrator. In chapter 2 Mr Compson makes it
clear that he has “heard” how Sutpen walked across the square, a very public act that was
witnessed by many townspeople–in that chapter Mr Compson used qualifiers while the narrator
did not. In chapter 3 all public actions are narrated in a manner that suggests that they are not
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hearsay, that there is no reason to doubt them. Of course, they are hearsay; almost all of Mr
Compson’s knowledge comes from what he has heard. In this chapter, however, he states this
less explicitly.
In chapter 4, Mr Compson speculates a great deal more and describes scenes he admits
are the product of his imagination. Though he does use qualifiers to justify his expansions of the
story, there are long passages that are introduced with a qualifier but then stretch over a great
deal of text. These stretches, like all of Mr Compson’s speech, do sound a great deal like the
narrator’s voice. Chapter 4 begins with a description of Quentin waiting to leave to go to
Sutpen’s Hundred. Mr. Compson continues to be the primary storytelling character. Here,
however, his speech is transcribed conventionally.
In this chapter Mr Compson presents a scene he alluded to in the previous chapter, where
Henry abjures his father. He imagines what he believes Henry thought and felt, but he does not
dramatizes the event. He does not present dialogue or action; he only paints a picture of the
scene; he imagines how it would look and how Henry felt. “I can imagine him and Sutpen in the
library that Christmas eve, the father and the brother, percussion and repercussion like a
thunderclap and its echo and as close” (72).
Here Mr Compson uses the terms “I can imagine it” not “perhaps.” He also says “He
must have known.” You could say “I imagine” “perhaps” or “maybe” he knew and these would
perform the same function. The repetition of “he must have known” is followed by the term “as
he knew” which suggests even more confidence on the part of the speaker while still remaining
subject to the original qualifier. They all state that the speaker is speculating. To say it “must
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have happened” is to argue for greater certainty, but it actually has no greater certainty than
“perhaps.” It does not reflect any greater knowledge of facts, only greater confidence.
His confidence in his speculations is such that he imagines what Henry Sutpen thought,
and these thoughts are presented in the text in the same manner as the narrator presents Quentin’s
thoughts and as Thomas Sutpen’s will be in subsequent chapters. Inside Mr Compson’s mimetic
voice the same typographic system as the narrator’s represents Henry’s psychic voice. Ross
defines it as the voice “of and in the psyche, the silent voice of thought heard only in the mind
and overheard only through fiction’s omniscience” (132).
Mr Compson describes what he imagines was Henry’s internal conflict; he claims to
understand Henry’s motivations and even his thoughts. Even though psychic voice is a written
phenomenon, part of Faulkner’s writing style, it is used in Mr Compson’s direct discourse, in his
reported speech. It is an example of the written psychic voice that Faulkner uses throughout the
novel, indeed throughout his oeuvre, which the narrator used with Quentin in the first chapter,
being used by a storytelling character. The result is what looks like psychic voice, a narrator’s
tool, being used by a storytelling character, who by definition cannot give us anyone’s thoughts
“through fiction’s omniscience.”19 We will see this throughout the novel, and also in Lee Smith’s
The Devil’s Dream, which is the subject of my next chapter. In contrast neither Aunt Rachel or
Huck ever present the thoughts of any of the characters they speak of.

19

Of course a storytelling character can represent the thoughts of a character he/she
considers fictional. In that case a storytelling character can act in every way like a narrator when
transmitting a fiction inside the fiction. But here Mr Compson is telling a story he would have his
listeners believe is true.
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If the storytelling character cannot have a narrator’s omniscience but uses all of the
orthographic techniques available to the narrator, where are the guidelines for the reader? Are we
to accept Mr Compson’s speculations as likely or even the truth? Is there any reason given to us
to either accept or doubt his speculations? We have been told that Mis Rosa’s telling is fueled by
an impotent rage that has not dissipated in forty-three years, but we are given no reason to doubt
her on matters of fact. The narrator never question or corrects her. Her story does not conflict
with Mr Compson’s, and we aren’t informed as to what fuels his narrative. We know he is a
father talking to a son, but the narrator does not expand or even comment on this dynamic, nor
does he comment on Mr Compson’s veracity. The only indication we have for Mr Compson’s
authority is how closely his voice is associated with the narrator. Though he has grown bolder
with each chapter, he never says anything that elicits a comment from the narrator.
One must assume that Mr Compson’s level of authority is equal to the narrator’s. I am
arguing that the closeness of the voices that Mr Compson and the narrator use and their similar
level of knowledge put them on the same dialogical plane. We cannot say whether the narrator
holds the same kind of knowledge as Mr Compson, or if he chooses to withhold his knowledge.
The narrator does not comment on Mr Compson’s reliability and this lack of evaluation leads us
to consider him reliable. Unless any narrator explicitly or implicitly leads us to doubt a
storytelling character, we tend to believe him. In any case a storytelling character should establish
and maintain authority in the same manner as any other storyteller. Mr Compson would hold that
his authority comes from both his familiarity with the communal tradition and his privileged
insight as the son of Sutpen’s friend and apparently the closest thing Ellen had to a friend. He
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does seem to have unique access to the story. The narrator gives us no reason here to doubt him
or his sources.
Chapter 4 ends in regular type with Mr Compson quoting Wash Jones. Chapter 5 begins
in italics with Miss Rosa taking up the telling at exactly that point in the story, though it isn’t
clear when in the chronology of the novel she is telling. The chapter begins with a phrase she will
repeat throughout this monologue: “So they will have told you doubtless already” (107).
The chapter is dominated by her mimetic voice; the italics mark her direct discourse,
which takes up all but the last two pages. It does not follow from where Miss Rosa stopped
talking, but it does follow directly in the story from where Mr Compson has just left off. Just as
Mr Compson picked up the story from the narrator without missing a beat in chapter 2, Miss
Rosa seems here to take over for Mr Compson. This smooth transition is brought about by the
narrator and comes at the expense of the chronology of the diegesis. It also shows, as did the
narrator’s telling in chapter 2, that the reader is not presented every word that is told in Quentin’s
presence during these storytelling events. The narrator omits some redundant tellings in order to
better relate his story, but this should not lead us to believe that they didn’t take place.
In chapter 5 we are prepared for Miss Rosa’s narration. We know most of her arguments,
biases and the story up to the point where she is picking it up, and we are ready to hear her tell
her story. We finally know enough about Sutpen and Rosa to hear her side of the story, and two
remarkable things happen: she reveals an ability to love that it would be an understatement to call
unexpected and her story listener doesn’t hear her reveal the depths of her emotions.
Before she can tell her own story, she has to address the fact that the communal version of
the story and hers are somewhat at odds, though even here there isn’t a tremendous discrepancy
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in the basic facts. One of the reasons Miss Rosa keeps repeating the phrase “they will have told
you” is to show that she is aware that Quentin and the town know much of the story. They are
part of the same community of memory and hold this story in common. However she may wish
to portray Sutpen and her relationship, she is constrained by the knowledge that this is not a new
story to Quentin; she cannot manipulate the story at will. At the same time, she lived through the
events she is narrating and she has private knowledge that Mr Compson and the community
cannot have. Egan suggests that her repetition of the phrase is part of a frame surrounding a
longer narration emphasizing Rosa’s personal experience:
Every major incident is either part of the popular lore, which the townspeople will have
told Quentin already, or part of Rosa’s personal history, which they cannot have told
them. Rosa organizes the popular view into a thin frame enclosing a long narrative of the
personal view. (205)
After she has told part of the public story involving her drive to Sutpen’s Hundred she tells
Quentin that “they cannot tell you how I went on up the drive, past Ellen’s ruined and weedchoked beds and reached the house” (108). Her use of this phrase argues for her own privileged
access to this part of the story. And she clearly does have privileged access here. She relates her
personal experience where it intersects with the Sutpen story–she tells parts of the story that no
one else ever has.
Quentin, however, doesn't hear her emotional confession. Olga Scherer argues, in an
intertextual reading of Absalom, Absalom! with The Sound and the Fury, that this door image
evokes in Quentin memories of his sister Caddy and as a result he is not really listening to her
(306-9). Brooks agrees that Quentin does not hear: “Quentin was not listening to Miss Rosa’s
account because his imagination remained gripped by the confrontation between Henry and
Judith when Henry bursts into her room to tell her he has killed her fiancé” (306). Brooks argues
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that he was gripped by the confrontation, but I would argue, with Scherer, that Quentin’s
imagination at this point cannot take him through the door to this confrontation. “But Quentin
was not listening, because there was also something which he too could not pass–that door”
(139). He will not be able to pass through the door metaphorically until he does so literally later
that evening at Sutpen’s Hundred.
Though audience inattentiveness is a very real problem in oral-aural transmission, it
doesn’t matter whether Quentin hears Miss Rosa’s telling because she cannot reveal a great deal
about Sutpen, Charles or Henry, and it is their stories which have meaning for Quentin. We see
Rosa’s side, and we learn that even bitter old ghosts are capable, or at least were once capable, of
smelling the wisteria–can have loves and losses we may not have believed possible. Brooks
writes that: “Whether or not Quentin was listening or merely sitting there bemused, the reader, of
course, has the benefit of Miss Rosa’s account” (307). Though her story may have limited
interest for Quentin, even if he had heard, we see that there is more to these historical events than
the community can tell.
This telling has been placed here because this is where the events Rosa narrates occur in
our reception of the story and because it continues a trend that Mr Compson started when he
imagined private scenes in chapter 4. Though the novel will revisit parts of the communal
tradition, there is a clear movement from public to private. We have gone from the events in
Sutpen’s life that were witnessed by the town to accounts of individuals’ thoughts and
motivations, and the narrator has exerted a conventional type of authorial privilege making
descriptive and evaluative remarks about Rosa and arranging the sections. Making this move
from public to private requires either first-hand testimony, like Miss Rosa’s and perhaps Thomas
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Sutpen’s, or the storyteller’s imagination. The communal tradition has given Quentin all the
information it can, and it has left many things inexplicable. Now perhaps only imagination can
take him any farther.
Who exactly is telling will be less straightforward for the rest of the novel. Mainly
because the storytelling event that Shreve and Quentin take part in is far more collaborative than
the previous ones, where Quentin was listening to his elders. Who speaks is also less clear
because Quentin and Shreve are both also clearly influenced by the earlier tellings, and adopt
much of their language. Their use of the language of the communal tradition is at the heart of
Ross’s contention that Absalom, Absalom! has an oratorical Overvoice that is closely associated
with the author.
The authority of oratorical voice comes from its relationship to a specific discourse
community. It is a type of communal voice, connected with a large but identifiable community.
In Faulkner’s case, since Southern colloquial oratory is a part of his heritage, his narrator’s or
storytelling character’s use of oratorical voice necessarily places their voices closer in status to
the author, than, as a specific example, Wash Jones’s mimetic voice, which is depicted as a
substandard dialect. In Absalom, Absalom! all of the primary storytelling characters use oratorical
voice, as does the narrator, and, Ross argues, all are therefore closely associated with the author.
All of these voices, that are not initially greatly divergent, merge in these later chapters.
All speakers evince the features of the oratorical style discussed earlier. All the narrators
more or less ‘sound like father’–and ‘father’ names a principle of authority greater, of
course, than Mr Compson. The Overvoice envelops the discourse, taking up into itself all
subsidiary voices. (Ross 220-21)
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There is certainly movement toward a single voice, but to suggest that the other voices are
subsumed by a single authoritative voice, which is the definition of a monological novel, may
give the individual voices less credit than they deserve. We hear the terms the of the individual
tellers–their echoes resound. Shreve is not enveloped or subsumed by the Overvoice. The
tradition has little power over him–it consists of a set of signifiers to be manipulated. The voices
that help create the discourse are not necessarily determined by it.
The last four chapters of Absalom, Absalom! are set in Quentin’s dormitory room at
Harvard shortly after Quentin has received a letter from Mr Compson telling him that Miss Rosa
has died. The letter reminds Quentin of the wisteria and cigar smoke that were part of the earlier
events, but can’t exist here. The letter is presented in italics. After the transcription of the letter
we read Quentin’s thoughts about how the letter evokes not only the smells but brings “with it
that very September evening itself” (142). He recalls an earlier storytelling event in much the
same manner the narrator takes us to “that Sunday morning in June 1833" (7). As that evening is
evoked for him, Shreve interrupts him and Quentin recalls the numerous times his fellow
students have asked him:
Tell about the South. What’s it like there. What do they do there. Why do they live there at
all)–that very September evening when Mr Compson stopped talking at last, he (Quentin)
walked out of his father’s talking at last because it was now time to go, not because he
had heard it all because he had not been listening since he had something which he was
still unable to pass: that door. (142)
Quentin begins to remember the trip to Sutpen Hundred, but Shreve interrupts before he gets
there. Then Shreve recapitulates the story. When Shreve takes over the narrative, he runs through
several different signifiers, acclimating himself to the role of storyteller, calling Sutpen “a
widowed Agamemnon to her Cassandra an ancient stiff-jointed Pyramus to her eager though
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untried Thisbe...this Faustus, this demon, this Beelzebub” (144-5). Situated outside of Quentin’s
community of memory, he has a different frame of reference, and a different language, but the
two pistols and Rosa’s term “demon” remain: “‘–this Faustus who appeared suddenly one
Sunday with two pistols and twenty subsidiary demons and skuldugged a hundred miles of land
out of poor ignorant indian and built the biggest house on it you ever saw’” (145). By framing the
story in terms of signifiers he is more familiar with, Shreve is able to better understand it for
himself. Shreve is playing–he is enjoying his turn at storytelling. While Shreve is playing with
some of the signifiers in the story, he is also recapitulating it and acquainting himself with the
discourse. This passage recounts, in different terms, events that were told in the first chapter.
Shreve is playing and treating the tradition with a youthful irreverence. At one point Quentin
describes the duration of Sutpens’s family’s trip: “ (you couldn’t call it a period because as he
remembered it or as he told Grandfather he did, it didn’t have either a definite beginning or a
definite ending. Maybe attenuation is better)–an attenuation” (182). In a later chapter Shreve
jokingly uses the term attenuation, which the narrator has also already used. Talking about
Henry’s trip to the University of Mississippi, Shreve says, “‘Bayard attenuated forty miles (it was
forty miles, wasn’t it?); out of the wilderness proud honor semestrial regurgitant’” (288). Here
again Shreve jokes about the tradition and its language. But he also demonstrates that he is
learning how to use the discourse. Shreve recasts the local particular tradition, which “he must
have got from Quentin, perhaps weeks before” (Brooks 311), into more widely known mythical
terms–showing how this story is similar to other myths, other stories.
Quentin has already told Shreve much of the story. We don’t hear every word that is
spoken in this or any of the other storytelling events in the novel because that would create

156

needless redundancies. The point of recapitulation here is to provide a much-needed summary,
and to show Shreve familiarizing himself with the discourse.
While Quentin is listening to and agreeing with the gist of what Shreve is saying, we hear
Quentin’s psychic voice instead of Shreve’s mimetic voice. Quentin thoughts refer overtly to the
similarity in the storytelling voices in the work for the first time :
He sounds just like Father he thought, glancing (his face quiet, reposed, curiously almost
sullen) for a moment at Shreve . . . Just exactly like Father if Father had known as much
about it the night before I went out there as he did the day after I came back thinking
Mad impotent old man who realised at last that there must be some limit even to the
capabilities of a demon for doing harm. (147-48)
Here we find out that Quentin had learned something during his trip to Sutpen’s Hundred, and
that that knowledge informs the versions we will subsequently hear, even though we do not know
what he has learned or how. We are told that the languages of the individual tellers are similar;
we also see that they are similar. Recall that Rosa characterized Sutpen as a “furious mad old
man” in her telling, though she certainly did not characterize him as “impotent,” yet the narrator
described Rosa’s frustration as “impotent yet indomitable” (3). Here Quentin thinks of Sutpen as
a “Mad impotent old man” and calls him a demon. All of the previous versions are coming
together.
At the end of this italicized section, Shreve breaks in to tell another part of the
story–actually to ask about how a storytelling event with Quentin and Mr Compson came about.
“‘How was it?’ Shreve said” (152 ). Shreve asks about Mr Compson and Quentin’s trip to the
Sutpen family grave site and the narrator picks the story up and shows Mr Compson telling about
the graves and about Charles’s son.

157

The language here, and the shift from italic to regular type, do not mark a clear difference
because Shreve’s participation in the storytelling event is so active that he is affecting how
Quentin tells the story, even if he is only telling to himself. This italicized section represents
Quentin’s thoughts, which are very similar to what Shreve is saying to Quentin at the same time;
all I want to emphasize is that this shift from italics to regular type isn’t the clear kind of shift of
speakers that takes place in earlier chapters. The telling is becoming more collaborative, more
communal some might say, and the distinction between speakers is blurring. The lack of clear
boundaries is not only between Quentin’s mimetic voice and his various levels of psychic voice.
Shreve’s voice–his presence–is also helping to blur the boundaries. The interaction of these two
consciousnesses is creating a new version of the Sutpen story. A version which is realized by the
narrator.
Robert Georges might well claim that this kind of blurring of teller and listener is
indicative of storytelling events, which rely on listener feedback: “As the storyteller receives and
decodes the responses of the story listener and interprets and responds to them as feedback, the
interaction between the storyteller and the story listener intensifies and begins to shape the
message” (321). For Georges, the message, the linguistically coded semantic content, is only part
of the event, indeed only part of the story, and is only formed with the active involvement of all
participants. The final chapters of Absalom, Absalom! are an attempt to show the kind of
collaboration that Georges talks about in the pages of a novel. This section could be described as
a version of the story told by Shreve, or as feedback which helps shapes Quentin’s message. It is
both. This type of collaboration, when it is rooted in a communal tradition, creates communal
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voices like those Lanser identifies. Matlack argues that their collaboration is a type of communal
voice:
Confusion in determining the locus of narration arises in the late chapters because these
two are speaking with a common voice which cannot be separately attributed to either of
them . . . This community expands to include the whole of what I have called the oral
tradition in the novel. The narrative structure and the external unity of the novel cause all
the storytellers to fuse into a single process, a common identity. (351)
The common identity that Matlack writes of is obviously very similar to the Overvoice Ross
writes of, as well as Lanser’s idea of communal voice. Matlack does not connect the communal
voice to the author, as Ross does. By definition Lanser’s communal voice is separate from an
authorial presence. Ross would have the Overvoice be imbued with the god-like power of the
traditional authorial voice, hence the capitalization of the term. I am arguing for a merging of the
voices that is a result of the communal nature of storytelling events and a concomitant equality of
all voices. But this equality of voices is still mediated, made possible, by the narrator who seems
to retain control of all the voices, though he chooses to make very few evaluative comments.
For Lanser, communal voice is “a practice in which narrative authority is invested in a
definable community and textually inscribed either through multiple, mutually authorizing voices
or through the voice of a single individual who is manifestly authorized by a community” (21).
Here we have multiple voices who are part of an identifiable community. Rosa, Quentin and Mr
Compson authorize themselves, in part, by using the communal discourse–by using the language
of the identifiable community of memory they establish their authority. The discourse of the
characters and the narrator are so closely associated, are so thoroughly intermingled, that the
structurally dictated difference between the different voices on different narrative levels and with
different levels and types of knowledge is blurred and diminished, if not eliminated.
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However much the characters may be contending for authority (and I see less of this than
many critics) the author has created a community of voices. We have been presented with several
storytellers from the same community who do authorize each other through their familiarity with
the communal tradition. We have also seen a narrator who speaks for the communal “we.” What
we are beginning to see in this chapter is Shreve, someone outside of the community, begin to
appropriate the discourse and tell his version of the story–one that reflects the influence of earlier
versions, but also reflects his sensibilities.
While Shreve is actively and energetically participating at this point, the outward
manifestation of Quentin’s involvement consists only of occasional “yesses.” In response to
Shreve’s question the narrator gives an account of a storytelling event that occurred well before
Quentin’s visit to Rosa. This event is the source of what Brooks calls “Stratum B” of Quentin’s
knowledge: “What Mr Compson told Quentin in the talk that was set by their visit to the Sutpen
graves” (142).
In the middle of this represented storytelling event Quentin imagines a scene Mr
Compson is telling about: “It seemed to Quentin that he could actually see them” (152). Though
this is presented in a later chapter, where the storytelling is usually attributed to Shreve and
Quentin, it is Mr Compson’s telling which is evoking strong images for Quentin. The story
evokes strong reactions and vivid images regardless of who is telling the story. In the middle of
this event, set in the Sutpen family graveyard, Quentin imagines Sutpen’s tombstone as it was
when it was leaning against the wall inside the house (though it may never have actually have
been there):
where Miss Coldfield possibly (maybe doubtless) looked at it every day as though it were
his portrait, possibly (maybe doubtless here too) reading among the lettering more of
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maiden hope and virgin expectation than she ever told Quentin about, since she never
mentioned the stone to him at all, and (the demon) drank the parched corn coffee and ate
the hoe cake which Judith and Clytie prepared for him and kissed Judith on the forehead
and said, ‘Well, Clytie’ and returned to the war, all in twenty-four hours; he could see it;
he might even have been there. Then he thought No. If I had been there I could not have
seen it this plain. (154-55)
The use of “Miss Coldfield” and “Quentin” signal the narrator’s voice, but here the narrator uses
terms indicative of Mr Compson’s style, through the use of the qualifier “possibly” and the
parenthetical modification of “maybe doubtless,” though it could be Quentin’s thought process
which calls for the use of, or at least modifies, those qualifiers. This is a less contentious version
of the psychic dialogue inside Quentin in the first chapter, though what is being contested here is
not terminology but certainty. The parenthetical expressions could signal conflicting voices
inside Quentin, or Quentin’s modification of the story being told. But this is the narrator’s voice
we are reading. Ross describes psychic voice passages such as this as “free indirect internal
discourse with uncertainty as to source” (142), and I agree with this assessment. In fact, this
particular passage has two types of psychic voice: most of the passage is free indirect discourse,
but the passage ends with “direct quotation marked by italics and absence of punctuation” (142),
which Ross also identifies in Faulkner’s oeuvre. “Then he thought No. If I had been there I could
not have seen it this plain” (155). Once again, the italics indicate a change in voice even if both
voices are inside one character.
Donnelly writes that “as Quentin visualizes past events, the material temporally distanced
becomes presently evocative and significant” (112). Quentin, three generations removed, can see
it more plainly, but it is Shreve, unfettered by tradition, who can finalize the Sutpen story and
confidently answer the question why. His confidence and finality should not be confused with
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fact. But before Shreve can take the telling past Quentin’s knowledge, Quentin must first tell him
more. Again, even this early, Shreve is affecting how the story is being told.
The chapter ends with Shreve recapitulating the story up to the point where Rosa and
Quentin arrive at Sutpen’s Hundred, but, as it is many times in the text, the forward movement of
the story is stopped–continuation is deferred–this time by a frantic plea: “‘Wait then,’ Shreve
said. “For God’s sake wait’” (175). Shreve says “wait” because he feels inadequately prepared to
move forward. He doesn’t have the information necessary to understand where he is. Before he
can move forward he must have some gaps filled in for him. As chapter 7 begins, Shreve says:
“‘So he just wanted a grandson’” (176). Shreve’s comments refer to a portion of the storytelling
event that we have not just heard. This does not follow directly from the last chapter, except that
it refers to the back story Shreve needs in order to understand. It certainly does introduce the
topic of this chapter: Sutpen’s childhood, his “innocence” and his “design.” In order to show why
Sutpen “just wanted a grandson” Quentin presents, in effect, Sutpen’s life story. Particularly the
story of his life before “that Sunday morning in June 1833" (7), when Sutpen first arrived in
Jefferson. Quentin sets the scene for a pair of storytelling events where Sutpen was the teller and
General Compson the listener. This story could only have come to Quentin through his father.
But Quentin never mentions his father as a conduit. Instead he uses two tags: “grandfather said”
and variations on “Sutpen told grandfather.” Skipping mention of his father has two advantages:
it is more convenient, and it increases his authority.
Obviously, for Quentin to narrate to Shreve a storytelling event about how his father
related a storytelling event where his father (Quentin’s grandfather) told him about a storytelling
event between him and Sutpen is unwieldy. “Quentin told Shreve that father told him that
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Grandfather told him that Sutpen told him about his childhood” slows things down quite a bit. It
is very reasonable to not mention many of these layers. In fact, it is more than understandable, it
is preferable. However, all of these layers exist in the oral tradition. All of these characters’
consciousnesses are theoretically responsible for the substance of Quentin’s telling. But this isn’t
a real storytelling event–it is a work of fiction that is presenting these events, and the question we
should be focusing on is who the author wants us to believe.
However much I would like Absalom, Absalom! to be an accurate model of storytelling
events and oral traditions, it is not. In this section the author wishes to present some of the
thoughts of a character who cannot directly take the stage. The only way that Sutpen can speak
for himself is for the author to create a past storytelling event for him. In order to retain the basic
structure of the novel, this event has to be passed down through two generations, creating not
only the possibility but the theoretical likelihood of distortion over repeated tellings, no matter
how committed the tellers are to maintaining the integrity of the tradition. If this were an oral
tradition we would have to be skeptical about how much of what is being transmitted can be
considered as actually coming from Sutpen, but it is not an oral tradition. The way that Sutpen’s
story is presented in the text encourages us to believe it is authoritative. I would argue that we are
to believe that the words that are given as Sutpen’s thoughts are his thoughts, or at least what
Sutpen claimed were his thoughts. The only distortion we should take into account are Sutpen’s.
The more important reason to omit mention of Mr Compson is because the more
narrative levels that are overtly mentioned between Sutpen and Quentin, the more aware we are
of the likelihood of distortion. Instead of presenting an event where we doubt the words of the
characters, Faulkner has Quentin directly quote Sutpen and give us his thoughts in the same
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manner that the narrator has given us Quentin’s thoughts. The only way to maintain the integrity
of the fictional frame and give Sutpen a chance to speak for himself is to create storytelling
events that have themselves been passed down through the Compson family tradition; however,
in order to give his telling equal weight with those of the others, the frame must be deemphasized.
Genette describes intervening layers of narrative like we have here as metadiegetic. In this
case Sutpen’s story is meta-meta-meta-metadiegetic. Genette also describes forms of narrating
“where the metadiegetic way station, mentioned or not, is immediately ousted in favor of the first
narrator, which to some extent economizes on one (or sometimes several) narrative
level(s)–these forms we will call reduced metadiegetic (implying: reduced to the diegetic), or
pseudo-diegetic” (236-37). I would rather use pseudo-diegetic (or perhaps pseudo-meta-diegetic)
here because the reader remains aware that this section has not actually been reduced to the
diegetic–the reader knows that this is not the narrator directly presenting Sutpen’s speech and
thoughts. In another important sense it is not pseudo-diegetic because terms like “grandfather
said” reassert the intervening levels. But the similarity of the voices, Ross’s Overvoice, and the
similarity Sutpen’s psychic voice has with the psychic voice the narrator uses for Quentin reduce
the sense of intervening storytellers. Again the two reasons for making a section with this many
layers pseudo-diegetic are to remove unwieldy phrases in order to promote ease of reading and to
increase the authority of Sutpen’s telling. At no point in this chapter does the narrator make
statements that might bring the veracity of Quentin’s account into question.
Initially Quentin tells his story in indirect discourse using the term “he told grandfather”.
This construction is also similar to the narrator’s description of Sutpen’s pistols in the first
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chapter, where the pistols’ butts were “worn smooth as pickhandles” (25). When Quentin sets the
scene for the two events where Sutpen is the teller, he uses the term “grandfather said” (178). He
only uses “grandfather said” when setting the scene and when he is presenting General
Compson’s evaluative comments. Every other time he uses “he told grandfather,” or a similar
term, which not only eliminates Mr Compson as a conduit, it also reduces General Compson’s
input. An omniscient narrator who presents the event can also say “Sutpen told him.” In terms of
the point of view there is little difference between Quentin and the narrator in this instance.
In answer to Shreve’s comment about Sutpen wanting a grandson, Quentin sets the scene
for a storytelling event where Sutpen “’told Grandfather something about it’” (178). After he sets
the scene he doesn’t present any of the other intervening tellers’ mimetic voices. Instead he
summarizes and uses indirect discourse to relate Sutpen’s story. He explains that Sutpen’s
“trouble was innocence” (178). For the first section of Sutpen’s story Quentin primarily uses
indirect discourse, though some of it might better be called summary. He is retelling Sutpen’s
story, but he is telling. The first part of Sutpen’s story is about his family’s move from what will
become West Virginia to the Virginia tidewater area. Here is an example of Quentin’s mimetic
voice:
“But he–” (“The demon,” Shreve said) “—didn’t know, or remember, whether he had
ever heard, been told, the reason or not. All he remembered was that one morning the
father rose and told the older girls to pack what food they had, and somebody wrapped up
the baby and somebody else threw water on the fire and they walked.” (181)20
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While Quentin is narrating and mentions Sutpen’s name, Shreve interjects “the demon.”
(181, 198) When Shreve is telling the story he calls Sutpen “the Demon.” He does this because
he enjoys it.
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Here Quentin comments directly on Sutpen’s state of knowledge. Quentin does not say that “he
didn’t tell grandfather.” Instead he says that he didn’t know, or remember. He directly comments
on Sutpen’s knowledge–explicitly stating what he remembered and what he did not. He also
comments on how Sutpen told the story. Though apparently he does have the ornate style
associated with Southern colloquial oratory and the other storytelling voices of the novel, he is
relatively taciturn in his telling. He omits, so the other characters tell us, a great many details, and
some facts, which he does not consider relevant to his specific purpose.
Quentin narrates Sutpen’s flight to a private spot after his pivotal rejection at the
doorway. I use the term “narrate” quite consciously because this section seems very much like
the narration of a novel. Quentin is narrating the initial storytelling event in a viewpoint very
similar to the narrator’s. Quentin comments on how Sutpen told the story–on his lack of
ornamentation or even elaboration–as if he heard how he told it, and he comments on the state of
his memory. He says: “‘That was how he told it. He didn’t remember if it was weeks or months
or a year they traveled’” (181). The intervening layers are ousted in favor of Quentin’s narration.
Quentin narrates Sutpen’s flight to seclusion, and then tells Shreve about his inner
turmoil, which is represented as a dialogue:
“He was quite calm about it, he said . . . arguing with himself quietly and calmly while
both debaters agreed that if there were only someone else, some older and smarter person
to ask. But there was not, there was only himself, the two of them inside that one body . .
. arguing quiet and calm: But I can shoot him.” (189)
Just as there are “the two separate Quentins now talking to one another in the long silence of
notpeople in notlanguage” in the first chapter negotiating the meaning and signifiers of the
Sutpen story (5), Sutpen’s inner turmoil is represented with two distinguishable psychic voices.
In both cases the “notlanguage” of consciousness is represented. Not only are they the same kind
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of voices in the general sense, but Sutpen’s psychic voice is presented on the page by Quentin’s
mimetic voice in the same manner the narrator has presented Quentin’s psychic voice. All of
Sutpen’s thoughts are presented in a section which is enclosed by quotation marks that signal
Quentin’s mimetic voice–his direct speech. Though most of Quentin’s telling presents Sutpen’s
indirect discourse, his psychic voice is presented by the storytelling character in the same manner
as the authorial voice presented Quentin’s thoughts; the same orthographic system is employed.
If you look on the page at how these two psychic voices are graphically presented, the only
discernable difference is the quotation marks enclosing Sutpen’s section.
The narrator, of course, does not qualify Quentin’s thoughts in the manner that Quentin
admits that these thoughts are second hand. But Quentin’s knowledge of Sutpen’s thoughts
seems to be as good as the narrator’s knowledge of any other character’s, and the similarities in
presentation remain. Quentin does add various forms of “he said,” but he does not mention the
intervening diegetic levels, and there are long stretches where the “he said”s and “he told”s are
few and far between. Instead, Sutpen’s inner dialogue is presented in a very authoritative manner:
“But I can shoot him: and the other: No. That wouldn’t do no good: and the first: What
shall we do then? and the other: I dont know: and the first: But I can shoot him. I could
slip right up there through them bushes and lay there until he come out to lay in the
hammock and shoot him: and the other: No. That wouldn’t do no good: and the first:
Then what shall we do? And the other: I dont know.” (190)
Like Mr Compson earlier, Quentin’s mimetic voice, his transcribed speech, uses the same
orthographic system as the narrator. The italics do not signal a change in inflection, or any other
sort of paralinguistic factor. They are literally a graphic reminder that psychic voice is being
employed.
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During his telling, Sutpen omits large portions of the narration which he considers
inconsequential. When he tells of traveling to the West Indies, he doesn’t explain how he got
there, though he was probably only twelve years old and had never seen a ship or the sea. “‘He
went to the West Indies. That’s how he said it . . . He just said, “So I went to the West Indies”’”
(193). In order to prove his taciturnity, Quentin momentarily abandons indirect discourse and
directly quotes Sutpen. Even though we could put at least two more sets of quotation marks
around Sutpen’s statement, we are expected to accept it as accurate. When Sutpen tells of
subduing a native uprising in the West Indies he merely says he subdued them:
“Not how he did it. He didn’t tell that either, that of no moment to the story either; he just
put the musket down and had someone unbar the door and then bar it behind him, and
walked out into the darkness and subdued them, maybe by yelling louder, maybe by
standing, bearing more than they believed any bones and flesh could or should (should,
yes: that would be the terrible thing: to find flesh to stand more than flesh should be
asked to stand); maybe at last they themselves turned in horror and fleeing from the white
arms and legs shaped like theirs and containing an indomitable spirit which should have
come from the same primary fire which theirs came from but which could not have, could
not possibly have (he showed Grandfather the scars).” (204-05)
Sutpen did not elaborate on this section of his story purportedly because the details, and in fact
telling an interesting story, were not important to him. He was trying to relate enough expository
information to make his present state of affairs clear. His “indomitable spirit” is of “no moment”
to his telling. It is, however, important to Quentin, as it doubtless was to Mr and General
Compson. So in this version of the story the confrontation is elaborated. Here again qualifiers are
employed to make it clear that Quentin is extrapolating (or passing on a previous teller’s
extrapolation). Note, however, that Sutpen’s scars are a testament to what he had to endure. Note
also that “he showed grandfather the scars.” This is the same kind of construction as “he told
grandfather” which acts again to make Quentin’s claims seem more a matter of fact than hearsay.
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Quentin tells in a different manner than Sutpen, and for different reasons; both use the
oratorical voice of the Southern tradition. Though Shreve sometimes chides Quentin about his
language he also encourages him to continue on several occasions. Shreve is clearly as absorbed
by the story, or nearly as absorbed, as Quentin. “‘Sure,’ Shreve said. ‘That’s fine. But Sutpen.
The design. Get on, now.’” (209). As Quentin is using indirect discourse to relate how Sutpen is
explaining his design, Shreve makes a comment about Quentin’s use of the language of the
tradition: “‘Dont say it’s just me who sounds like your old man,’ Shreve said. ‘But go on.
Sutpen’s children. Go on’” (210). Quentin’s verbal response is another “yes”, but Shreve’s
statement leads him to think about the connection between all of the storytellers and their
subject:
‘Yes,’ Quentin said. ‘The two children’ thinking Yes. Maybe we are both Father. Maybe
nothing ever happens once and is finished. Maybe happen is never once but like ripples
maybe on water after the pebble sinks, the ripple moving on, spreading, . . . thinking Yes,
we are both Father. Or maybe Father and I are both Shreve, maybe it took Father and
me both to make Shreve or Shreve and me both to make Father or maybe Thomas Sutpen
to make all of us. (210)
This is also an attempt to explain the type of communal voice that the novel is enacting. It is like
a type of communal voice that Lanser describes “a simultaneous form, in which a plural ‘we’
narrates” (21). Of course, Shreve is outside of the community whose story this is, but he has
internalized the story and the linguistic norms to some extent. More importantly, Shreve and
Quentin are forming a sort of community that is also connected to the story’s tradition. The
narrator who actualizes the story they are imagining is neither a personal nor an authorial
narrator. However limited their community is, and I would argue that they retain a strong
connection to the tradition, it is a community, and the narrator acts as their plural “we”. The
communal narrator here is different than the communal one in chapter 2. More precisely, the
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narrator speaks for a different community in this chapter, and his authority is derived from
communal and not authorial sources.
Quentin’s understanding of his heritage–of the Sutpen story–is based not only on hearsay,
but on his experience at Sutpen’s Hundred. While Quentin is relating a storytelling event with Mr
Compson to Shreve, Shreve comments on how Mr Compson’s state of knowledge has seemed to
change: “‘Your father,’ Shreve said. ‘He seems to have got an awful lot of delayed information
awful quick, after having waited forty five years’” (214). Mr Compson’s and Rosa’s earlier
tellings suggested, based on the evidence of Bon’s son and a picture of Bon’s wife in a locket,
that Henry killed Bon in order to prevent him from involving his sister in a bigamy scandal.
Here, Quentin relates Mr Compson’s speculations based upon the premise that Bon was Sutpen’s
son, a different story than the one he told in chapters 2-4. Shreve’s confusion is understandable;
Quentin’s response is pivotal:
“He didn’t know it then. Grandfather didn’t tell him all of it either, like Sutpen
never told Grandfather quite all of it.”
“Then who did tell him?”
“I did.” Quentin did not move, did not look up while Shreve watched him. “The
day after we—after that night when we----“
”Oh,” Shreve said. “After you and the old aunt. I see. Go on.” (214)
Here Quentin, the son, the story listener, becomes the teller, and he has gained this status because
he has experience and knowledge that he can add to the tradition. It is made clear that Quentin’s
superior knowledge is a result of his trip to Sutpen’s Hundred with Rosa. It is never made clear
what exactly he learns or how what he learns leads him to the conclusion that Charles Bon was
the son Sutpen abjured, but it is clear that this is a piece of the puzzle that Quentin’s experience
supplies. In chapter 8 Shreve recapitulates his understanding of how Quentin knows, and it is
clear that no one tells him anything. Many critics have speculated on exactly where, how and
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what he learns; Brooks tries to posit additional conversation between Henry and Quentin, but this
is what the reader gets. Any additional speculation goes beyond the available evidence.
Shreve is only too happy to speculate; he begins racing ahead of Quentin, prompting him
to cry “wait”:
’Wait, I tell you!’ Quentin said, though he still did not move or even raise his voice–that
voice with its tense suffused restrained quality: ‘I am telling’ Am I going to have to hear
it all again he thought I am going to have to hear it all over again I am already hearing it
all over again I am listening to it all over again I shall have to never listen to anything
else but this again forever. (222)
Here, as in other places, Quentin attempts to curb Shreve’s forward momentum. Here his
hesitation is based on his desire to tell the story properly, and on a desire to escape the story at
the same time. Only by telling the story can Quentin keep control of it, but telling the story also
bring his ambivalence to the foreground, and it threatens to overwhelm him. The
“commonwealth” of voices dominates his consciousness. But Shreve is less interested in Quentin
maintaining control.
‘No,’ Shreve said; ‘you wait. Let me play a while now. Now, Wash. Him (the demon)
standing there with the horse . . . then the voice of the faithful gravedigger who opened
the play and would close it, coming out of the wings like Shakespeare’s very self: “Well,
Kernel, they mought have whupped us but they ain’t kilt us yit, air they?”’ (224-25)
Again Shreve connects the Mississippi story with stories he is more familiar with, casting
Wash Jones as Shakespearian comic relief, showing that the specific story and its characters have
universal qualities. Wash speaks a substandard dialect similar in social status to the
Shakespearian character’s. Shreve seems to be clearly enjoying making light of the story, but
here the narrator aggressively intervenes to make it clear that he is not taking the story lightly:
This was not flippancy either. It too was just that protective coloring of levity behind
which the youthful shame of being moved hid itself, out of which Quentin also spoke, the
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reason for Quentin’s sullen bemusement, the (on both their parts) flipness, the strained
clowning. (225)
Here the narrator tells what is behind the two voices we hear. This is one of the most overt signs
of authoriality in the novel. We hear very little from the narrator about the other storytellers. In
particular the narrator never discusses how we should read Mr Compson’s tone. His words are
presented with little or no evaluation and are tacitly endorsed by their similarity to the narrator’s.
Here the narrator explains not only how their speech should be interpreted, but the feelings
underlying their speech. However much they are shamed by it, however much Quentin has been
trying to hide it here and throughout the other storytelling events, they are moved by the story. In
chapter 9 Shreve tries to explain to Quentin what the narrator has just claimed:
“Wait. Listen. I'm not trying to be funny, smart. I just want to understand it if I can and I
don't know how to say it better. Because it's something my people haven't got. Or if we
have got it, it all happened long ago across the water and so now there aint anything to
look at every day to remind us.” (289)
Shreve takes the communal tradition seriously, in part because he realizes it is something he
doesn’t have. He is not consciously part of a community of memory, and he feels that it is a lack.
He has used fragments from the stories he has learned, the stories of the literate tradition, in order
to try and understand a tradition he is not a part of. Though Shreve tries to take a turn at telling
the story here, Quentin almost immediately takes back the floor: “Quentin did not even stop. He
did not even falter, taking Shreve up in stride without comma or colon or paragraph” (225).
Quentin picks up the story in stride. Previously it had been the intervention of the narrator that
allowed people to take each other up in stride. Mr Compson takes over for the narrator in chapter
2, and the narrator at other times arranges the chapters so separate storytelling events follow each
other. Here the narrator doesn’t need to intervene because Quentin and Shreve are collaborating
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so closely that they can pick up for each other. Their collaboration will become so intense that
their voices will later seem to merge, but even here they have a very strong rapport.
Quentin narrates Sutpen’s death at the hand of Wash Jones twice in this chapter. He
repeats their final dialogue word for word both times. In this section, Quentin once again
becomes the carrier of the communal tradition. Here his authority comes from his father, from
Mr Compson’s mastery of the communal tradition. The story of Wash and Sutpen is peppered
with the phrase “father said”. Mr Compson’s knowledge of the final confrontation comes from
the same place as the town’s knowledge, from the black midwife who was helping to deliver
Milly Jones’ daughter (229).
The chapter ends with Shreve suggesting they stop talking and go to bed. Chapter 8 will
end the same way. Shreve’s suggestion has gone unheeded. Instead he takes an even more active
role in telling the story. Instead of recapitulating parts of the story he has heard from Quentin, he
begins to tell his own versions of the story.
Chapter 8 is remarkable. The novel has several storytelling events and shows us that
Quentin is both deeply moved and deeply conflicted by the story he is reconstructing. In this
chapter, he and Shreve collaborate on the story so closely that the boundaries, not only between
teller and listener but between teller and subject become blurred. We are given a story that is not
clearly assigned to one speaker, because we are to believe that they are so closely collaborating
that it is not relevant or even clear who the author of individual statements is. The voice that tells
us they are collaborating is the narrator’s. This collective voice is a kind of communal free
indirect discourse. I would call some sections more examples of phenomenal voice, like in the
first chapter where an image of Sutpen is evoked for Quentin by the power of Rosa’s speech. The
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narrator dramatizes parts of Shreve and Quentin’s version, mainly because to have either
character identified as the speaker would distinguish the line between storyteller and story
listener that Faulkner wishes to blur. It is dramatized also because straight mimetic voice can not
represent the power this storytelling event has for the participants. Most of the chapter, however,
is told in Shreve’s mimetic voice. Quentin’s mimetic voice in this chapter is limited to feedback
he gives Shreve.
There are two tellers in this chapter, Shreve and the narrator. It begins with Shreve’s
mimetic voice. Shreve recapitulates the private scene where Sutpen supposedly tells Henry about
Bon. In the second paragraph the narrator describes the state of the storytelling event, but then
shifts not to what either of them is telling, but to what they are both thinking:
Not two of them in a New England college sitting-room but one in a Mississippi library
sixty years ago . . . and they–Quentin and Shreve–thinking how after the father spoke and
before what he said stopped being shock and began to make sense, the son would recall
later how he had seen through the window beyond his father’s head the sister and the
lover in the garden. (236)
The narrator doesn’t tell us what either of them is saying. Instead he tells us the two have in some
sense become one, and then he tells us what they are thinking.21 Here they identify with Henry;
they “see” this scene from his point of view. Brooks argues that the events that Shreve and
Quentin imagine “are given something like the authority of objective events. It is no longer I
think this or I believe that, but the events take place before the waking eyes of Quentin and
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There are several instances where the narrator suggests that they are merged. At several
points in this chapter the narrator says that Quentin understood Shreve’s unclear pronoun
references. The narrator simultaneously shows how closely they are linked and supplies the
proper noun so the reader can understand: “neither of them said ‘Bon’. Never at any time did
there seem to be any confusion between them as to whom Shreve meant by ‘he’” (249). Our
confusion is eliminated while their level of understanding is highlighted.
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Shreve” (317). This is true, at least to some extent. However, one of the things they see is the
garden with a “shrub starred with white bloom.” The narrator explicitly states that the garden
could not have looked as they think it did–as they see it, and that their inaccuracy is irrelevant to
their purpose: “it would not matter here that the time had been winter in the garden too and hence
no bloom nor leaf even if there had been someone to walk there and be seen there since, judged
by subsequent events, it had been night in the garden also” (236). The narrator does not show any
omniscient knowledge of what went on that evening–he only demonstrates the communal and
general knowledge of when any such meeting could have taken place. He does not commit to
anyone actually being in the garden, but he states that there would have been no white blooms.
Their story is inaccurate, though in this case only in a largely irrelevant fact. Even though, as
Brooks says, their imagined events are presented very authoritatively, they are also contradicted
by the narrator, who explicitly states that it could not have been as they imagine it.
This doesn’t entirely invalidate their story, however. The narrator also claims that “that
did not matter because it had been so long ago. It did not matter to them (Quentin and Shreve)
anyway” (236). Again, the truth of a dialogical novel is the hero’s own truth, not an objective
one. For these tellers, the historical facts are not necessarily relevant. The authorial voice uses the
extrarepresentational acts to focus us on the fact that truth is more complex than what happened.
The small details, and some of the facts, are not important. It is important to find the parts of the
story that are relevant to their lives, what they can identify with. They put part of themselves into
the characters, their conception of the characters is based in part on their conception of
themselves. Quentin and Shreve so closely identify with the historical subjects of their story that
they imagine themselves in their places: “not two of them there and then either but four of them
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riding the two horses through the iron darkness and that not mattering either: what faces and
what names they called themselves and were called by so long as the blood coursed” (237).
Here they are physically riding the horses. They don’t “almost see it”; it is not that they “could
have been there”; they are there. And they can only be there because they are far enough away
from the story to be able to vividly imagine it–it had been so long ago. The fact that they can
vividly imagine, that this event is highly evocative, does not necessarily give it the authority of
objective events. The facts, the events that can satisfactorily be proven, do not explain. In order
to create a satisfying explanation, Quentin and Shreve must fill the gaps by using their
imaginations. Only their active construction can build a story that meets their needs. Throughout
the novel there has been a movement towards greater concreteness. In Rosa’s telling, in chapter
1, a “demon” “abrupts” into Quentin’s consciousness “upon a scene peaceful and decorous as a
schoolprize water color, faint sulphur-reek still in hair clothes and beard” (4), and he is a
shadowy relatively insubstantial figure, placed against an artificial backdrop; while Mr Compson
is telling, Quentin thinks: “he could see it; he might even have been there. Then he thought No. If
I had been there I could not have seen it this plain” (154-55). In earlier chapters Quentin can see
it, but he isn’t there. In this chapter he is there.
Quentin is there and so there is greater power, for Quentin, in this event, where his
imagination is more actively involved in the construction of the story, and where Shreve has in
part freed him from the constraints of the communal tradition. The narrator, however, also makes
statements that act to diminish the authority of these events. The narrator reminds us that, no
matter how important these versions are to Quentin, they do not necessarily reflect what actually
happened. The narrator indicates that Shreve is speaking, but “it might have been either of them
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and was in a sense both: both thinking as one, the voice which happened to be speaking the
thought only the thinking become audible, vocal” (243). Here we have an authoritative
omniscient narrator, as we have had throughout the novel. The narrator tells us that this
storytelling event has brought the two so close together that their thoughts are identical. The
narrator is describing the power of storytelling. I would call this phenomenal voice because Ross
describes it as existing “when explicitly mentioned in the diegetic discourse as sound, act,
gesture, or the power of speech irrespective of speech’s semantic ‘content’” (19). Here it is the
power of speech. These two who are one create a compelling version of the Sutpen story.
the two of them creating between them, out of the rag-tag and bob-ends of old tales and
talking, people who perhaps had never existed at all anywhere, who, shadows, were
shadows not of flesh and blood which had lived and died but shadows in turn of what
were (to one of them at least, to Shreve) shades too. (243)
Notice that the narrator acknowledges the distance Shreve has from the tradition–his people at
least were shades of shades. There are two other interesting things about this passage: Quentin
and Shreve create “people”, not shades–vague images, and these people “may not have existed.”
The earlier tellings brought forth “shades” for Quentin, the image of Sutpen came to him, not
Sutpen himself. Here they “create between them” actual people. They are far more real than the
previous images. Language both brings the past to them and transports them back to the past.
At the same time, these people may not be accurate representations of the historical
individuals. In fact, they “may not have existed”. Not only are their actions not necessarily those
of the people who were involved, they may not have existed “at all anywhere”. These people may
be entirely fictional. Though Mr Compson may also take liberties, though he may fictionalize
almost as much as Shreve does, he never provokes this kind of statement from the narrator. The
narrator never goes so far as to suggest that anyone Rosa or Mr Compson told of was even
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possibly fictional. If the narrator only reveals knowledge available to the communal tradition, he
still makes it clear that Quentin and Shreve have gone beyond the ability of this tradition and
beyond the facts in order to shape their story.
I return again to Lord’s description of epic singer’s commitment to their traditions. Lord
writes that singers assume “the role of conserver of the tradition, the role of the defender of the
historic truth of what is being sung; for if the singer changes what he has heard in its essence, he
falsifies truth” (28). Mr Compson and Rosa feel an analogous responsibility to stay faithful to
their particular traditions. They don’t want to “falsify truth.” This is not to suggest that they, or
epic singers, necessarily succeed. Of course, part of Rosa’s adherence to the tradition arises from
what “they will have already told” Quentin. She only veers from the tradition when she can
appeal to her authority as an eye-witness to or a participant in events. Mr Compson does not stray
far from the traditional knowledge he holds because his authority lies in his mastery of this
knowledge and the discourse. Shreve doesn’t feel this responsibility–he is not a “barracks filled
with stubborn backward-looking ghosts” (7). He takes this story seriously, but he does not invest
the tradition with the kind of authority Mr Compson does. He has not grown up with this
tradition and he feels far less responsibility to it.
Shreve’s goal is to tell an interesting and compelling story, and Quentin allows him to
stray from the tradition. In this chapter he introduces a character even though there is no physical
evidence he exists.22 Shreve creates a character who is almost an avatar of greed: “that lawyer
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This is not the first time it happens in the novel. In chapter 4, Mr Compson imagines
Bon and Henry’s New Orleans trip, including “a swarthy man resembling a creature out of an old
woodcut” (89), who may or may not have existed. The narrator never suggests that this man is
fictional, though Mr Compson admits to “imagining” this section.
178

with his private mad female millionaire to farm” (241). Hugh Ruppersberg calls this “Shreve’s
most apparent fabrication” (124). Shreve posits the existence of a lawyer who represents
Sutpen’s first wife and arranges for Bon to come into contact with the Sutpen’s. Ruppersberg
adds that “Though Faulkner seemed to verify, twenty years after writing Absalom, the lawyers
existence [see Gwynn 77], the narrative itself provides no such evidence” (124).
Events that might have been put in motion by Bon or his mother or may have even been
purely coincidence are assigned to the lawyer. “Shreve uses the lawyer to provide a rational
explanation for what he cannot otherwise explain” (Ruppersberg 124). Events that are
inexplicable, or only explicable by assigning malevolent intent to Bon, which Mr Compson does,
are explained by the creation of this malevolent figure. His existence fills motivational gaps in
the story. The existing set of signifiers just did not explain.
At one point, Shreve does more than fill the gaps in the story–he changes it. Earlier in the
novel, Mr Compson mentions that Henry saved the wounded Bon during the war, even though he
knew he would eventually be forced to kill him. Shreve decides that Mr Compson is wrong:
‘He said it was Bon who was wounded, but it wasn’t. Because who told him? Who told
Sutpen or your grandfather either, which of them it was who was hit? . . . it was not Bon,
it was Henry; Bon that found Henry at last and stooped to pick him up and Henry fought
back, struggled, saying, “Let be! Let me die! I wont have to know it then.”’(275)
Having Shreve tell this version allows an interesting possibility to come to light, but Shreve has
no warrant to contradict Mr Compson. We should assume that Mr Compson is closer to the truth
of this part of the story; he certainly relates what is widely believed to be the truth. Battles make
history. Soldiers who save wounded comrades are talked about by other soldiers and perhaps
written about in reports or dispatches. Also, there must have been other Jeffersonians who were
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in their regiment who would have talked about it in town.23 It is reasonable to assume that the
common knowledge of Henry’s saving Charles is based on reliable sources, while Shreve is
calling him wrong only because it’s an interesting version of the story. Shreve changes the
story–boldly asserting that Mr Compson, who has been fastidious about his sources, got the facts
wrong by using the argument “who told him?” An obvious response is “who told Shreve?”
Though Ruppersburg says the lawyer is Shreve’s most obvious fabrication, at least the lawyer’s
existence doesn’t contradict the communal tradition’s knowledge. Shreve has little commitment
to the oral tradition, he wants only to tell a story that is interesting and that explains.
Colleen E. Donnelly argues that the version told mainly by Shreve is the most
compelling. She writes that Shreve:
sorts through all possible causes and motive, as he questions and explores the
ramifications of each, to find those that have the most power to explain. His method of
inquiry, his attention to detail, works to assure us that he is on the right track and compels
us to believe his conjectures, despite the numerous qualifying adverbs and phrases that
appear in his narrative. He discards those details that do not explain and keeps what
seems most capable of illuminating the destruction of the Sutpen dynasty. (115)
Since he more vigorously fictionalizes than any of his predecessors, what illumination he gives
seems to necessarily be less historically accurate. Shreve’s telling is certainly dramatic and
compelling, but I find no reason to privilege it over any of the other tellings. Throughout
Shreve’s section I was always very aware that Shreve had no direct knowledge of these events,
that he is playing. “Shreve’s participation is neither more nor less than the joyous response to the
challenge of creating a narrative by an intellect and imagination which are equal to the task”
(Tobin 267). Shreve wants to play with the story, and he does not care if he is historically
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Now I’m sucked in to the “must have been” game.
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accurate or not. When he decides that Henry saved Bon at Pittsburgh Landing he is taking a
liberty that a traditional storyteller would not take, no matter how neatly that change would fit the
story he was trying to tell.
Quentin and Shreve know they are taking liberties, but they forgive each other their
trespasses as they build their story together. Again and again the narrator stress the communal
nature of their telling, how the material is very much alive for them, and also how we should be
wary of their methods:
it did not matter to either of them which one did the talking, since it was not the talking
alone which did it, performed and accomplished the overpassing, but some happy
marriage of speaking and hearing wherein each before the demand, the requirement,
forgave condoned and forgot the faulting of the other–faultings both in the creating of this
shade whom they discussed (rather, existed in) and in the hearing and sifting and
discarding the false and conserving what seemed true, or fit the preconceived. (253)
As in all storytelling events it is not talking alone that completes communication, but Faulkner
here is certainly arguing for an unusual level of understanding between the two participants. Not
only do they think together, their forgiveness for each other is certainly a sort of love–a close
communion.
At the same time the narrator reminds us that their accuracy is not necessarily to be
trusted. One thing they forgive each other for is distorting the material in order to fit their ideas
of what the story should be. Donnelly’s description of Shreve’s method mirrors the narrator’s.
The narrator uses the terms “discarding” and “conserving” while Donnelly uses “discarding” and
“keeping”. While Donnelly argues that this is the soundest method, the narrator also mentions
that they discard and retain material in order to make the story “fit the preconceived”, and things
that merely “seem” true. The narrator explicitly states that one of their criteria for retention of
detail is its ability to fit preconceived notion about what the story should be about. Clearly
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“fitting the preconceived” is not a criterion for truth, if truth is historical accuracy, but the truth
that Shreve arrives at is not historically accurate.
This part is presented in Shreve’s direct discourse for several pages. After he stops
talking, the two are once again represented as closely linked: “Shreve ceased. That is, for all the
two of them, Shreve and Quentin, knew he had stopped, since for all the two of them knew he
had never begun, since it did not matter (and possibly neither of them conscious of the
distinction) which one had been doing the talking” (267). As in the first chapter where “hearing
reneges” the talking continues even though the narrator says it might have “never begun”. In
order to show the power of the event the narrator de-emphasizes the speaking itself because
linking the story, on the printed page, solely to mimetic voice does not adequately represent the
event. No sort of mimetic voice could adequately portray the closeness Shreve and Quentin feel,
both to each other and to the characters they create. The narrator describes “not two but four of
them riding the two horses through the dark over the frozen December ruts of that Christmas
eve” after Bon and Henry have left Sutpen’s Hundred (267). Once again describing closeness
between Quentin and Shreve and the characters they create, the narrator tells us what everyone
involved is apparently thinking (267). The narrator attempts to represent the level of absorption
of these two storytelling participants. At some point in this fictional storytelling event something
that in part conveys these ideas is indeed spoken by one character or another. Quoting that
character directly, however, would not adequately convey the sense of the event or the effect it
has on its participants.
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This begins a long section that is the narrator’s and which is as full of qualifiers as any
other section. Quentin and Shreve are described as “believing that that24 must have occurred to
Henry, certainly during the moment after Henry emerged from the house” (267). After Henry
emerges, the narrator then tells a version of Henry’s story as if it were diegesis, at least a version
which “Shreve and Quentin believed” (268). And they believe “perhaps, doubtless” that there
were several Christmas celebrations on their boat to New Orleans. Even though it is the
narrator’s voice here, the narrator is relating what they would have told, or perhaps are telling,
including the qualifiers they would use. These are not the narrator’s qualifiers; they are Quentin
and Shreve’s.
Employing the showing/telling contrast, Brooks suggests that “instead of having the
character tell of a certain experience, we move through a fade-out-dissolve into a sequence that
presents the experience” (317). Brooks concedes that “Faulkner cannot, with his verbal medium,
quite manage a fade-out-dissolve;” instead there are the kind of transitions that I have described,
where the narrator’s voice takes up for a storytelling character (317). Except for the beginning of
chapter 2 and probably chapter 9 there are no fade-out-dissolves that present experience. Instead
these sections dramatize a teller’s version of events. These versions appear to present the
experience, but they do not. The sections of chapter 8 that are in the narrator’s voice often have
the feel of diegesis–have the tone of authoritative and reliable narration, but they are not. They
are a recreation of events based on premises that may well be false. And the reader knows this
because the narrator has explicitly stated it.
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The “that” being referred to is not relevant to this discussion.
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The narrator describes Shreve’s conception of Charles’s mother’s drawing room. He
describes “the four of them” (Shreve, Quentin, Charles and Henry) as being in this room, but the
room itself is Shreve’s creation–“that drawing room of baroque and fusty magnificence which
Shreve had invented and which was probably true enough” (268). They are so vividly
experiencing these scenes that they are described as part of them, but it is their own creation
which they are a part of.
Sutpen’s first wife is also in the room; she is described parenthetically as “the slight
dowdy woman . . . whom Shreve and Quentin had likewise invented and which was likewise true
enough” (268). Of course we have already heard from Sutpen that there was a first wife. Shreve
and Quentin create a version of what we have every reason to believe was an actual person. This
version is apparently “true enough” for the narrator. Her slightness and dowdiness have no
factual or traditional basis.
At one point, the narrator evaluates their version of events, and also comments on how
their version relates to Mr Compson’s: “Bon may have, probably did, take Henry to call on the
octoroon mistress and the child, as Mr Compson said, though neither Shreve nor Quentin
believed that the visit affected Henry as Mr Compson seemed to think” (268). The narrator also
says that Quentin did not tell Shreve what Mr Compson had said when he “related (recreated?)
it” the night before Quentin went to Sutpen’s Hundred. This is the first indication from the
narrator that anything Mr Compson says should, perhaps, be doubted. The trip to New Orleans is
one of Mr Compson’s most fabricated sections, but the narrator has made no comment on its
accuracy before this point. It is as if seeing the process Quentin and Shreve go through has
brought Mr Compson’s narrative into question. Note that the narrator’s endorsement is a
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qualified one–they are probably right. It is important to note that the reason the endorsement
cannot be unqualified is that the narrator is speculating as much as the characters.
After he questions Mr Compson’s credibility, the narrator endorses another speculation
made by Quentin and Shreve: “both he and Shreve believed–and were probably right in this
too–that the octoroon and the child would have been to Henry only something else about Bon to
be, not envied but aped if that had been possible” (268-69). The narrator says they were probably
right–he endorses their speculation, but he makes no claim to knowledge greater than Mr
Compson, or Quentin. The omniscient authorial voice–who knows, at least, what Quentin and
Shreve believe, doesn’t seem to know if what they believe is true. In earlier chapters the narrator
refrains from evaluating Mr Compson or Rosa’s information. He knows what happens in the
novel’s present and he knows everything the town knows. He has the information a limited
omniscient narrator is supposed to possess. In this chapter his level of knowledge has not
changed. He has never claimed to know what happened in New Orleans, or anywhere except
Jefferson and Cambridge, but this is the first time he comments on other characters’ speculations
and his opinion has no more weight than Quentin or Mr Compson. At least it appears no different
from their speculation. His voice is in dialogue with those of the storytelling characters.
Shortly after this, Shreve’s mimetic voice takes up the story. There is no signal for this
shift other than the quotation marks and his distinctive use of “old dame,” this time in reference
to Charles’s mother (268). This section ends with Shreve’s description of Bon saving Henry at
Pittsburgh Landing. Right after this extraordinary statement the narrator describes the two young
men (alternately two then four then two) braving the tomblike cold of their dormitory, as if their
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suffering in the New England winter was somehow equal to the scene we shift to “(—the winter
of 64 now” (276).
The narrator then tells about a meeting between Henry and Sutpen. In order to signal the
fade-out-dissolve in this case the narrator uses italics, and parentheses. This shift is neither to
experience or to one character’s remembrance. Instead it is to a communal version of events. A
few interspersed paragraphs in regular type present Shreve’s direct discourse. Shreve tells about
Quentin’s trip to Sutpen’s Hundred, interrupting the narrator’s italicized version of Charles’
meeting with Sutpen, which may or may not have happened. There is a clear indication that these
two scenes are closely related in Quentin’s mind, at least.
The transitions between Shreve’s direct discourse and the narrator are as smooth here as
those with Mr Compson in chapter 2. The difference between the narrator here and in chapter 2,
where Sutpen’s pistols, “with the butts worn smooth as pickhandles,” are authoritatively
described, is that the narrator directly states that Shreve’s tellings are fabrications and that his
narrations are based on Quentin and Shreve’s conception of the story. In both chapters 2 and 8
the narrator seemingly transports us back to the events which the character is talking about.
Chapter 2, however, is presented as a limited omniscient narrator’s version of events, as diegesis,
while in chapter 8 the same narrator presents what the characters “believe” the events were.
This section is a type of free indirect discourse, straddling the border between narrative and
mimetic voice. As Gates argues, free indirect discourse lies “in the middle spaces between these
two extremes of narration and discourse” (191).
Free indirect discourse is not the voice of both a character and a narrator; rather, it is a bivocal utterance, containing elements of both direct and indirect speech. It is an utterance
that no one could have spoken, yet which we recognize because of its characteristic
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‘speakerliness,’ its paradoxically written manifestation of the aspiration to the oral. (Gates
208)
In this instance it is a poly-vocal utterance because it contains elements of all of the characters’
discourse; not just Shreve and the narrator, but Quentin, Miss Rosa, and Mr Compson have
contributed to this version. More precisely, the narrator is attempting to represent the merger of
Quentin and Shreve’s discourse which cannot be realistically represented with mimetic voice. It
is not an effort at mimesis; it is more a type of phenomenal voice, an effort to show in print the
collaborative nature of storytelling and its evocative power. As Gates argues, “free indirect
discourse attempts to represent ‘consciousness without the apparent intrusion of a narrative
voice,’ thereby ‘presenting the illusion of a character’s acting out his [or her] mental state in an
immediate relationship with the reader’” (209). In this instance it is two characters’ mental state,
a state that has been influenced by the oral tradition. It is also an attempt to dramatize the
substance and effect of this particular storytelling event. This is a communal form of free indirect
discourse. The merging of the voices is not the joining of all version into one truth–it is the
merging of all versions into equally authoritative discourse.
Along with the narrator’s comments that mark these italicized sections as Quentin and
Shreve’s, Bon saves Henry in this version, which marks it as their fabrication. Specifically, when
Henry is meeting with Sutpen, Sutpen says he has heard he was wounded. Henry does not reply.
“He is about to say Charles carried me back but he does not, because already he knows what is
coming” (282). He knows that his father is about to order him to stop Charles. He doesn’t,
however, know Sutpen’s reason. Here Sutpen is represented as telling him something the
communal tradition has no knowledge of, or had no knowledge of before Quentin introduced it.
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Quentin replies “yes” to Shreve’s questions, endorsing the truth of his claims. Through
some of his earlier statements, where some of the assumptions about Charles were “true enough”
or “probably” true, the narrator endorses this version of events almost as strongly as Quentin
does. But now his authority is no greater than Quentin’s. He no more holds the truth to the
Sutpen saga than Mr Compson, Miss Rosa, or Quentin. He privileges no version over any other.
The narrator shows himself as not holding authority right before he dramatizes the
climactic scenes of the novel where Sutpen confronts Henry and where Henry and Charles
confront each other. There are two pivotal scenes dramatized here. Both are presented as
dialogues in italics with dashes indicating new speakers; and both are probably true enough, but
not necessarily what actually happened. Both scenes are marked by the narrator as fabrications,
even while he also admits they have some sort of truth, even if this truth is not historical
accuracy.
Many critics believe that the truth of the story resides at Sutpen’s Hundred and that
Quentin discovers it there. The final chapter of the novel presents Quentin’s trip there with Miss
Rosa that leads to his confrontation with Henry Sutpen. As he listens to Shreve tell about that
evening Quentin is described as jerking “violently and uncontrollably” (288). As Shreve tells,
Quentin remembers: “He could taste the dust. Even now, with the chill pure weight of the snowbreathed New England air on his face, he could taste and feel the dust of that breathless (rather,
furnace-breathed) Mississippi September night” (290). This fade-out-dissolve goes to diegesis. In
this case the narrator presents the experience, though some may say that Quentin’s memory of the
experience is being presented. I follow Brooks in calling these sections narrated experiences
instead of narrated remembrance, but there is little evidence to support this. I think they should
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be differentiated from the sections that Shreve helps fabricate–even if they are Quentin’s
memory, the literary conventions at play would suggest that his memory is reliable.
The only interesting thing about the all-important revelatory trip to Sutpen’s Hundred
which somehow led to Quentin’s greater knowledge and understanding is how uneventful it
actually is. The face-to-face meeting with a pivotal player in the story does not explain anything.
It may confirm or reinforce the existence of the whole tragedy, but it provides no insight. The
insight Quentin gains comes either from his confrontation with Clytie, as Shreve has said, or
from his finally forcing himself to literally go through the door and confront the past. It can be
persuasively argued that Quentin is better able to put the already extant pieces of the puzzle
together after he has forced himself to confront the implications of the past. Finally passing the
door that has checked him throughout the novel is more important than what is on the other side.
Perhaps he gains no knowledge at Sutpen’s Hundred, only courage.
Before he goes through the door, his courage seems to be lacking. He implores Miss Rosa
to “wait” twice (294). Again a character asks another to wait, to slow down. This time it is about
something other than talking. As always, people say “wait” when they are not ready to go
forward. But this time Quentin isn’t stopping a storyteller, but an actor. There is not, however, a
great difference in these acts–both move forward or delve deeper into the Sutpen story; both acts
attempt to reveal truth that someone is resisting. The narrator says that Quentin remembered
how: “he stood there thinking, ‘I should go with her’ and then, ‘But I must see too now. I will
have to. Maybe I shall be sorry tomorrow, but I must see’” (296). Quentin must go through the
doorway and he does, but we are not told what he sees or does on the other side. This revelation
is delayed. When their meeting is narrated it is singularly unhelpful.
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Countless critics have discussed the circular, closed nature of Henry and Quentin’s
exchange. There can be no question that Henry Sutpen tells Quentin nothing beyond what we are
given and what we are given reveals nothing except for the continued existence of Henry Sutpen.
This meeting was supposed to have revealed the truth of the past, but the ghost from the past has
nothing to tell. Whatever truth Quentin arrives at comes from another source.
The source of truth remains murky. When he was speaking at the University of Virginia,
Faulkner himself claimed to have a level of knowledge similar to the narrator’s. Asked if Charles
knew that Sutpen was his father, he replied with the same kind of qualifiers the novel has: “I
think he knew. I don’t know whether he--his mother probably told him. I think he knew” (Gwynn
79). Even the author, the creator of the fictive world who should have been able to answer all
questions definitively chose instead to qualify his answer, with a familiar “probably”. He did this
because the nature of oral traditional knowledge, as well as all other types of history, is that there
are some things we can not know. Faulkner explained that Absalom, Absalom! is about the nature
of truth:
I think that no one individual can look at truth. It blinds you. You look at it and you see
one phase of it. Someone else looks at it and sees a slightly awry phase of it. But taken
together the truth is what they saw though nobody saw the truth intact. So they are true as
far as Miss Rosa and Quentin saw it. Quentin’s father saw what he believed was truth,
that was all he saw. But the old man was himself a little too big for people no greater in
stature than Quentin and Miss Rosa and Mr. Compson to see all at once. It would have
taken perhaps a wiser or more tolerant or more sensitive or more thoughtful person to see
him as he was. (Gwynn 273-4)
Some critics attempt to privilege one truth over another. I have tended to privilege the
sections that appear to be more historically accurate; others privilege the sections that are more
vividly detailed. Finally, I don’t wish to privilege any of the sections. All of the tellers speak
some of the truth, or some truth, and no voice should be privileged over any other because all of
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them arrive at the truths of their own consciousnesses, and the author invites us to find the truth
of ours. Brooks writes that: “There are, to be sure, obvious elements of the Sutpen story about
which we can never arrive at certainty–matters of motivation and ultimate purpose that are
involved in the mystery of the human spirit itself” (302). Of course an omniscient narrator can
choose to reveal matters of the human spirit if he chooses to. A monological narrator provides
certainty, or at least can. This author chooses instead to have us speculate about the mystery of
the human spirit. There are some questions he cannot answer because the communal tradition
does not–and cannot–have them. Of course, Faulkner also used authoritative narrators in the
Yoknapatawpha series, and this narrator authoritatively presents Quentin’s internal struggle. This
is part of the reason I cannot definitively state that Absalom, Absalom! is a dialogical novel,
where no single voice has ultimate authority. If this novel is about Quentin and his struggle then
the narrator presents all the information authoritatively and Quentin’s struggle is resolved
satisfactorily. He goes through the door to face Henry–he finds the strength not to be a ghost, as
Miss Rosa does.
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KATIE COCKER TELLS IT LIKE IT IS
THE DOWNSTAGE NARRATOR IN THE DEVIL’S DREAM
Though Lee Smith is college-educated and was on the faculty of North Carolina State
University, oral traditions played a significant role in her development. Nancy Parrish writes that
“Smith acquired certain tools for her literary work” from her father’s side of the family: “an
Appalachian heritage, a storytelling tradition, and a proclivity for following one’s mind” (16768). Parrish writes that Smith has also used “details of Ernest Smith’s Ben Franklin store and
gossip of the county that gained an airing in their house during her grandfather’s forty-year tenure
as county treasurer. From them, too, Smith began innocently collecting the story elements that
would appear in later writing” (168).
Once again I will compare a novelist with Lord’s description of an apprentice epic singer.
Lord describes them listening to other, more experienced tellers and “consciously or
unconsciously, laying the foundation . . . learning the stories and becoming acquainted with the
heroes and their names, the faraway places and the habits of long ago” (21). While they listen
singers are “imbibing the rhythm of the singing and to some extent the thoughts as they are
expressed in song” (21). Lord describes a transition from listening and absorbing the discourse to
becoming proficient enough to begin singing on one’s own. Twain, Faulkner and Smith learned
not only specific stories and characters, historical and fictional, from the people around them;
they also learned cultural values and storytelling techniques. Smith has written that her “whole
sense of story is, as a consequence, oral” (“Introduction” xxxii).
The stories themselves are also very important. Katerina Prajznerova writes that Smith is
“convinced that remembering the stories of the past generations can offer a sense of rootedness
and orientation in the quickly changing modern world and its increasingly homogenized mass
192

culture” (48-49). In the first section of Smith’s novel The Devil’s Dream, the novel’s protagonist,
Katie Cocker, addresses the importance of past generations: “‘not a one of us lives alone, outside
of our family or our time, and . . . who we are depends on who we were and who our people
were’” (14). Katie’s sense of self is deeply rooted in her sense of belonging to a very specific
community. That community’s story is the subject of the novel. Robert Bellah argues that stories
play a significant role in the function of communities. He argues that communities “have a
history--in an important sense they are constituted by their past--and for this reason we can speak
of a real community as a ‘community of memory,’ one that does not forget its past” (153). A
community of memory need not be connected geographically. All it requires is a strong feeling of
community–of a past that binds the individuals together:
In order not to forget that past, a community is involved in re-telling its story, its
constitutive narrative, and in so doing, it offers examples of the men and women who
have embodied and exemplified the meaning of the community. These stories of
collective history and exemplary individuals are an important part of the tradition that is
so central to a community of memory. (153)
In The Devil’s Dream Smith tries to show the sense of community in Grassy Branch and the
Bailey family, and how that community constructs meaning by retelling stories, and how who
Katie Cocker is depends on these things. She sometimes shows this by using storytelling events
where there is a storytelling character telling part of the family’s story and the reader becomes the
implied story listener. In the novel, characters tell stories about their past and often in so doing
come to a clearer definition of themselves. Smith uses other types of narration as well, including
a third-person omniscient narration that I will argue is a type of authorial voice. One result of this
third person narration is that the voices of the individual storytellers presented are, in Bakhtin’s
terms, objectified, making The Devil’s Dream a monological novel, where all the individual

193

character’s voices are subsumed by one semantically authoritative voice. Mixing characters’
direct and indirect discourse with an authorial voice, Smith presents the history of the Bailey
family leading up to Katie Cocker’s telling which brings the novel to its present. In a way Katie
is the novel’s semantically authoritative voice, but her voice is authorized by a source outside of
her. There is a pervasive authorial presence that sometimes narrates and other times performs the
directing function. This narrator decides the order of the tellings and through this control
manipulates our reactions to individual characters. These chapters prepare us for Katie’s telling,
which the narrator assures us is the direct discourse of an honest, wise and balanced character
whom we should like, trust and respect. This voice, however, does not use the voice of authority.
Instead this third-person narrative voice is similar to the storytelling characters’ mimetic voices.
Even though this voice is not superior in discourse level, it is structurally superior in its level of
knowledge and insight.
The novel spans several generations and features a variety of narrative voices. In an
interview Smith joked that “It’s a mess, really. I’ve got a little bit of everything in there. But it is
mostly each person telling his own story” (34). Conrad Oswalt writes that “The Devil's Dream
follows a family legend through 150 years from 1833 in a little cabin on Cold Spring Holler to
the glitz and glamour of the lobby of the Opryland Hotel at Christmas” (98). More than half of
the novel consists of the mimetic voices of individual characters. The two pages after the novel’s
dedication hold the Bailey family tree, which has Moses Bailey and Kate Malone at the top. This
is followed by an italicized section, which is set off from the five larger, numbered sections.
Rebecca Smith writes that “each of the five major divisions of The Devil’s Dream begins with a
transcription of a song that Smith herself writes to encapsulate a major idea of the section”
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(Gender Dynamics 156). The novel ends with an italicized section which shares the first
section’s title. It would be fair to say that the two italicized sections, set at the Opryland hotel,
constitute the novel’s frame.
The first italicized section presents the colloquial voice of what one would assume is an
average tourist at the Opryland Hotel. This section is physically set off from the rest of the novel,
and it is marked as different by the use of italics. Like all the chapters of the novel it has an allcaps title. In this case it is the traditional hymn “Shall We Gather at the River.” One of the things
being described is a reunion of Katie’s family–of her community of memory. We realize as we
go along that the events related in the novel lead up to this gathering. The voice in this section is
never identified. I assume it’s a woman speaking. 25 She immediately sets the scene: “It’s
Christmastime at the Opryland Hotel, and you never saw anything like it!” (11).
This speaker introduces the novel’s protagonist, Katie Cocker. This section is in the
present tense. “But look–right now, right over here . . . sure enough, it’s Katie Cocker!” (12).
The events narrated are occurring in front of the speaker’s eyes. She describes Katie as one “of
the real superstars of country music, looking just as natural–looking just like herself!” (12). The
statement “looking just like herself” is perhaps a little odd, but it conveys the idea that the
speaker believes Katie to be authentic. Even with the wig that all country and western stars wear,
she appears natural, real. The primary purpose of this section is to introduce the apparently selfactualized Katie of the present before we look at her and her family’s story.
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I assume this because the author is a woman and because few men are likely to mention
Katie Cocker’s wig and say “She don’t have to take off those twelve extra pounds if she don’t
want to, either. She looks okay. She looks fine!” (12).
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This monologue alludes to Katie Cocker’s present stature as a country and western star,
and to how she arrived there, hinting at what the novel itself will hold. “God knows she’s paid
her dues, too. Some of the events of her life are just tragic, but she’s weathered them” (12). The
narrator here gives us more than Katie’s voice; she tells us she is a strong woman, one whose
word should be trusted. “When Katie Cocker answers a question she leans forward on her stool
and speaks right to the one who asked it. She looks you dead in the eye” (14). This direct
statement of her strength and confidence introduces Katie’s answer to a question about why she
is about to record an album that looks back to her family’s past.
“it took me a long time to understand that not a one of us lives alone, outside of our
family or our time, and that who we are depends on who we were and who our people
were . . . I know where we’re from. I know who we are. The hard part has been figuring
out who I am, because I’m not like any of them, and yet they are bone of my bone . . .”
(14)
The section ends with an ellipsis, suggesting that what follows might be considered a flashback
that will help us figure out who she is. Katie’s direct discourse seems more confident than this
narrator’s. I think we are meant to lend her voice as much credence, if not more, than that of the
narrator who presents her. I will argue that later in the novel an authorial voice, a narrator, will
encourage us to trust Katie. Even though it is certainly valid and probably correct to call the
unnamed speaker in this section a narrator, this is not the primary narrative voice of the work.
She is clearly represented as speaking, and she has no authorial privileges. This novel has an
authorial presence, a narrator, who can give us the thoughts of any character and who gives us
indicators of which voices to respect and believe. This authorial presence sometimes narrates and
other times only performs the directing function. The narrator of the italicized section is like
Huck in that hers is a mimetic voice used by an authorial figure. Unlike Huck, there is no
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indication she is aware a novel is being written; she is a private personal voice. In this section
Smith chooses to present the direct discourse of a character who is not identified or described in
any way.
There is no question who the speaker is in chapter 1, however, which begins when what
appears to be an epigraph is revealed on the following page to be a transcription of part of a song
that is sung by “Old Man Ira Keen.” The first words of the chapter establish that this is a
storytelling event. “That the one you mean? Speak up” (17). A story listener that the reader never
hears speak and that is never described is clearly being addressed by Ira Keen. He seems to be
very comfortably in the midst of a storytelling event, promising his listener to play the whole
song, “but first I’ll tell ye how come I was to write it in the first place” (17). The second
paragraph begins with a dash that indicates a pause for the unnamed story listener to speak
followed by Keen exclaiming: “–Well then, I’ll sing it, a course” (17). Three other times in the
chapter there is a dash which is followed by what appears to be Keen responding to the listener.
In one instance the listener must be expressing impatience with the pacing of Keen’s narrative.
“–Well now, I’m a-getting to it. I’m getting to it. Anything worth hearing is worth waiting to
hear, as the feller says” (20). Keen reacts to listener feedback that is not explicitly represented
and thereby could be imagined as our own impatience with him. Keen even asks the listener to go
get him some “tonic” and offers him some.
Internal evidence suggests that this storytelling event takes place early in the twentieth
century, sometime between 1905 and 1915. Keen begins the story of the Bailey family for us by
presenting the patriarch, the law giver, Moses Bailey:
Well, hit was in the year 1833 or 1834, as I figger it, that Moses Bailey . . . brung young
Kate Malone over here to live in that little cabin right down there in Cold Spring Holler.
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Hell yes, that’s what I’m a-telling you, right down this here hill and across Paint Creek
yonder . . .you could see the cabin right from this porch where we’re a sitting, iffen it
weren’t fer them cedar trees that has growed up so high over there. (19)
Keen’s storytelling event is not narrated; all we are given is his mimetic voice, which is not
contained or marked by quotation marks. He speaks in a substandard dialect. We hear him
responding to his listener, his personal thirst, and his own story. Like Aunt Rachel in “A True
Story,” Keen’s statements help establish the context of the storytelling event without the
intrusion of a narrator. Aunt Rachel describes her movements herself; Keen mentions they are
sitting on the porch across the creek from the other cabin. These elements are not dramatized by a
narrator, the characters reveal them in the course of their tellings. There is no omniscient narrator
telling us anything. We know it’s Keen because we have been given his name in the title at the
head of the chapter. Throughout the chapter, Smith allows Keen to tell his story without
interference.
Smith asks us to fictionalize ourselves as sitting on Ira Keen’s porch. We are to imagine
ourselves asking him to hurry up and handing him cider. Keen remains inside the
fiction–unaware of the existence of a novel or a readership. He is speaking directly to a story
listener inside the fiction. The leap required of us as readers is to put ourselves inside the fiction.
Smith tries to present Keen’s speech in such a way that it seems as private and unmediated as
print can make it.
Keen has authority because he was a witness to past events. “I used to could see pretty
Kate out there of a morning with a baby on her knee” (19). He didn’t witness everything he
narrates. He also provides information available from the communal tradition. He says that after
Kate and Moses were married “it is said that Kate’s mamma took to her bed the day of the
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wedding, she was that upset about it, and hit is further said that all of Kate’s brothers fell on the
ground a-crying when Moses took her away” (23). He also relates information he obtained from
his mother, who was with the Bailey family shortly after a pivotal incident where Moses beat all
of them for playing “the devil’s music”: “But Moses was the one in torment, Mamma said . . .
Kate never left his side, Mamma said . . . She said Kate’s face gave off a light that calmed all
who come around her that day” (29).
His authority is much the same as Mr Compson and Miss Rosa’s in Absalom, Absalom!
He is a member of a community and knows its story and has both personal and secondhand
knowledge of the Bailey family. Like Mr Compson, Keen presents the mimetic voice of a
character during an event he was not present for. He announces his separation from the event by
stating that “it is said” (26). Moses reportedly told his son that “‘The fiddle is a instrument of the
Devil’” (27). Keen’s description is relatively exact. He describes Moses’s voice as “deep and
terrible” (27), but this description is qualified by the use of “it is said.”
While he tells the story of Moses and Kate Bailey, Keen also tells his own. As Faulkner
said, about characters in Absalom, Absalom!, “every time any character gets into a book, no
matter how minor, he’s actually telling his biography–that’s all anyone ever does, he tells his
own biography, talking about himself, in a thousand different terms, but himself” (Gwynn 275).
The storytelling characters in The Devil’s Dream do this more overtly than those in Absalom,
Absalom!, with the exception of Miss Rosa. Like Miss Rosa, the storytelling characters in this
novel are witnesses to or participants in at least some of the events they relate. All of these
characters advance the story of the Bailey family while they also tell their own stories. While
telling Moses and Kate’s story, Keen talks about his infatuation with Kate, who he first saw
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when he was twelve years old. He also refers to his now-deceased wife, Piney, in part because the
story is about how difficult Kate’s life was. “I swear,” he says, “hit’s a sight what all a woman
puts up with” (24).
The chapter ends with Keen associating Kate positively with music. At the end, it is his
story and his dreams which he has been talking about, but he has also provided the reader with
information about the Bailey family and about one of the major conflicts of the novel–the
conflict between religion and secular music. Keen tells how Moses Bailey, who was deeply
religious, severely beat his family and indirectly caused the death of one of his sons when he
returned home unexpectedly to find them playing musical instruments which Kate had been
hiding from him. This episode dramatizes a crucial conflict in the novel between religion and
secular music, and shows Kate defying her husband because of her love for music.
Though Keen says that his own wife “was a good old woman. I wish I had loved her
better” (31), his story is about Kate. He clearly recalls images of her while he “cannot now recall
Piney’s face, fer the life of me! Not the way I recall Kate Malone the day she made the apple
butter when she was young” (26). He ends his story talking about how music comes from the
Bailey house, which he claims is haunted. Of course, I say he claims the house is haunted, instead
of suggesting it is. In this instance, the novel’s narrator also doesn’t have to comment on whether
or not the cabin is haunted. Keen states his belief and is neither confirmed nor denied by an
authoritative voice. One reason (though certainly not the only one) Smith uses a storytelling
character here is so he can make supernatural claims while the narrator can refrain from
commenting. As Lanser writes, “in realist fiction, characters may imagine the ‘magical,’ but the
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narrator’s superiority lies precisely in refraining to corroborate such imaginings as truth” (134).
Whether or not Smith believes people can be guided by voices, her narrator cannot.
Keen says that music comes from the Bailey cabin many nights, and that it doesn’t bother
him because it reminds him of Kate:
hit don’t bother me none to stay up here the way I do now, hit don’t bother me having that
hanted cabin acrost the way there. Hell, that fiddle music don’t even bother me, most
times. Now I won’t go over there, mind ye, on a bet, but I kindly like to hear that music.
Most times it will start up about now, jest about dark, and iffen hit’s a dance tune, why
sometimes I’ll lean my head back and close these old eyes and listen, and them times
hit’ll seem like I can fair see us, Kate and me together as we never was in life, a-waltzing
in the dark. (32)
At this point in the novel the reader has heard two separate voices with almost no mediation from
an overarching, controlling narrator. The novel appears at this early point to conform to the
definition of a dialogical novel given by Bakhtin. A dialogical novel, he writes, “is constructed
not as the whole of a single consciousness, absorbing other consciousnesses as objects into itself,
but as a whole formed by the interaction of several consciousnesses, none of which entirely
becomes an object for the other; this interaction provides no support for the viewer who would
objectify an entire event according to some ordinary monological category (thematically, lyrically
or cognitively)--and this consequently makes the reader a participant” (Problems 18). Individual
characters speak for themselves and readers judge for themselves which voices they will give
authority to, without the influence of an author who valorizes one character’s “truth” over
another’s.
In a dialogical novel the individual “character is treated as ideologically authoritative and
independent” (5). This independence spills over to the reader. “The direct and fully weighted
signifying power of the character’s words destroys the monological plane of the novel and calls
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forth an unmediated response–as if the character were not the object of authorial discourse, but
rather a fully valid, autonomous carrier of his own individual word” (5). Bakhtin suggests that
the mimetic voice of individual characters can be presented in a novel without it being secondary
to the primary narrative voice. The reader’s response to this autonomous consciousness is not
dictated by a transcendent, controlling authorial voice.
Keen’s discourse appears to be entirely unmediated, as did the personal voice in the
italicized section. There is no voice in this chapter other than his. There is, however, at least one
other presence worth noting that is not exactly in the chapter. This presence is similar to “THE
AUTHOR” who opens The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. A voice I am identifying as a
narrator, Hayman’s arranger, has moved us through time and space and entitled the chapter,
giving us Keen’s name. We gather from Keen’s monologue that he is at his home, on his front
porch where he can comfortably point to the nearby landmarks that are part of his story, speaking
to a listener who is something of an outsider. Keen appears to be an autonomous consciousness
who is speaking his own individual word. We gather all of this information because an authorial
presence, an “unstated but inescapable source of control” (Hayman 123), has arranged the
information for us.
The novel to this point has had relatively unmediated first-person points of view. The
story Smith wants to tell, however, requires a variety of viewpoints, some of which cannot be
realized by storytelling characters. She also uses an omniscient narrator. As Gates observes
“third-person omniscient voice . . . allows for a maximum of information giving” (185). Smith
wants to give us more information than storytelling characters can. At the same time, a
conventional authorial voice would stand on a higher plane than the other voices and lessen the
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authority of storytelling characters. Smith had had this problem with earlier novels and has
written about her problem and solution several times. In her introduction to the Oxford Edition of
Mark Twain’s Sketches, New and Old, she describes the problem she faced when she was one
hundred pages into the novel that would become Oral History:
The problem was that I was writing this novel in the third person, in good standard
American English . . . I sounded like I was condescending to my characters–the last thing
in the world I intended to do. The gap between the third-person narrative voice of the
novel and the characters’ own voices was simply too great. (“Introduction” xli)
Her problem stemmed from her use of the conventional authorial voice that Lanser identifies–the
unmarked narrative voice of the American novel, “good standard American English.” While
using this voice Smith found that the mimetic voices in her work were secondary, indulged and
condescended to, as Ross claims is the case with all mimetic voice. This was “the last thing in
the world” she wanted. In response to this, she employs the downstage narrative voice.
At the beginning of the second chapter of The Devil’s Dream the point of view shifts
from a storytelling character to a particular third person voice which Smith first used in the
writing of Oral History: she describes it as “using the way the characters spoke in the narrative
voice” (“The Voice Behind the Story” 99). When she used this voice she felt she had overcome,
at least in part, the secondary status of her characters’ mimetic voices: “now I felt I could write
about my characters without writing down to them, because I was using their words, but I wasn’t
restricted to their words, either. I was using what Tom Wolfe has called the downstage narrative
voice” (100). The downstage narrative voice is a third-person voice that uses the idioms and
rhythms of individual characters while maintaining an authorial point of view. This narrator does
not use any sort of phoneticized speech; the difference in language does not include
pronunciation differences. Smith’s narrator, unlike Keen and other characters, does not use ‘hit”
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for “it.” This narrator is not speaking, so regional pronunciation variation should not be
represented. The narrator can relate events and use language the characters could not, while still
using the character’s basic language style. Though the downstage narrative voice shares qualities
with Henry Louis Gates’ definition of free indirect discourse, it is not indirect discourse. It is the
narrator’s discourse; it is not a blend of narrator and character. The narrator retains separation
and omniscience while using the same kind of language as the characters.
In the second chapter, Smith use the downstage narrative voice. The first signal that the
narrative is not in the first person (other than the absence of the pronoun “I”) is in the fifth
paragraph of the chapter. It initially appears to be the same as the last chapter, the direct
discourse of a storytelling character–mimesis. We soon find that it is neither direct nor indirect
discourse; it is diegesis. There is no specific characterized consciousness this colloquial voice is
speaking for. This is a narrator–it is diegesis presented in a colloquial voice. It is “the way the
characters [speak] in the narrative voice” (Smith “Voice” 99). It is the language of an omniscient
third-person narrator who does not use the language of authority. A voice that is practically
indistinguishable from Ira Keen’s gives us Ezekiel’s thoughts and actions: “even as a child, Zeke
had sense enough not to tell anybody about the voices in his head” (34). Since Zeke never told
anyone about the voices, only he and an omniscient narrator can know about them. The narrator
also tells us that several spiritual experiences, sexual, musical and religious, quiet Zeke’s voices.
Zeke likes going to “meeting; it helps him the way a woman and a fiddle tune help him” (38-39).
After he is baptized, we are informed, the voices are taken away. This narrative voice gives
Smith the freedom to give us Zeke’s thoughts, without creating a voice that is markedly on a
higher dialogical plane.
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The chapter begins with a sentence that deserves close attention. “Small wonder, then,
that Zeke grew up so muley-hawed and closemouthed” (33). The “then” suggests a direct
continuation from the last chapter even though the narrative voice has changed from first to third
person, and we don’t initially notice this change. We had learned about how harsh Zeke’s father
was and the incident that cost his brother his life. This phrase also indirectly endorses Keen’s
narrative. Initially, we can not distinguish this omniscient, extradiegetic narrator from the
storytelling character Ira Keen, but we come to see that this voice, which is similar to Keen’s,
performs all the functions of an authorial narrator, even if this voice does not conform to the
usual expectations for authorial discourse. This narrator gives us no reason to doubt Keen, and
also subtly endorses his version of events.
In a monological novel “ultimate semantic authority,” Bakhtin writes, “resides in the
direct speech of the author” (187). Given the facts of Keen’s story, the semantically authoritative
narrator tells us, it is “small wonder” that Zeke grew up this way, and he did, in fact, grow up this
way. The narrator is telling us that his story is true. “The author neither argues with his hero nor
agrees with him. He speaks not with him, but about him. The final word belongs to the author,
and that word--based on something the hero does not see and does not understand, on something
located outside the hero’s consciousness--can never encounter the hero’s words on a single
dialogic plane” (Bakhtin 71). The narrator, located outside of Zeke and Keen’s consciousnesses
speaks, not with, but about them.
The narrator of this chapter knows and relates Zeke’s thoughts and actions. The narrator
also relates the town’s opinion, in much the same manner as the narrator of Absalom, Absalom!
The narrator describes Zeke’s ability to sit still as “unnatural” and adds, “Everybody said so”
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(33). The “everybody” here is the community. This narrator speaks for Grassy Branch in much
the same manner as the narrator of Absalom, Absalom! speaks for Jefferson. Smith’s narrator
goes on to describe the community’s feelings towards Zeke:
For the pure fact was, Zeke spooked them. He spooked them all. They were not used to a
big old boy that wouldn’t say a word. It made them feel bad, like they ought to do
something about him, but they couldn’t think what . . . Finally they grew to hate the very
sight of him sitting hunched on the floor thataway, staring into the fire. (33)
The Devil's Dream has a strong authorial presence. The narrator tells us both specific facts and
larger truths. Later in the chapter, Zeke’s Aunt Dot tells him “‘they is pretty singing and they is
true singing,’ and although Ezekiel didn’t know what she meant then he does now” (40). This is
one of several instances in the novel where Smith is stressing the importance of authentic voice.
This is also one of several examples where characters consider themselves wiser with age.
Though Aunt Dot speaks it and Zeke comes to understand it, “the idea is merely placed in [her]
mouth . . . it could with equal success be placed in the mouth of any other character. For the
author it is important only that a given true idea be uttered in the context of a given work”
(Bakhtin 79). Almost any characters could have said this with equal weight. Smith places it in the
mouth of a minor character, who may only exist in order to say that, and this is a piece of wisdom
the reader is to believe. Though this isn’t the most overt sign of authoriality, Lanser argues that
“generalizations in the narrator’s voice” are one of the types of “extrarepresentational structures”
which are “constituents of authoriality” (48).
The next two chapters follow the pattern of the first two. A character speaks in chapter 3
and is followed in the next chapter by a downstage narrator. Chapter 3 is subtitled “Zinnia Hulett
Talking.” This title explicitly states that the novel is leaving third person narration, though her
narration is different from Keen’s in some respects. Zinnia tells the story of her sister Nonnie, the
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mother of R.C. Bailey; R.C. is one of the main characters in the Bailey story. Zinnia’s first words
delineate her as a first-person speaker. “I never did know what ailed Nonnie. Don’t know to this
day!” (48). She also quickly establishes herself as a very unreliable storyteller. “Why, the very
first thing she ever done was kill Mamma!” (48). We soon learn that their mother died while
giving birth to Nonnie, which is a far cry from the murder Zinnia hints at.
Rebecca Smith writes that “Zinnia’s narrative recalls that of Sister in [Eudora] Welty’s
‘Why I Live at the P.O.,’ for her unreliability stems from her jealousy of her brazen sister and her
self-aggrandizement about her own hard work in the family home” (160). Though Zinnia does
seem to work hard in the role of matriarch in the family home, she clearly reveals herself as both
jealous and unreliable. She also recalls the character of Sister because she is a first-person
speaker who does not refer to her surrounding storytelling event, and one who is seemingly
unaware of how clearly she is revealing herself.
Lee Smith has acknowledged the direct influence of Welty’s character, saying Sister was
the genesis of Zinnia and calling “Why I Live at the P.O.” “probably one of my favorite stories. It
knocked me out many, many years ago when I first read it” (Herion-Sarafidis 94). Like Sister,
Zinnia blurs the line between storytelling character and interior monologue. Zinnia blurs it to
such an extent that the only warrant I have for calling her a storytelling character is the assurance
in the chapter’s title that she is “talking.” A difference between Zinnia and Keen is that Zinnia’s
monologue has less of a sense of realism than Keen’s; there is no sense of an actual event–a
setting, a listener, a time of day. This difference between Keen and Zinnia may be academic, but I
think there is one and it is often important. In The Sound and the Fury, for example, neither
Jason nor Quentin Compson are storytelling characters but Jason’s interior monologue could be
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mistaken for a storytelling event where the story listener is only implied. Quentin’s voice is
clearly psychic, while Jason’s is more like that of a speaker.
Stephen Ross rightly argues that even though Jason’s narration has “none of the familiar
textual signs of the Faulknerian psychic voice” what might seem to be mimetic voice is psychic
voice (170). Though Jason’s narration echoes “colloquial storytelling of the Southwest Humor
tradition” (169), he loses control of his story and reveals far more of his private thoughts than he
would in any sort of public speech. Jason is not speaking to anyone, and it is not always clear that
Sister or Zinnia are either. All three are unsympathetic characters who reveal themselves as such.
Jason famously begins his monologue: “Once a bitch always a bitch, what I say” (113). Zinnia
waits until the second paragraph before she accuses her sister of killing her mother. All three also
have a rambling, almost breathless quality that is often equated with stream of consciousness.
There are, however, more than enough storytellers with disjointed, rambling styles.
Zinnia’s monologue is presented in a colloquial voice that strongly suggests her direct
speech; however, Zinnia never refers to her surroundings or to co-present auditors. Unlike Keen
and like Jason Compson, she never overtly confirms that she is part of a storytelling event. More
indicative of interior monologue is the way she reveals her own insecurities. It is difficult to
imagine a woman like Zinnia referring to her own unattractiveness, yet she does so twice in the
chapter. At one point she remarks that Zeke “did not even appear to notice my face none” (60).
And at the end of the chapter, in a manner that is similar to the end of Keen’s narration (where he
imagines himself dancing with Kate), she describes riding away from the Bailey house with her
father “in the pitch-black night, the night so dark I didn’t have no birthmark, and I was just as
pretty as Nonnie” (61).
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Like Welty’s Sister, Smith’s Zinnia unwittingly reveals herself to the reader through her
monologue. The ironic gap between character and author is absolutely clear. Zinnia accuses her
sister of murdering her mother in childbirth and calls her “it.” “Granny slapped it until it cried.
Then she flung it down in the cradle they had there, my cradle, mind you, Daddy had made for
me” (51). She vents her anger, and the reader and the author stand above Zinnia and see her
ranting jealously, and see her unaware of how her words would affect her audience. She does not
see or understand how she is perceived. The reader and the author exist on an entirely different
plane from her.
Unlike Ira Keen, Zinnia is not affirmed by the narrator; she is repudiated. Chapter 4,
“Nonnie and the Big Talker,” like chapter 2, is not subtitled with the word “talking.” In chapter 4
a downstage narrator gives us the thoughts of several characters. One of the first things we find
out is that Zinnia’s belief that she had positively impressed Ezekiel is incorrect. Shifting to the
third person allows Smith to give us Preacher Stumps, Ezekiel and Nonnie’s thoughts far more
efficiently, and a better insight into their motivations. We also know Nonnie’s last thoughts on
earth–thoughts that only an omniscient narrator could give us. There is no debate among
consciousnesses about these events. This narrator clearly demonstrates how far off the mark
Zinnia is. In her narration Zinnia claims that Zeke preferred her:
He come out to the wagon grinning when we drove up, and he was just as nice to me as
ever he was to that silly Nonnie who done nothing but cry and cry, and he did not even
appear to notice my face none. I remarked upon how tight he helt my arm when he helped
me down off the wagon, and how much he appeared to like the fried apple pies we had
brung them–which I had made!–and I knowed in my heart of hearts that Ezekiel Bailey
preferred me over Nonnie. (60)
One of the first things we find out from the third-person omniscient narrator is that Zinnia’s
belief that Ezekiel preferred her (and her pies) is incorrect:
209

When Nonnie Hulett climbed down off her daddy’s wagon to stand before him at Grassy
Branch, Ezekiel Bailey thought she was just about the prettiest thing he had ever seen in
his whole life. it made him happy to look at her, and he stood there looking at her for the
longest time. . . .Her ugly sister had presented Ezekiel with a little bag of fried pies which
he ate automatically, one after the other, watching Nonnie. Ezekiel did not look at the
sister, who was poking around the yard and exclaiming over this and that and acting the
fool in general. (62-63)
In a later chapter, Zeke’s son R.C. says that after Nonnie died “that that strawberry-faced ugly old
sister of Mamma’s had come around . . . and Daddy had run her off” (86). Evidence from her
monologue suggests that this occurred before she “talks” in her chapter, and yet she still claims
that Zeke preferred her.
These are devastating refutations of Zinnia as a storyteller, and as a person, and ones that
the reader is not surprised to hear. The downstage narrator in the second chapter had at least
tacitly confirmed Keen’s narration, while also moving the story forward. No other “talking”
character is as overtly refuted as Zinnia is. The refutation in this chapter is related and
orchestrated by an omniscient voice that seems to act as the author’s proxy. There is no debate
among consciousnesses about these events. Zinnia gets some of the basic facts of the story right,
but her view is warped by hate; the narrator and the reader see the truth clearly–a truth Zinnia
does not see or understand, located outside of her consciousness.
Smith uses the downstage narrative voice here to give us authoritative confirmation of
Zinnia’s unreliability, and to give us a better insight into Preacher Stumps, Ezekiel and Nonnie
without having to go through the effort of constructing storytelling events for each of them,
particularly when the information is that which someone would or perhaps could never actually
tell anyone. The reader hears the thoughts of several characters in this chapter. While he is
watching Zeke and Nonnie’s first meeting, the aging Preacher Stump sighs and thinks “This will
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be a hard row to hoe” (63). Note that his psychic voice is marked by italics, as it often is in
Faulkner and in Smith’s other works. I don’t want to overemphasize this, but it is clearly an
omniscient narrator representing the psychic voice of a character. Except for the fact that this
narrator does not use the accepted authoritative discourse, she functions like a conventional
authorial voice.
The narrator provides us with a quick glimpse into Preacher Stump’s thoughts, showing
his evaluation of the impending marriage, and showing how his story is similar to those of the
other characters we have seen.
Preacher Stump felt old and foolish, surveying this scene from his porch. It was not a
thing like the time when Garnet had come to him, a young girl not yet sixteen, fullfigured and trembling, with a look on her face that he knew. Bent double, barely
breathing, Preacher Stump could see her still, his bride of sixty years before, could feel a
stirring of the heavy passion he felt then. He had to go lay down. (63)
This is all the back story we get of Preacher Stump, but his recollections, like Ira’s, reinforce the
themes of love, sex and memory that are repeated throughout the generations the novel covers.
Though a storytelling event could have been constructed for Stump where he might have
plausibly covered these ideas, an omniscient narrator can give us these two short glimpses in a
far more efficient manner.
It would also be difficult to contrive a storytelling event where Nonnie could explain why
she abandons her family for Harry, a member of a traveling show, in part because it is not a
particularly appropriate topic for conversation, but also because she may not entirely understand
it herself. When the narrator tells us how Harry makes Nonnie feel special it may in fact be a
feeling Nonnie could not have put into words. Her husband Ezekiel is not a talker, but Harry
encourages talk, and helps Nonnie find herself: “Nonnie never knew she had so much to say. She
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told him her whole life, which grew in the telling until she found herself going on and on about
things she never knew she’d noticed. Talking to Harry, Nonnie became more and more
interesting; Nonnie became her own story” (78). I include this excerpt because it is one of the
first times the act of telling is also expressly shown to be an act of self definition. One of the
reasons Nonnie leaves Zeke is that she sees herself being defined as a mother and therefore old.
Fleeing this role and singing for a living with the traveling show help her escape this definition,
but her interaction with Harry also helps her arrive at a new one. Telling her story to Harry, she
sees that she is more than any label–she is the sum of her thoughts and actions, and this sum is
not inconsiderable. I also include this passage because it is a revelation she might never have told
anyone, and therefore one that a storytelling event could not have revealed. Later the narrator
reveals something Nonnie never could have told anyone. The chapter ends with the narrator
presenting Nonnie’s thoughts and her last words. Nonnie wakes in a hotel room during a fire:
“The last thing she saw before she lost consciousness was the wide blank gaze of Ezekiel’s blueblue eyes as he led the high cold singing in the church at Chicken Rise. ‘Oh God,’ Nonnie said.
‘Oh God,’ for she really had loved him. Then her mouth was full of dirt and she was dead” (79).
Since they are her last thoughts, there is no way she could tell anyone. It is important that we
acknowledge the obvious limits of personal narrators and storytelling characters. Only an
omniscient narrator can give us Nonnie’s last thoughts. If Smith wants to include them in the
novel, she has no choice but to use an omniscient narrator.
An example of another type of limitation of personal narrators is found late in The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, shortly after Huck and Tom have helped Jim escape. Aunt Sally
tearfully asks Huck not to sneak out of the house to find the missing Tom. Huck promises not to
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crawl down the drainpipe, telling the reader: “Laws knows I wanted to go, bad enough, to see
about Tom, and was all intending to go; but after that, I wouldn’t a went, not for kingdoms”
(286). It is important to the story that we see Huck’s empathy and that he can obey the right kind
of maternal figure. But in order to show the reader that Aunt Sally is a figure worthy of this kind
of obedience, Huck has to break his promise.
Even though he decides not to slip away, Huck crawls down the lightning rod three
times–“the third time, I waked up at dawn, and slid down, and she was there yet” (286). Huck
shows the reader that Aunt Sally had kept a vigil for Tom all night long. An omniscient narrator
can just tell us this and can tell us Nonnie’s last thoughts, while an author must contrive reasons
for a personal narrator to be present for events in order to relate them to the reader and simply
can not know some things. Throughout the novel, the narrator fills in gaps left by storytelling
characters. In order to give Huck’s voice the stage Twain must lose the authorial privileges an
omniscient narrator must have.
The second section of the novel, “DOWN BY GRASSY BRANCH,” is mainly about
how R.C. founds the Bailey family’s musical dynasty. The first four of the five chapters in this
section consist of one personal voice each, while the fifth features a downstage omniscient
narrator who focuses on R.C. taking the family to a recording studio in nearby Bristol. The first
and third are narrated by R.C. There is no sense, in this or in the following section of a
controlling authorial voice either confirming or repudiating the personal voices which dominate
their respective chapters. The downstage narrator of the last chapter does not present any
information regarding the preceding chapters. The voices in this section seem to speak for
themselves.
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Though the first chapter’s title doesn’t say that R.C. is talking, he speaks in the first
person from the start. “When Mamma run off with the medicine show, I was working days. . . I
was wild as any young buck” (83). Like Zinnia, R.C. never gives any indication of a copresent
auditor or any other aspect of a storytelling event, but there is not the sense of ironic distance
between the author and the character that Zinnia’s narrative engenders.
Like storytelling characters in Absalom, Absalom! R.C.’s use of psychic voice is marked
by italics. “Best I can recall, my thinking run kindly along these lines. Mamma is a whore and I
am a bastard, and so by God I set out to prove it” (87). Also like the spelling of ‘sivilized’ in The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, there is an authorial presence transcribing his speech,
transforming his spoken word into appropriate written discourse. This particular instance need
not be considered a particularly significant act by the author. It could be argued that, given the
conventions for italicizing psychic voice which Faulkner helped establish, Smith marks this
psychic voice wherever it occurs for the sake of clarity. There is no need to posit any attempt to
make this any more significant than the use of quotation marks when a character uses mimetic
voice. Lizzie Bailey, who is represented as writing in the following chapter, also uses italics in
this manner: “I will not be like that, I told myself over and over” (94).
The chapter entitled “Lizzie Bailey” is one of the more interesting of the novel. Lizzie
doesn’t speak for herself--she writes. Rebecca Smith argues that “Lizzie writes in a stilted
Victorian prose . . . Lizzie in fact is an outsider in her own home of Grassy Branch, and her
written text illustrates her distinction from other Bailey family members who favor orality over a
more literate, written record of events” (54). Though she is different in some ways–her prose is
certainly stilted and written, and she does not favor orality–she is not entirely an outsider. In
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order for Lizzie Bailey to have a voice in the novel she must write because she has at least partly
joined a different discourse community–a culture of the written word. The first sentence, “We
depart for Europe in a fortnight” (89), throws the word “fortnight” straight at the reader. This is
not someone sitting around talking in Grassy Branch. We soon find out that Lizzie is a trained
nurse leaving for Europe during the First World War.
During her written reminiscence she presents a story her sister told her more than once.
Lizzie’s use of literary dialect clearly marks the difference she perceives between her language
and that of her sister. “Then as Lucie tells it, ‘we gone into the drugstore and got us a dope, and
whilst we was a-setting there . . . All of a sudden I took this notion’” (102). Note that she
announces that it is “as” Lucie tells it. She announces her intention to reproduce her speech.
Lizzie’s representation of Lucie’s dialect may be a little more heavily marked than the literary
dialect the author uses, but it would be difficult to prove this. All of the nonstandard spellings
used here are also used elsewhere, but there is a greater frequency of nonstandard spellings here
to help mark the difference between Lizzie’s literary dialect and grapholect, but it may also mark
Lizzie’s condescension towards Lucie’s speech.
Throughout her account Lizzie shows her ambivalence about Grassy Branch, and the
society she has entered. “We mountain people are a peculiar, proud lot, and must be approached
correctly if we are to be approached at all. We will not brook contempt, or being talked down to-‘biggetyness,’ as Lucie would say” (100). She is part of this “we” even though she has more
education and different life experiences. While she defends her people she puts her sister Lucie’s
term into quotation marks because it is indicative of mountain people’s crude, uneducated
speech. She condemns and confirms her own “biggetyness” at the same time.
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While she uses written instead of oral discourse she also shows, as Nonnie does with
Harry, that the act of narrating her past helps give her a sense of identity. No matter how far
removed she is, in language and distance, from Grassy Branch, she remains tied to it:
Perhaps it is simply the writing of this account which has transported me back in time and
place to Grassy Branch, to the little girl who lived there then with her old father and her
little sister trying to be good . . . what has become of her? I believe this is the question
I’ve been asking as I’ve written my way back through the years, and now the answer
comes to me, for I see that we are one after all, she and I, a life as continuous as
anybody’s. (107)
These lines echo Katie Cocker’s words in the prologue: “not a one of us lives alone, outside of
our family or our time, and . . . who we are depends on who we were and who our people were . .
.The hard part has been figuring out who I am, because I’m not like any of them, and yet they are
bone of my bone” (14). Even though she has created an identity for herself outside of Grassy
Branch, in effect divorced from her community of memory, the process of narrativizing her life
has created a sense in her of personal wholeness and connection with the rest of the Bailey
family. Who she is depends on who she was and who her people were. Lizzie is not like any of
them, yet she is bone of their bone. This statement is as true from Lizzie’s pen as it is from
Katie’s lips. Even though these characters speak for themselves, they also repeat and reinforce
themes that are displayed throughout the novel. The repetition of major themes throughout the
generations makes the conflict that Katie Cocker will resolve very clear and is orchestrated by an
authorial presence.
The truth tends not to come from Blackjack Johnny Raines’ lips. His section is unique in
the novel. He doesn’t tell his own story; instead his section is told in free indirect discourse: “it’s
raining the way it seems to do most of the time in Louisiana, a pee-warm drizzle that don’t do
much to cool things off, at least in Blackjack Johnny Raines’s opinion but hell, what does he
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know? What the fuck does he know anyway?” (165). Though this profanity clearly reflects
Johnny’s specific speech patterns and his attitude at this particular point in the diegesis, it is
clearly not his mimetic voice–it is not his direct discourse. It is not a downstage narrative voice
either because it is not simply a narrator’s voice. As Gates argues, free indirect discourse lies “in
the middle spaces between these two extremes of narration and discourse” (191).
Free indirect discourse is not the voice of both a character and a narrator; rather, it is a bivocal utterance, containing elements of both direct and indirect speech. It is an utterance
that no one could have spoken, yet which we recognize because of its characteristic
‘speakerliness,’ its paradoxically written manifestation of the aspiration to the oral. (Gates
208)
A downstage narrator’s utterance is not bi-vocal. A downstage narrator speaks in the same
manner as the characters–not for, through or with them. Though the downstage narrative voice
also uses speakerly diction, it does not actually blend the character and the narrator; the
downstage narrator is a separate third-person narrator who uses speech patterns on the same
plane as the character’s voices. The downstage narrator does not state the character’s opinion as
if it were his own.
In his discussion of Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, Gates gives an
example that shows that neither the character (Joe Starks in this case) nor the narrator is the sole
source of the utterance in free indirect discourse:
the presence of the adverb here (‘yes indeed, right here in his pocket’) as opposed to
‘there,’ which would be required in normal indirect speech because one source would be
describing another, informs us that the assertion originates within and reflects the
character’s sensibilities, not the narrator’s. (210)
While the adverb “here” announces the difference from normal indirect discourse, it is also “his”
pocket. The pronoun is indirect; the assertion originates within and clearly reflects the character’s
sensibilities, but the narrator actualizes it. A downstage narrative voice, on the other hand,
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describes the other “source;” in free indirect discourse the voice is, in part, the source. “The
principal indices of free indirect discourse direct the reader to the subjective source of the
statement, rendered through a fusion of narrator and a silent but speaking character” (210). In The
Devil’s Dream Johnny remains silent. We are told that “Johnny prefers to keep his bottle right
here, in the inside pocket of his western jacket” (165). It is exactly the same type of discourse as
in Their Eyes Were Watching God. And this is different from the downstage narrator in the
novel’s second chapter, who also mentions a pocket: “Zeke kept the steelie in his pocket always,
and sometimes he’d roll it around and around in his fingers. He never traded it, or shot with it, or
even took it out of his pocket” (35). Zeke’s pocket is never “here”. It is described by an
omniscient narrator.
The discourse in Johnny’s chapter is unique in the novel, at least in part because
transmitting Johnny’s information in any other manner would force the narrator either to be more
directly judgmental or to take much more space. It’s difficult to imagine a storytelling event that
Johnny would be a part of that could transmit as much information about him to the reader in as
short a span. At the same time, since the chapter reflects his thoughts, the narrator can maintain
an ironic distance that Smith’s downstage narrator cannot. The character’s sensibilities are, in
effect, actualized by the narrator. The narrator, however, is no more responsible for the content of
these remarks than of those of a storytelling character. All of the necessary information is
transmitted while the narrator maintains distance.
Johnny is as clearly repudiated as Zinnia and, as in Zinnia’s case, there is evidence of this
both in his chapter and outside of it–evidence that the characters give us, but cannot see
themselves. This chapter recounts a night where Johnny is working as a touring musician. While
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he is playing a sparsely-attended show at a run-down club, he is disdainful of his audience, and
“reflects that if he ever gets this way, this sad-ass and beat-down, he hopes somebody will just
shoot him in the head and put him out of his misery. Hell, he’ll shoot himself” (168). This
statement is clearly revealed as ironic later when his wife shoots and kills him, but even in this
chapter we see he is already relatively sad-ass and beat-down. He plays in clubs where the
clientele is sad-ass and beat-down and the club owner neither trusts nor respects him; he has been
evicted from his apartment; he experiences pain when he urinates, suggesting venereal disease;
and he steals money from a lonely fan he convinces to have sex with him. There is a clear
authorial judgement of Johnny, but there are no overt statements by the narrator that do so. Both
Zinnia and Johnny are clearly repudiated, but not by any direct statements by any narrator.
Instead the inconsistencies in their own narratives and statements in others’ show their
shortcomings.
Later in the novel, Katie Cocker, who receives the closest thing to an overt endorsement
the narrator supplies, confirms everyone’s opinion of Johnny: “I wasn’t too anxious to see
Johnny again, to tell the truth, because of this one time I remembered when he tried to come on
to me when we were kids” (262). We learn later in the novel that Rose Annie shoots Johnny after
a woman comes to their home with Johnny’s illegitimate child. Johnny admits in his section that
he has a child somewhere in Los Angeles, and the only defense he can muster is that “‘men are
shits’” (180). The final judgment of Johnny is resoundingly negative. Every mention of Johnny
outside of this chapter, except for some made by Rose Annie, who is insane and infatuated, is
negative. In his chapter, he clearly conforms to the stereotypical patterns that he is accused of
following throughout the novel. Rebecca Smith argues that Johnny is “one of Smith’s most
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despicable male characters, one who never grows beyond seeing women as objects to be groped”
(169). Johnny is almost that simple to dismiss and perhaps should be.
Johnny himself is conflicted, however. At one point he remembers an encounter with an
attractive young woman that was surprisingly nonsexual. While driving at night to his next gig
and musing about why he hates “college towns and college girls, smart-ass, got-it-all, know-it-all
rich girls” (178), Johnny recalls an evening with two college-age women. He recalls returning to
the home of the more attractive of the two women, Greer. Greer and her friend, “Buffy or maybe
Muffy, one of those names” (178)26, strip and jump into the backyard pool, an experience Johnny
finds strangely nonsexual.
So being naked in the water like this was no turn-on at all, in fact it was the opposite of a
turn-on, in fact it put Johnny in mind of the swimming hole that Robert Floyd dynamited
in Grassy Branch, it made him remember how long it took him to teach Rosie to swim
and how little she looked in the water. She was just a kid then. At first, she was scared to
put her face in. Later she was scared to lean back. She never did learn to swim very good,
not like these rich girls who seemed to be part fish; they could tread water for hours and
ask him innumerable personal questions. (179)
This passage suggests that his relationship with Rose Annie is deeper than one might think. Greer
reminds Johnny of Rose Annie, but Greer also has a power and confidence in the water Rose
Annie was incapable of. This affects Johnny strongly enough that he speaks frankly with her.
“And for once, that night, Johnny just told the truth, fuck it, it was pretty clear he wasn’t going to
get any off of Greer anyway, so what the hell. He told them about leaving home--although he left
out the part about why” (179). Even when he chooses to tell the truth, however, he omits
significant details, this chapter is in free indirect discourse instead of Johnny’s mimetic voice.
This evening with Greer suggests far greater depths to Johnny than the rest of the novel does, or
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An omniscient narrator–a downstage narrator–would, of course, know her name.
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at least potential depth. It suggests that men may in fact be more than shits. Johnny finds himself
uncomfortable with his actions–with the role he plays.
Johnny decides to call Greer the next day, not sure himself why, and is greeted by Muffy
or Buffy, who he hears tell Greer that “Johnny Men-Are-Shits” is calling (181). This labeling of
Johnny, this oversimplification of him, produces an immediate and indignant reaction. Another’s
dismissive labeling of him leads him to retreat from a vulnerable position. At a crucial point
where he might have grown, or at least revealed more depth, a wrong word leads him to recoil.
“So when Greer finally came on the line, Johnny was damned if he’d say a word. He was
Blackjack Johnny Raines, he would not be made light of” (182). After showing this vulnerability,
Johnny resumes his “despicable” character, returning to the image of himself as sexual predator
that he has cultivated. At the end of the chapter Johnny is still in his self-destructive cycle. “By
the time he has broken the seal on a new pint bottle of vodka and taken a pill or so, he’s feeling
pretty good. He’s feeling right” (183). He looks forward to repeating the events of the previous
evening. He imagines the woman he will lie to–the same lie he told the night before to a different
woman.
Johnny Raines doesn’t break the boundaries of his character, but there is a moment where
we see that he is not as simple as his function in the novel or in society. He has, perhaps, the
potential to exceed the boundaries of his character, but he does not. He is a monological
character in a monological novel, but it is suggested here that he contains the ability to exceed his
boundaries. Bakhtin writes:
In a monologic design, the hero is closed and his semantic boundaries are strictly defined:
he acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the limits of what he is, that is,
within the limits of his image defined as reality; he cannot cease to be himself, that is, he
cannot exceed the limits of his own character. (52)
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Though I’m arguing that both Zinnia and Johnny are kept on a different dialogical plane than the
primary narrative voice, these characters are not as two-dimensional as the term monological
suggests. They are monological in the strictest sense. They hint at greater depth, but they never
act in a way that reflects this. I’m not sure if monological or dialogical are entirely adequate
terms. Smith has tried to allow at least some of her characters to be carriers of their own
autonomous words. She also, however, has sections where the novel’s authorial voice dominates
the other’s consciousnesses from a higher dialogical plane. There is never a character who knows
more, or as much, as the primary narrative presence, except perhaps for Katie Cocker.
Katie is a different sort of storytelling character, and, like Huck, she tests the boundary
between narrators and storytelling characters. As I’ve already argued, Huck is not a storytelling
character. Even though he is represented as speaking, there is no explicit or implicit reference to
a specific time or place where Huck actually speaks. Also, Huck is aware that the novel is being
written and that his audience is its future readership. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn records
a very public speech act, though how exactly the book was “made” is not mentioned in the text.
Huck is a personal, public, narrator.
Lanser would argue that Katie is a personal narrator, because, like Huck, she is a
character inside the fiction telling her own story. It is difficult to argue against this because Katie
and Huck are very similar, indeed. The definition of their exact roles, is not as important as the
difference between their voices–their presences in the novels–and the authorial presences that
dominate the novels in a way that no presence dominates Absalom, Absalom!
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The last of the five major sections of The Devil’s Dream consists of several chapters
where Katie tells her own story. She begins by reflecting on her young adulthood in Richmond
living with her Aunt Virgie and cousin Georgia:
We’d sit on the old iron bed in the boarding house in Richmond and giggle, me and
Georgia, and not say out loud what we were thinking. Or at least I didn’t say out loud
what I was thinking, and I know what I was thinking. I reckon I’ve always had a dirty
mind, or at the very least a mind which is down-to-earth. I will call a spade a spade. I will
tell it like it is. I can’t kid myself, or not for long, anyhow. Oh I guess we all kid ourselves
a little bit (209).
Katie’s self effacement is endearing and leads us to believe she will be a reliable narrator. In a
way Katie’s initial acknowledgment that she may not be entirely reliable–her simultaneous
establishment and undercutting of her own authority–echoes the opening of The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn. In that novel Huck marks himself as a very different sort of narrator while also
making a similar acknowledgment of unreliability:
You don’t know about me, without you have read a book by the name of “The
Adventures of Tom Sawyer,” but that ain’t no matter. That book was made by Mr. Mark
Twain, and he told the truth, mainly. There was things which he stretched, but mainly he
told the truth. That is nothing. I never seen anybody but lied, one time or another, without
it was aunt Polly, or the widow, or maybe Mary. Aunt Polly–Tom’s aunt Polly, she is–and
Mary, and the widow Douglas, is all told about in that book–which is mostly a true book;
with some stretchers, as I said before. (13)
Though Huck doesn’t explicitly state that he will “tell it like it is” or that he sometimes kids
himself, he acknowledges that at least all men, even him, are somewhat unreliable–everyone lies
at one time or another. He, like Katie, establishes a realistic credibility outside of the power of
authorial voice. They are not authorial narrators; they do not have privileged access, but they are
forthright and trustworthy. Of course Huck also undercuts the authority of Tom Sawyer and
Huckleberry Finn’s authorial voice by saying that Twain “told the truth, mainly.” Unlike Katie,
Huck acknowledges the author and the novel’s existence.
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Katie and Huck are also similar in their presentation styles because both express
reluctance to tell parts of their stories. Their hesitance gives a sense of honesty and forthrightness
to their narratives. At the beginning of her fourth chapter Kate says: “Lord, I hate to even tell this
next part, it makes me look like such a fool. Well, I was a fool, I might as well say it” (248). Her
embarrassment about her actions is a very different emotion than what Huck feels before he tells
about the bloody confrontation between the Sheperdsons and Grangerfords, which he claims to
still dream about (134). He begins that episode by saying: “I don’t want to talk much about the
next day. I reckon I’ll cut it pretty short” (132). Though both express reluctance, they both also
tell these uncomfortable portions of their stories, showing admirable forthrightness which
increases the audience’s admiration and trust.
Though Katie Cocker is a storytelling character, her status isn’t initially clear. The reader
has already seen several storytelling characters, several chapters dominated by a downstage
narrator, one chapter of free indirect discourse, and one where a character wrote her own story. It
is not out of the question for the novel’s central character to tell in a different manner than all the
others, so when we begin her section we are not sure how she will tell her story. She could
initially be interpreted as either a private or public narrator.
The entire section is entitled “Katie Cocker Tells it Like It Is.” Two chapters have firstperson pronouns in their titles (“I Have a Baby,” “I Act Like a Fool”), which suggests Katie’s
authorship of them, an authorship reminiscent of 19th century personal narrators. None of the
chapter titles contain the word “talking” which sometimes distinguishes authorial and personal
voices in other parts of the novel, and there is no suggestion that she is writing her account.
There are chapters which present storytelling characters that are not prefaced “talking,” so its
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absence is not sufficient warrant to suggest that Katie is not a storytelling character. Her exact
status is not spelled out initially, but it eventually becomes evident as Katie points to objects that
are part of the storytelling event, for instance “two pictures taken on my wedding day. . . Here we
are with Georgia. Here we are just the two of us, holding hands. We look like children. We were
children” (227). Like Ira Keen and Aunt Rachel, her represented speech includes references to
the context of the storytelling event. Katie is a storytelling character, and we are to fictionalize
ourselves as story listeners.
One of my fundamental arguments is that there is a pervasive authorial presence in this
novel. This presence is not manifested inside every chapter. In some chapters there is an
unmistakable ironic gap between the storytelling character and the authorial presence. The
storytelling characters exist on a different plane from the narrator. I’ve singled out Zinnia and
Johnny as examples, but there are others as well. Other chapters are in the downstage narrative
voice, which is a type of authorial voice where there is no perceptible ironic gap between the
narrator and the author. All of the chapters are arranged, selected and titled by the authorial
presence. This type of presence is felt in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as well, both in the
novel’s prefatory section and in its ironic gaps.
There is an authorial presence, an arranger, in The Devil’s Dream who decides who
speaks and when, and who decides which personal narrators will be followed either by
downstage narrators or by personal narrators who sometimes either confirm or contradict them.
This presence has orchestrated all of the voices in the novel in order to give us clear indicators of
which voices to believe, and to what extent.
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The authorial voice, by entitling the section “Katie Cocker Tells it Like It Is,” has already
informed the reader that Katie is, in fact, telling it like it is. Other tellers were merely “talking”;
Katie is “telling it like it is” and the reader has been conditioned by this time to accept the
author’s judgement in these matters. This authorial endorsement, admittedly not the strongest one
could receive, is not the only evidence that Katie is reliable. The narrator of the initial italicized
section has described her favorably and given a supporting example, telling us that Katie looks
people she is talking to “dead in the eye” (14). Katie, along with being the subject of the
prefatory section, is also given more chapters in which to speak than any other character, and
these chapters are in a later position in the novel which is generally a privileged one. Also, as
Katie tells her story it becomes clear that her experience parallels those of her ancestors, and that
she has gained wisdom by overcoming difficulties that defeated many of her forebearers. As she
said in the novel’s first section, “who we are depends on who we were and who our people were”
(14).
She is like and unlike almost everyone who has preceded her. Her story and her
experiences are like and unlike those of other characters. Johnny’s chapter ends with him
thinking about what will become his comeback hit song (falling upon it in a way similar to how
Katie falls upon her song about him, “Borrowed Time”), and sees “all of Louisiana laid out
before him like the future” (182-83). Katie sees similar hope in the Louisiana landscape: “I was
used to mountains, hemming me in, holding me back. But Louisiana stretched out as far as I
could see” (251). Both were raised in the mountains of Virginia and see Louisiana from a similar
perspective.
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Katie and Johnny’s stories parallel each others in many other ways; Johnny is also similar
to Katie’s second husband, Wayne Ricketts. When Katie reads about Johnny’s death, she sees
one connection between the two: “As I was reading, it occurred to me that Johnny Raines had
just been waiting for that bullet his whole life long. I can’t tell you exactly what I mean by that,
but I know it is so. There’s some men that are born to be killed. Johnny Raines was one and
Wayne Ricketts was another, and every minute they’re alive is borrowed time” (269). Another
interesting parallel exists between Wayne and the man Nonnie Bailey runs off with, Henry Sharp.
Both seduce women, in part, through talking. Henry’s talking is apparently a large part of his
allure: “Nonnie couldn’t get enough of his talking. Those first months, they’d sit up late into the
night in a rented room in whatever town they were in, smoking cigarettes and drinking rye
whiskey and talking, talking, talking” (78). Talking isn’t the only thing alluring about these men,
but it is important. Katie attempts to explain why she allowed Wayne to dominate her: “I see I
have not said too much yet about sex. But sex is a factor here, let me tell you. So is talking. A big
talker who is great at sex can have his way in this world” (254). This passage is interesting, in
part because Katie uses the term “big talker” in reference to Wayne. We encounter that term
earlier in the novel in reference to Henry, but no character calls him a big talker. The chapter that
features Henry and Nonnie’s relationship is entitled “Nonnie and the Big Talker” (62). Wayne
and Harry are both identified as big talkers, but in Harry’s case it is the arranger that helps to
explicitly link the two characters. No one inside the chapter refers to Harry as a big talker. The
parallels between Henry and Wayne are clear. These parallels are established by an authorial
presence that has arranged the novel in such a way as to emphasize the similarities between
individual stories, and uses the same idiomatic terms as Katie.
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Time and again Katie faces the same challenges and experiences as her forebearers.
Sharing the name of the family matriarch, Katie hears a voice at a pivotal moment in her life–as
does Kate Bailey’s son, R.C. Katie, hospitalized for nervous exhaustion, is told she is pregnant
and contemplates an abortion:
So I lay there for a while, and then all of a sudden, the truth came to me. Katie, I heard a
voice as clear as a bell. Katie, sit up. So I sat up. I looked around but nobody was in my
room except my roommates sleeping their drugged sleep. The sun was coming up outside.
Katie Cocker, I heard. I could tell it was a voice from home, from up on Grassy Branch. It
sounded like something like Little Virginia, a woman’s voice, but it was not anybody I
knew. It was a voice I had not heard before, yet it was as familiar to me as my own.
Maybe it was my own, in some crazy way which is past understanding. I listened for
more. Katie, girl, I heard. You can either lay in this bed for the rest of your life, or you
can get up and make something of yourself. It’s up to you. You’ve got some more singing
to do. Get up. (260-61)
Rebecca Smith argues that Katie “is the first character in Smith’s canon to hear the voice of God
as a female voice” (155). Smith is talking specifically about Carole Bliss, who gives Katie
important advice and elicits this thought from her: “If it is possible for God to speak to Paul on
the road to Damascus, it is possible for Him to speak to me in the voice of a crackerjack lesbian
accountant” (301)27. The voice Katie hears in the hospital, however, is also a woman’s, and has
no clear human source. Katie’s is not the first character in this novel to hear a woman’s voice like
this. R.C. finds himself at a crossroads and hears his dead mother’s voice speaking to him, “plain
as that blazing sun.”
‘Go home now, son,’ she told me, and so I did.
I got back to find that Daddy had had a stroke and couldn’t say a thing . . . Durwood and
Lizzie and me figgered out later that Daddy had had the stroke just right about the time
that I had heerd Mamma speaking to me up in West Virginia. Somehow it didn’t surprise
me none to learn this. (88)
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Again the authorial narrator does not overtly endorse a supernatural event but does
present two similar scenes told by characters.
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The repetition of the sunlight motif, and the characters’ prompt and simple obedience to the
commands show that these two are analogous experiences. Katie’s voice told her to sit up, so she
sat up. R.C.’s voice told him to go home, and so he did.
What we see throughout Katie’s section is that her family’s story is her story. She faces
the same conflicts her ancestors have. Conflicts that Fred Chappell summarizes:
The Baileys are a passionate tribe and they have only three things in mind: religion,
music, and sexual love. Their religious faith is strong and usually sustains them, but for
the sake of a man or a woman or for the sake of music they will turn their backs on their
church beliefs and follow the willful ardencies that lead them crazily astray. (942)
Baileys are passionate about all of these things and the conflict between them is only slightly
more complex than Chappell has put it. Religious and secular music and romantic and sexual
love, in and outside of marriage, are all deeply moving experiences. The fact that some of these
experiences are frowned upon by organized religion and sometimes an obstacle to religious
experience, also deeply moving, is the source of almost every conflict in the novel.
What Katie tells us, and what we see, is that Katie has negotiated these conflicts, and
built a life for herself that includes all kinds of music, sexual love and spirituality. Rebecca Smith
writes that, through Katie, Lee Smith “finally has healed the breach of sexuality and spirituality
that the patriarchal religion and culture have prescribed” (173). The author has healed this breach
and the reader is clearly led to this conclusion.
Katie doesn’t have the last word in the novel; the narrator does. In the last full chapter,
Katie tells how Carole Bliss, the crackerjack lesbian accountant, suggested that Katie produce her
own album of traditional songs. This is where her story catches up to the novel’s present. Katie
says to her undramatized story listener, who we learn is on her bus with her, “So we are going
ahead with it . . . right now it’s two a.m., the middle of the night, and I can’t sleep a wink
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thinking about this album” (301). She now speaks in the present and even the future tense. Her
chapter ends with her looking forward to a bright future which includes family, spirituality and
sexual love. It also includes recording an album with her family entitled “Shall We Gather at the
River,” which is also the title of the italicized sections which bookend the novel. The first
italicized section is narrated by an unnamed bystander. The final section is told by a downstage
narrator. Instead of ending as it began, with an unnamed bystanding character narrating, the novel
ends with a voice that enjoys the superhuman privileges of an omniscient narrator.
Both sections are in the present tense (in effect the entire novel has been a flashback) and
quickly establish the setting: It’s Christmastime at the Opryland Hotel, and you never saw
anything like it!” (11). This is almost indistinguishable from the beginning of the finale: The
Opryland Hotel has got a lobby as long as a football field. Right now at Christmastime this
lobby is decorated from top to bottom” (303). In the second paragraph, however, we see this is
not the bystander who spoke in the first section; this is an omniscient narrator who gives us the
thoughts of several characters, beginning with Homer Oslow, who, we are told, would never
admit “out loud” that he is happy to have the help of the “slick little boys from the RCA record
company” (303). This narrator brings the novel to a close, telling us the thoughts and feelings of
several characters and transporting us temporarily to Grassy Branch: “Carole Bliss’s walkietalkie crackles smartly as she leads them around the corner at exactly the moment when R.C., in
the barn at Grassy Branch, puts the barrel of his rifle in his mouth” (309). The novel brings all
of the storylines to closure. At the conclusion of a dialogical novel “nothing conclusive has yet
taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been
spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and always will be in the
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future” (Bakhtin 166). At the conclusion of The Devil’s Dream, on the other hand, R.C. shoots
himself while the rest of the family is gathered together to cut a record which will reflect their
family heritage. “After they make this album, after a decent length of time has gone by to mark
R.C.’s passing, Little Virginia and Homer will decide to go along with Gladys and Tammy’s idea
of opening up the barn to the general public” (310). The world of The Devil’s Dream is closed.
The past will soon be recorded–finalized–and the future is confidently predicted, not by any
character, but instead from a plane inaccessible to the characters.
It is interesting that Smith would choose to wield the kind of authority she exhibits in The
Devil’s Dream. In an interview she gave while she was writing the novel she said, “another thing
that fascinates me about the notion of oral history is that I think it is an oxymoron: if it is spoken
it is not history, if it is spoken it is automatically the storyteller’s tale . . . you can ask a whole
bunch of people the same thing and get six different descriptions” (Herion-Sarafidis 95-96). In
The Devil’s Dream there are different versions of some events, but these differences are always
clearly resolved. Why would someone not only aware of how problematic oral history is, but
indeed interested in the problem, finalize these narratives? One answer lies in her audience’s
response to her earlier novels.
In an interview with Rebecca Smith, Lee Smith discusses a problem that arose with
interpretations of her novel Family Linen. The interviewer suggests that one of the pivotal events
of the book, Fay’s murder of Jewel (which is not narrated), may be considered open to
interpretation, that “perhaps we’re not supposed to believe Fay’s or even Nettie’s narrative, since
one point of the book is that the truth is very elusive.” Smith’s reply is to the point -“Well, Fay
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did kill him” (25). In this interview she exerts her authority. As the author, as the creator of the
fiction, she unequivocally states this.
It is understandable that some readers of Family Linen would find this fact elusive. There
are two key passages which reveal Fay as the killer. First, late in the novel, there is an italicized
section that gives the reader Fay’s psychic voice. It is disjointed stream of consciousness which
reveals that Fay was angry about someone, who we easily infer is Jewel: “He meant to go without
me, I saw him trying to leave. He tried to sneak out in the storm in the night with Elizabeth
[Jewel’s wife] sound asleep” (207). The narrator shows us Fay laying down in the back of a car
during the summer which leads to her death, and it is made very clear that she does so because
the body of the long dead Jewel is about to be found. One reason people might doubt she is the
killer is that she is clearly deeply disturbed, so even her psychic voice isn’t necessarily reliable.
Also, she could certainly have known where the body was even if she wasn’t the killer. Even if
she is somehow reliable, she never admits to killing or even attacking Jewel, though she clearly
knows where Jewel is buried, and had a justifiable animosity towards him.
Two chapters later, a downstage narrator dramatizes Nettie’s realization that Fay is the
killer. Nettie is probably the only person still living who knows of Jewel’s abuse of Fay. After
reflecting on Fay’s death, Nettie makes an intuitive leap to solve the mystery:
‘She must of done it then, Fay. Why sure. She done it all along, and to think I never knew
it, all these years.’ So the mystery is solved, but it’s more of a mystery than ever. Because
Nettie won’t say any more, or explain it, not even when they sit her down at the kitchen
table with iced tea. Nettie says, ‘She didn’t know it either. I mean Elizabeth.’ And that’s
all. That’s all they’ll ever know. (255)
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Smith’s narrator does say: “the mystery is solved,” but she also leaves a great deal unsaid. One
can certainly understand how some people could miss these indicators or consider them
inconclusive.
Smith goes on in the interview to tell about how Lee Yopp was writing a play based on
Family Linen [which ran Sept. 26-9, 1991]:
he [Yopp] didn’t get the point about Fay. And then he wanted to leave it ambiguous, and I
told him I really didn’t want to leave it ambiguous. I wanted to leave a lot of ambiguity-- I
wrote that book right after I wrote Oral History, and I had been doing a lot of oral
histories with my family and people up in the mountains, and I had come to the firm
conclusion that there is no such thing as history. That it is only who tells the story. And I
kind of wanted to reflect that point that the past can never be exactly known. But I clearly
made it a little too ambiguous. (Rebecca Smith “Conversation” 25)28
The Devil’s Dream is less ambiguous. The ambiguity that Smith is striving for may be the same
kind of indeterminancy that Bakhtin attributes to the dialogical novel. The truth that Ira Keen, for
example, arrives at is the truth as he sees it, one that cannot answer all of the reader’s questions.
He tries to explain the lives of Kate and Moses Bailey with the information he has, which is
naturally limited. In one key scene, Keen admits his inability to understand why Moses would
react as he did.
Now who knows what went on in Moses’ head whilst he stood there a listening?
Who can say what drives a man to do the things he does? Fer what Moses done
was awful. He come busting outen them woods like God Hisself, a-hollering,
snatched that fiddle and broke it over the porch rail, then beat all of them . . . At
the last he throwed hisself down on the floor and cried like a baby the rest of the
whole night long, or so Kate told it to Mamma. (29)

28

Of course, Smith is writing in a historical moment where readers often embrace and
seek both ambiguity and indeterminancy. This is a significant contrast between one of the several
initial reviews that damned Absalom, Absalom! for its ambiguity. “If in the great show-down of
years,” Max Miller of the San Diego Union writes “Absalom, Absalom! does prove to be a great
book then the joke is on me. But I have yet to know a great book which was built exclusively on
tricky confusion” (qtd. in Bassett 101-4).
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This is the kind of ambiguity that Smith wants to show–our inability to say why exactly a man
would do something that awful. As Brooks said of Absalom, Absalom! there is uncertainty
concerning “matters of motivation and ultimate purpose that are involved in the mystery of the
human spirit itself” (302). What Smith wants to keep clear is the fact that the awful event
occurred. There were events that occurred in the past that have been chronicled and can be
established as fact, but why these things happened, the truth behind them, is not something Ira
can know. Ira’s knowledge of events and the oral tradition is similar to Miss Rosa’s or Mr
Compson’s, and he is equally unable to explain. There are two kinds of truth personal narrators
can give us. The first is the character’s interpretations and opinions. The second is the simple
facts about individual events. Though storytelling characters often hold opinions and
interpretations of events which vary from narrators or other characters, it is problematic to allow
a novel’s character to misstate facts without giving the reader evidence that character is lying. It
is of limited usefulness to present a character who lies to the audience and is not somehow
refuted. If we don’t know a character is lying, what exactly is the point of the lie? As slanted as
Rosa and Zinnia are, by literary convention, indeed necessity, we assume unless it is otherwise
indicated that the information they give us is on some basic level correct. We have no reason to
believe that any of the factual claims storytelling characters make in either The Devil’s Dream or
Absalom, Absalom! are incorrect.29 Their speculations and opinions may be skewed or downright

29

Again, some exceptions exist, but we know they exist because we are pointed to them.
Shreve changes the story, but he says he’s changing the story–his changing of the story is clearly
marked in the text. Zinnia says that Nonnie killed Momma, but we learn that her mother died
during childbirth. The indeterminancy of Ryunsuke Akutagawa’s “In a Grove” is the kind of
exception that proves the rule. The author arranges the conflicting testimonies in such a way as to
show us that they are in conflict, that some, and perhaps all, are not merely biased but false.
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wrong, but they give us the basic facts correctly, or we are shown where they err. Any other state
would be incomprehensible. This is true for both personal narrators and storytelling characters;
unless it is otherwise indicated in the text, both are reliable in terms of facts. The unmarked case
is for them to be both relatively and predictably honest and accurate.
But there is more authorial control in The Devil’s Dream than just insurance that basic
facts can be confirmed. We are shown and assured that Katie has transcended the family
narrative and closed the rift between the secular and the sacred. Though Smith shows
ambiguity–more precisely uncertainty, she also shows us exactly why some characters do the
things they do and she has presented her judgment of these characters, both through evaluative
comments and through the arrangement of sometimes conflicting testimonies. She has allowed
characters to speak for themselves, but these voices have been arranged in a way that leads us to
see Katie’s narrative in a particular context. The narrator of The Devil’s Dream does not seem to
seek authority outside of the novel’s discourse, instead she seeks to give Katie that authority. She
gives Katie’s evaluations, her extrarepresentational acts, discursive authority. Katie is, in a way,
the single consciousness which absorbs the other consciousnesses as objects into herself. She is
the sum of the family narrative, but she is authorized by a voice that exists on a higher plane. All
of the other voices are also organized and evaluated by a presence entirely above them. The novel
arrives at the truth of Katie’s consciousness, but there is an authorial voice that assures us that it
is the truth.
This authorial presence does not use a voice that is recognizable as authorial. Instead this
narrator exercises the super human privileges of authorial voice while using the discourse of the
characters. The downstage narrative voice is an attempt to give authorial privilege to a narrator
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whose discourse does not conform to the standards of the dominant discourse. Smith writes about
her use of this kind of voice:
I can’t say whether it’s good or bad that I have fallen upon this kind of an intrusive,
down-home narrative voice. I don’t even know that it works. But it has made it possible
for me to write about what I want to write about right now–the people I’m interested in,
their lives and times. (100)
One of the things Smith wanted to write about was the power of oral storytelling. Whether Smith
succeeds or not, she tries to represent oral discourse in a written medium without the storytelling
characters’ voices being automatically “secondary, indulged and condescended to by the reader
who shares (as an audience shares the mimic’s knowledge) the author’s power over all the
voices” (Ross 108). She adopted the downstage narrative voice for reasons similar to Twain’s
decision to make Huck the narrator of his own story: “if I tell a boy’s story, or anybody else’s,”
he wrote, “it is never worth printing, it comes from the head and not from the heart, and always
goes into the wastebasket. To be successful and worth printing, the imagined boy would have to
tell his story himself and let me act merely as his amanuensis” (Qtd in Knoper 94). They are
different techniques, but both are attempts at giving speaking voices the ability to speak for
themselves without their level of their discourse, in relation to the authorial voice, determining
their authority.
Ross argues that mimetic voice is structurally, necessarily, secondary to authorial voice.
Because the authorial presence in the novel is a written one, all spoken voices are secondary at
best. Whether or not it is necessarily the case, it is generally held to be so, and it is certainly
reasonable to believe that the written presence would be the primary one in a written medium.
The three authors studied here have struggled with this speakerly paradox. In their fiction, Twain,
Faulkner and Smith all try to make the mimetic voices they present not necessarily
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secondary–they try to allow them to be judged by criteria other than their structural position in
the novel or how their language compares to the conventional voices of authority. As I have
shown, the three novelists have all tried to imbue the spoken voices with authority at least equal
to the written. Twain removed the primary authorial voice–first halfway through “A True Story”
and then almost immediately from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. He hoped that the
removal of the authoritative presence would allow the speaking voices to take a position free of
authorial evaluation, and then they could perhaps speak for themselves, even if the message they
transmit demonstrates the power of the dominant discourse over them. In Absalom, Absalom!
Faulkner has his storytelling characters use the same discourse style as the narrator, and has his
narrator deny authority he conventionally would hold, bringing the notion of narrative authority
into question, problematizing all of the versions presented. Smith, during a historical moment
where readers are accustomed to and even seek indeterminacy, creates an omniscient narrator
who uses the same discourse as her character’s while retaining and asserting the superhuman
privileges of authorial voice.
The similarity in all three cases is that the discourse that a particular voice uses is not the
measuring stick for discursive authority. In “A True Story,” and perhaps even in “The Jumping
Frog,” the genteel narrator has less wisdom than the vernacular character. In The Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn some characters who speak in higher and lower discourses than Huck have
varying degrees of wisdom and honor. No one is more honorable than Huck, who believes
society’s assessment of him as low down. In Absalom, Absalom! almost every voice, including
the narrator, speaks in a similar manner, so the type of discourse is no indicator of authority, nor
is the structural position of the narrator as presenter and creator of the fictive world. In The
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Devil’s Dream the level of discourse is again no indicator of reliability but the structural position
and omniscience of the primary narrative voice lends it authority.
Attempting to have storytellers or any mimetic voices taken seriously does not necessarily
require that they have authority equal to that of the narrator. They need not be better or smarter
than the written voice. As Lanser argues is the case with all personal voice, and as is the case
with all actual storytellers, storytelling characters must create their own authority through the act
of narration. By the same token, these authors would have omniscient narrators have [earn]
authority because of their status as creators of the fictive world and their demonstrable wisdom,
and not because of their use of the dominant discourse.
If Absalom, Absalom! is about Sutpen, then it may be a dialogic novel. No one voice is
privileged over any other. Ross argues, however, that “transcribed speech, the product of
mimicry, always occupies an inferior position in relation to the diegetic discourse of its
production. The mimetic voices we hear are always secondary, indulged and condescended to”
(108). There may be no way to overcome the structural hierarchy inherent in all storytelling. The
first layer, the diegesis, may be first, and all others are secondary. Faulkner tries, however, to
level the dialogical playing field for his characters. He creates a number of communal voices
which appear equally authoritative. If Absalom, Absalom! is a dialogical novel–if a dialogical
novel is truly possible–we see the great lengths an authorial narrator must go to in order to
relinquish his conventional semantic authority and to build authority for his characters–to show
the “phase of truth” they saw without exerting the authority narrators have by literary convention.
Faulkner tried to present thinking human consciousnesses thinking and speaking for themselves.

238

WORKS CITED
Anderson, Frederick, Michael B. Frank, and Kenneth M. Sanderson, eds. Mark Twain's
Notebooks and Journals. Volume I. Berkeley: U of California P, 1975.
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Theory and History of Literature, Volume 8.
Ed. and Trans. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
—. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and
Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981.
Bassett, John. William Faulkner: An Annotated Checklist of Criticism. New York: David
Lewis, 1972.
Belcher, Steven. “Framed Tales in the Oral Tradition: An Exploration.” Fabula 35 (1994): 1-19.
Bellah, Robert et al. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life.
Updated Edition with a New Introduction. Berkeley: U of California P, 1996.
Benjamin, Walter. “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov.” Illuminations.
Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. London: Jonathan Cape, 1970. 83-109.
Blair, Walter. Native American Humor (1800-1900). New York: American Book Company,
1937.
Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing.
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991.
Booth, Wayne. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1961.
Bowdre, Paul Hull, Jr. A Study of Eye Dialect. Dissertation University of Florida, April 1964.
University Microfilms. Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1970.
Branch, Edgar M. “‘My Voice is Still for Setchell’: A Background Study of ‘Jim Smiley and His
Jumping Frog’”PMLA 82 (Dec 1967): 591-601.
Bridgman, Richard. The Colloquial Style in America. New York: Oxford UP, 1966.
Brooks, Cleanth. William Faulkner: Toward Yoknapatawpha and Beyond. New Haven: Yale UP,
1990.
Brownlee, Kevin. “Introduction.” Discourses of Authority in Medieval and Renaissance
Literature. Kevin Brownlee and Walter Stephens, eds. Hanover, NH: Published for
Dartmouth College by UP of New England, c1989.
239

Burrison, John A. "The Golden Arm": The Folk Tale and Its Literary Use by Mark Twain and
Joel C. Harris. Atlanta: Georgia State UP, 1968.
Carkeet, David. “The Dialects in Huckleberry Finn.” American Literature 51 (November 1979):
315-32.
Chappell, Fred. “The Devil’s Dream.” (Book Reviews) The Southern Review 28.4 (1992): 93744.
Chaucer, Geoffrey. The Canterbury Tales. 1387-1394. Electronic Text Center, University of
Virginia Lib., 1995. 21 March, 200. <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/mideng.browse.html>.
Childers, Joseph and Gary Hentzi, eds. The Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literary and
Cultural Criticism. New York: Columbia UP, 1995.
Clanchy, M.T. From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307. Second Edition. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993.
Claxton, Simon. “Interview.” Lion in the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner, 1926-1962.
James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate, eds. New York: Random House, 1968.
Cooley, Thomas ed. Adventures of Huckleberry Finn: An Authoritative Text, Contexts and
Sources, Criticism. A Norton Critical Edition: Third Edition. New York: Norton, 1999.
Cox, James M. Mark Twain: The Fate of Humor. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1966.
Cronon, William. “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative.” The Journal of American
History (March 1992): 1347-76.
Cuff, Roger Penn. “Mark Twain’s Use of California Folklore in His Jumping Frog Story”
Journal of American Folklore 65 (1952): 155-58.
DeVoto, Bernard. Mark Twain’s America. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1932.
Donnelly, Colleen E. “Compelled to Believe: Historiography and Truth in Absalom, Absalom!”
Style 25:1 (Spring 1991): 104-21.
Dyson-Hudson, Neville. “The Need for an Audience: A Response to Dennis Tedlock.”
Boundary 2: A Journal of Postmodern Literature and Culture. 8.1 (1979): 335-8.
Egan, Philip J. “Embedded Story Structures in Absalom, Absalom!” American Literature. 55.2
(1983): 199-214.

240

Faulkner, William. Absalom, Absalom: The Corrected Text. New York: Vintage International,
c1986 (1936).
—. The Sound and the Fury: An Authoritative Text Backgrounds and Criticism. Second Edition.
David Minter, ed. Norton: New York, c1994. (1929).
Fishkin, Shelley Fisher. Was Huck Black? Mark Twain and African-American Voices. New
York: Oxford UP, 1993.
Gates, Henry Louis Jr. The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism.
New York: Oxford UP, 1989.
Genette, Gerard. Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method. Jane E. Lewin, Trans. Ithaca:
Cornell UP, 1980.
Georges, Robert A. “Communicative Role and Social Identity in Storytelling.” Fabula 31.1-2
(1990): 49-57.
—. “Do Narrators Really Digress? A Reconsideration of 'Audience Asides' in Narrating.”
Western Folklore 40:3 (1981): 245-252.
—. “Toward an Understanding of Storytelling Events.” Journal of American Folklore 82 (1969):
313-28.
Gittes, Katharine Slater. “The Canterbury Tales and the Arabic Frame Tradition.” PMLA 98
(1983): 237-51.
Gray, Richard. Writing the South: Ideas of an American Region. With a New Afterword. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1997.
Gwynn, Fredrick L., and Joseph L. Blotner, eds. Faulkner in the University. Charlottesville: UP
of Virginia, 1995.
Harris, George Washington. Sut Lovingood: Yarns Spun By a Nat’ral Born Durn’d Fool Warped
and Wove for Public Wear. 1867. Electronic Edition. Academic Affairs Lib., U of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1997. 15 Feb. 2002 <http://docsouth.unc.edu>.
Havelock, Eric. Preface to Plato. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap P, 1963.
Hayman, David. Ulysses: The Mechanics of Meaning. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1982.
Hemingway, Ernest. Green Hills of Africa. New York: Scribner’s, 1935.
Herion-Sarafidis, Elisabeth. “Interview with Lee Smith.” Tate, 92-103.
241

Hill, Dorothy Combs. Lee Smith. New York: Twayne Publishers. 1992.
Howells, William Dean. My Mark Twain: Reminiscences and Criticisms. Marilyn Austin
Baldwin, ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 1967.
Irwin, Bonnie. “What’s in a Frame? The Medieval Textualization of Traditional Storytelling.”
Oral Tradition 10.1 (1995): 27-53.
Ives, Summer. “A Theory of Literary Dialect.” Tulane Studies in English 2 (1950): 137-82.
Johnstone, Barbara. Stories, Community, and Place: Narratives from Middle America. Indiana
UP: Bloomington, 1990.
Kibler, James E. Jr. “Introduction.” Longstreet, vii-xxiv.
Knoper, Randall K. Acting Naturally: Mark Twain in the Culture of Performance. Berkeley: U of
California P, 1995.
Krause, Sydney J. “Twain’s Method and Theory of Composition.” Modern Philology Feb 1959,
167-177.
Kroeber, Karl. Telling and Retelling: The Fate of Storytelling in Modern Times. New Brunswick:
Rutgers UP, 1992.
Lanser, Susan. Fictions of Authority: Women Writers and Narrative Voice. Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1992.
Levins, Lynn G. “The Four Narrative Perspectives in Absalom, Absalom!” PMLA 85 (1970): 3547.
Lindahl, Carl. Earnest Games: Folkloric Patterns in the Canterbury Tales. Bloomington: Indiana
UP, 1987.
Longstreet, Augustus Baldwin. Georgia Scenes. Southern Classics Series, M.E. Bradford, Series
Editor. J.S. Sanders: Nashville, 1992.
Lorch, Fred W. The Trouble Begins at Eight: Mark Twain’s Lecture Tours. Ames: Iowa State
UP, 1966.
Lord, Albert B. The Singer of Tales. Cambridge, Mass; Harvard UP, 1960.
Lowry, Richard S. “Littery Man”: Mark Twain and Modern Authorship. New York: Oxford UP,
1996.

242

Lynn, Kenneth S. Mark Twain and Southwestern Humor. Boston: Atlantic Monthly-Little,
Brown. 1959.
Lyotard, Jean-Francis. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Theory and History
of Literature, Volume 8. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota P, 1984.
Marx, Leo. “Mr. Eliot, Mr. Trilling, and Huckleberry Finn.” The Adventures of Huckleberry
Finn: A Case Study in Critical Controversy. Gerald Graff and James Phelan, eds. Boston:
St. Martin's, 1995. 290-305.
Matlack, James H. “The Voices of Time: Narrative Structure in Absalom, Absalom!” Southern
Review 15 (1979): 333-354.
McClary. Ben Harris. “George Washington Harris’s ‘Special Vision’: His Yarns as Historical
Sourcebook.” No Fairer Land: Studies in Southern Literature before 1900. J. Lasley
Dameron and James W. Matthews, eds. Troy NY: Whitston, 1986. 226-241.
Messent, Peter B. The Short Works of Mark Twain: A Critical Study. Philadelphia: U of
Pennsylvania P, c2001.
Minter, David. William Faulkner: His Life and Work. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1980.
Ong, Walter J. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen, 1982.
—. “The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction.” PMLA 90 (1975): 9-21.
Parrish, Nancy. Lee Smith, Annie Dillard, and the Hollins Group: A Genesis of Writers. Southern
Literary Studies, Fred Hobson, ed. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State UP, 1998.
Pattison, Robert. On Literacy: The Politics of the Word from Homer to the Age of Rock. New
York: Oxford UP, 1982.
Pease, Donald E. “Author.” Critical Terms for Literary Study. Second Edition. Frank Lentricchia
and Thomas McLaughlin, eds. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995. 105-120.
Poirer, Richard. “‘Strange Gods’ in Jefferson, Mississippi: Analysis of Absalom, Absalom!”
William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! Ed. Elisabeth Muhlenfield. New York: Garland.
1-22.
Pratt, Mary Louise. Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse. Bloomington: Indiana
UP, 1977.

243

Prajznerova, Katerina. Cultural Intermarriage in Southern Appalachia: Cherokee Elements in
Four Selected Novels. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Prince, Gerald. A Dictionary of Narratology. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1987.
Quirk, Tom. Coming to Grips with Huck Finn: Essays on a Book, a Boy, and a Man. Columbia:
U of Missouri P, 1999.
Radloff, Bernard. “Absalom, Absalom!: An Ontological Approach to Sutpen's ‘Design.’” Mosaic:
A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature 19.1 (1986): 45-56.
Riessman, Catherine Kohler. Narrative Analysis. Qualitative Research Methods, Volume 30.
Newbury Park: Sage, 1993.
Robinson, Forrest G. In Bad Faith: The Dynamics of Deception in Mark Twain’s America.
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986.
Rosenberg, Bruce. Folklore and Literature: Rival Siblings. Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1991.
Ross, Stephen M. Fiction’s Inexhaustible Voice: Speech and Writing in Faulkner. Athens: U of
Georgia P, 1989.
Rubin, Louis D. “William Faulkner: Why the Very Idea!” Faulkner and Ideology: Faulkner and
Yoknapatawpha, 1992. Donald M. Kartiganer and Ann J. Abadie eds. Jackson: U of
Mississippi P, 1995. 329-352.
Ruppersberg, Hugh. Voice and Eye in Faulkner’s Fiction. Athens: U of Georgia P, 1983.
Sample, Tex. Ministry in an Oral Culture: Living with Will Rogers, Uncle Remus, and
Minnie Pearl. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster- John Knox, 1994.
Santayana, George. “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy.” George Santayana:
Volume VII. New York: Scribner’s, 1937. 127-150.
Schank, Roger C. Tell Me a Story: Narrative and Intelligence. Rethinking Theory. Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1990.
Scherer, Olga. “A Dialogic Hereafter: The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom!”
Southern Literature and Literary Theory. Ed. Jefferson Humphries. Athens: U of Georgia
P, 1990. 300-17.
Schmitz, Neil. Of Huck and Alice: Humorous Writing in American Literature. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota P, 1983.

244

—. “Mark Twain’s Civil War: Humor’s Reconstructive Writing.” The Cambridge Companion to
Mark Twain. Forrest G. Robinson ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995. 74-92.
Schoenberg, Ellen. Old Tales and Talking: Quentin Compson in William Faulkner's Absalom,
Absalom! and Related Works. Jackson: UP of Mississippi, 1977.
Scholes, Robert and Robert Kellogg. The Nature of Narrative. London: Oxford UP, 1968.
Smith, Henry Nash. Mark Twain: The Development of a Writer. New York: Atheneum, 1962.
—, and William M. Gibson eds. Mark Twain-Howells Letters; The Correspondence of Samuel
L. Clemens and William D. Howells, 1872-1910. Cambridge: Belknap P of Harvard UP,
1960.
Smith, Lee. The Devil’s Dream. New York: Ballantine, 1992.
—. Family Linen. New York: Ballantine, 1985.
—. “The Voice behind the Story.” Voicelust: Eight Contemporary Fiction Writers on Style. Allen
Wier and Don Hendrie Jr., eds. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1985. 93-100.
—. “Introduction: A Familiarity with Lightning.” Mark Twain’s Sketches, New and Old. The
Oxford Mark Twain, Shelley Fisher Fishkin, ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. xxxi-xliii.
Smith, Rebecca. Gender Dynamics in the Fiction of Lee Smith: Examining Language and
Narrative Strategies. San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1997.
—. “Conversation with Lee Smith.” Southern Quarterly 32.2 (1994): 19-29.
Sobol, Joseph D. “Innervision and Innertext: Oral and Interpretive Modes of Storytelling
Performance.” Oral Tradition 7.1 (1992): 66-86.
Tate, Allen. “A Southern Mode of Imagination.” Essays of Four Decades. (1968). Wilmington,
DE: ISI, 1999. 577-92.
Tate, Linda, ed. Conversations with Lee Smith. Literary Conversations Series, Peggy Whitman
Prenshaw, General Editor. Jackson: U of Mississippi P, 2001.
Tebbetts, Terrell L. “Ogre and Pigmies: Sutpen's Stature in Absalom, Absalom!” New Orleans
Review 14.4 (1987): 15-23.
Thompson, Stith. The Folktale. New York: The Dryden Press, 1946.

245

Tobin, Patricia. “The Time of Myth and History in Absalom, Absalom!” American Literature 45
(1973): 252-270.
Twain, Mark. “A Deception.” The Complete Humorous Sketches and Tales of Mark Twain
Charles Neider, ed. Garden City: Hanover House, 1961. 207-08.
—. The Adventures of Tom Sawyer. Minneapolis: B. Dalton, (1876) 1986.
—. “First Interview with Artemus Ward” Sketches, New and Old. New York: Oxford UP, 1996.
286-91.
—. “How the Author Was Sold in Newark.” The Complete Humorous Sketches and Tales of
Mark Twain. Charles Neider, ed. Garden City: Hanover House, 1961. 217-18.
—.“How to Tell a Story.” The $30,000 Bequest and Other Stories. New York: P.F. Collier,
(1872) 1917. 263-70.
—. Mark Twain’s Own Autobiography: The Chapters From the North American Review.
Michael, J. Kiskis, ed. Madison: U of Wisconsin P. 1990.
—. “Private History of the ‘Jumping Frog” Story.” The Complete Humorous Sketches and Tales
of Mark Twain. Charles Neider, ed. Garden City: Hanover House, 1961. 623-30.
—.“A True Story Repeated Word for Word as I Heard It.” Sketches, New and Old. New York:
Oxford UP, 1996. 202-07.
Weimann, Robert. “Memory, Fictionality, and the Issue of Authority: Author-Function and
Narrative Performance in Beowulf, Chrétien and Malory.” Roy Eriksen (ed.). Contexts of
Pre-Novel Narrative: The European Tradition. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994.
Williams, George III. Mark Twain and the Jumping Frog of Calaveras County: How Mark
Twain’s Humorous Frog Story Launched his Legendary Career. Carson City: Tree By
The River, 1999.
Wilson, James D. A Reader’s Guide to the Short Stories of Mark Twain. Boston: G.K. Hall,
1987.
Wohnam, Henry. Mark Twain and the Art of the Tall Tale. New York: Oxford UP,
Xiao, Minghan. “The Fundamental Unfinalizability of Absalom, Absalom!” New Orleans
Review 18.3 (1991): 34-47.

246

VITA
Kenneth Broyles was raised in Springfield, Virginia. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree in
English literature from George Mason University and a Master’s in English from the University
of Richmond. He then traveled to Louisiana, where the leaves stay on the trees year round, to
earn his doctorate. Throughout his college career he played ultimate frisbee competitively, and
occasionally played guitar. He currently resides in his native Virginia and enjoys seeing the
leaves change colors in the fall but isn’t entirely happy with how cold it gets.

247

